On 28 Dec 2013, at 17:16, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Bruno,


On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 4:54 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 27 Dec 2013, at 17:51, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Bruno,


On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:11 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 25 Dec 2013, at 18:40, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:

Are we not presuming, structure, or a-priori, existence of something, doing this processing, this work?


In the UDA we assume a "Turing universal", or "sigma_1-complete" physical reality, in some local sense.


Could this "Turing universal/sigma_1-complete in a local sense" be the exact criteria required to define the observations 3- experiences of individuals or is it the 1-experiences of individuals (observers) in keeping with the definition of an observer as the intersection of infinitely many computations?

I think the UDA answers this question. You need Turing universality, but also the FPI, which in some sense comes from mechanism, but not necessarily "universality", which has, here, only an indirect relevance in the definition of what is a computation in arithmetic.

I suspect that the FPI results from the "underlap" or failure to reach exact overlap between observers. As if a small part of the computations that are observers is not universal. This would effectively induce FPI as any one observer would be forever unable to exactly match its experience of "being in the world" with that of another.

<,












We need this to just explain what is a computer, alias, universal machine, alias universal number (implemented or not in a physical reality). Note that we do not assume a *primitive physical reality*. In comp, we are a priori agnostic on this. The UDA, still will explains that such "primitiveness" cannot solve the mind-body problem when made into a dogma/assumption-of-primitiveness.

It has always seemed to me that UDA cannot solve the mind-body problem strictly because it cannot comprehend the existence of "other minds".

UDA formulates the problem, and show how big the mind-body problem is, even before tackling the "other minds" problem. But something is said. In fact it is easy to derive from the UDA the following assertions:

comp + explicit non-solipsism entails sharable many words or a core linear physical reality.

I do not comprehend this. It is easy for us to "see" that solipsism is false,

?




but how can a computation "see" anything? I do not understand how it is that you can claim that computations will not be solipsistic by default.

The 1p is solipsist, but not in a public way, just in the trivial way that nobody can see that solipsism is false, as the dream argument justifies. Solipsism is irrefutable, and hopefully false.

Now, if you remember the definition of first person plural (which is just when different people enter the same annihilation-reconstitution box), if we add non solipsism, it means that when machine interact, they share the computations. So, the only way to avoid solipsism in comp, is that the measure is sharable by interacting machine, and so they have to live in a quantum-lile many worlds.








But comp in fact has to justify the non-solipsism, and this is begun through the nuance Bp & p versus Bp & Dt. Normally the linearity should allow the first person plural in the "& Dt" nuance case.

Exactly! I am looking forward to the explanation of this " nuance Bp & p versus Bp & Dt". :-

Keep in mind that UDA does not solve the problem, but formulate it. AUDA go more deep in a solution, and the shape of that solution (like UDA actually) provides already information contradicting the Aristotelian theology (used by atheists and the main part of institutionalized abramanic religion).

Sure. My main worry is that your wonderful result obtains at too high a price: the inability to even model interactions and time.


If you show that, you extend the UDA in a full proof refutation of comp. Good luck! I thought this would be easy, but the simplicity of this is counterbalanced by the self-referential constraints. On p-sigma_1, we get already three arithmetical (quantum) quantizations.

Keep in mind that I offer a problem, not a solution (although I offer a path toward it, and some shaping of the possible solutions, notably that they belong to (neo)platonism and refute Aristotle).

Bruno






Bruno





Then in AUDA, keeping comp at the meta-level, I eliminate all assumptions above very elementary arithmetic (Robinson Arithmetic).

The little and big bangs, including the taxes, and why it hurts is derived from basically just

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

or just

x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)

 x *0 = 0
 x*s(y) = x*y + x




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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