On 28 Dec 2013, at 00:20, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 6:03 PM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
On 28 December 2013 11:55, Stephen Paul King <[email protected]
> wrote:
Hi LizR,
That is what is not explicitly explained! I could see how one
might make an argument based on Godel numbers and a choice of a
numbering scheme could show the existence of a string of numbers
that, if run on some computer, would generate a description of the
interaction of several actors. But this ignores the problems of
concurrency and "point of view". The best one might be able to do,
AFAIK, is cook up a description of the interactions of many
"observers" -each one is an intersection of infinitely many
computations, but such a description would itself be the content of
some observer's point of view that assumes a choice of Godel
numbering scheme.
Something doesn't seem right about this!
It seems to suggest "multi-solipsism" or something along those lines
- which doesn't make it wrong, of course.
I await Bruno's answer with interest. I think he has already said
something about this, but I don't recall it being satisfactory, at
least to my limited understanding.
I am also interested to hear what Bruno has to say.
I should have read this before answering. Hope you are not too much
disappointed :)
My perspective is that most of the computations that support you and
I are not isolated and short-lived "computational Boltzmann brains"
but much larger, long-running computations such as those that
correspond to a universe in which life adapts and evolves.
Yes. I suspect both deep (in Bennett sense) computations, + the
physical symmetrical and linear core. This would makes us both
relatively very numerous in our type of reality, and relatively very
rare at some other level. I suspect also the FPI relative random
oracles to play some role in the "continuous" self-multiplication. But
this is speculation, and should be derived from self-reference alone,
to keep intact the exploitation of the G* minus G difference, on the
intensional variants, to have the qualia and their non communicable
feature.
The starting conditions for these is much less constrained, and
therefore it is far more probable to result in conscious
computations such as ours than the case where the computation
supporting your brain experiencing this moment is some initial
condition of a very specific program. Certainly, those programs
exist too, but they are much rarer. They appear in the UD much less
frequently than say the program corresponding to the approximate
laws of physics of this universe. It takes far more data to
describe your brain than it does to describe the physical system on
which it is based.
That is right. I think it is the correct intuition, but unfortunately,
we cannot use it per se, we have to derive it from the math to be able
to exploit the whole "theology" of the numbers. Universal system like
the braids group, or the unitary group, might solve this, but we
cannot use them directly, we have to derived them from the comp mind-
body constraints.
So we are (mostly) still "in the same universe", and so we can
interact with and affect the consciousness of other people.
Hopefully. The existence of 3 different sort of physical realities
seems to give sense to a pretension of salvia (i), which is that a
form of plural first person reality might still exists "near and after
clinical death". this is not obvious. A priori, with comp, we might
surivive in solipsist state, but apparently, there are entities with
which we can communicate. In fact our own consciousness here and now,
seems to involve many internal dialog and interaction.
Note that no Boltzman brain can ever implement a UD, nor even
arbitrary part of UD*, which involves very long and stable
computations. Eventually the "simple" but global and complete
arithmetical reality is a very highly structured reality.
Bruno
Jason
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