On 28 Dec 2013, at 17:16, Stephen Paul King wrote:

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Dear Bruno,On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 4:54 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 27 Dec 2013, at 17:51, Stephen Paul King wrote:Dear Bruno,On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:11 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 25 Dec 2013, at 18:40, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:Are we not presuming, structure, or a-priori, existence ofsomething, doing this processing, this work?In the UDA we assume a "Turing universal", or "sigma_1-complete"physical reality, in some local sense.Could this "Turing universal/sigma_1-complete in a local sense" bethe exact criteria required to define the observations 3-experiences of individuals or is it the 1-experiences ofindividuals (observers) in keeping with the definition of anobserver as the intersection of infinitely many computations?I think the UDA answers this question. You need Turing universality,but also the FPI, which in some sense comes from mechanism, but notnecessarily "universality", which has, here, only an indirectrelevance in the definition of what is a computation in arithmetic.I suspect that the FPI results from the "underlap" or failure toreach exact overlap between observers. As if a small part of thecomputations that are observers is not universal. This wouldeffectively induce FPI as any one observer would be forever unableto exactly match its experience of "being in the world" with that ofanother.

<,

We need this to just explain what is a computer, alias, universalmachine, alias universal number (implemented or not in a physicalreality).Note that we do not assume a *primitive physical reality*. In comp,we are a priori agnostic on this. The UDA, still will explains thatsuch "primitiveness" cannot solve the mind-body problem when madeinto a dogma/assumption-of-primitiveness.It has always seemed to me that UDA cannot solve the mind-bodyproblem strictly because it cannot comprehend the existence of"other minds".UDA formulates the problem, and show how big the mind-body problemis, even before tackling the "other minds" problem. But something issaid. In fact it is easy to derive from the UDA the followingassertions:comp + explicit non-solipsism entails sharable many words or a corelinear physical reality.I do not comprehend this. It is easy for us to "see" that solipsismis false,

?

but how can a computation "see" anything? I do not understand how itis that you can claim that computations will not be solipsistic bydefault.

`The 1p is solipsist, but not in a public way, just in the trivial way`

`that nobody can see that solipsism is false, as the dream argument`

`justifies. Solipsism is irrefutable, and hopefully false.`

`Now, if you remember the definition of first person plural (which is`

`just when different people enter the same annihilation-reconstitution`

`box), if we add non solipsism, it means that when machine interact,`

`they share the computations. So, the only way to avoid solipsism in`

`comp, is that the measure is sharable by interacting machine, and so`

`they have to live in a quantum-lile many worlds.`

But comp in fact has to justify the non-solipsism, and this is begunthrough the nuance Bp & p versus Bp & Dt. Normally the linearityshould allow the first person plural in the "& Dt" nuance case.Exactly! I am looking forward to the explanation of this " nuance Bp& p versus Bp & Dt". :-Keep in mind that UDA does not solve the problem, but formulate it.AUDA go more deep in a solution, and the shape of that solution(like UDA actually) provides already information contradicting theAristotelian theology (used by atheists and the main part ofinstitutionalized abramanic religion).Sure. My main worry is that your wonderful result obtains at toohigh a price: the inability to even model interactions and time.

`If you show that, you extend the UDA in a full proof refutation of`

`comp. Good luck!`

`I thought this would be easy, but the simplicity of this is`

`counterbalanced by the self-referential constraints. On p-sigma_1, we`

`get already three arithmetical (quantum) quantizations.`

`Keep in mind that I offer a problem, not a solution (although I offer`

`a path toward it, and some shaping of the possible solutions, notably`

`that they belong to (neo)platonism and refute Aristotle).`

Bruno

BrunoThen in AUDA, keeping comp at the meta-level, I eliminate allassumptions above very elementary arithmetic (Robinson Arithmetic).The little and big bangs, including the taxes, and why it hurts isderived from basically justKxy = x Sxyz = xz(yz) or just x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + xhttp://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic inthe Google Groups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/sqWzozazMg0/unsubscribe.To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/“This message (including any attachments) is intended only for theuse of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and maycontain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged,confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or maybe constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intendedrecipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination,distribution, or copying of this communication is strictlyprohibited. If you have received this message in error, notifysender immediately and delete this message immediately.”--You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

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