On 31 Dec 2013, at 17:37, Stephen Paul King wrote:

On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 5:09 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 30 Dec 2013, at 19:44, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/30/2013 2:07 AM, LizR wrote:
On 30 December 2013 21:02, Stephen Paul King <stephe...@provensecure.com > wrote:
Dear Bruno,

Why do you not consider an isomorphism between the Category of computer/universal-numbers and physical realities? That way we can avoid a lot of problems! I think that it is because of your insistence of the Platonic view that the material/physical realm is somehow lesser in ontological status and the assumption that a timeless totality = the appearance of change (and its measures) is illusory. I would like to be wrong in this presumption!

The problem is that assuming the material / physical realm as fundamental gets you no further than assuming that "God did it!" It's a "shut up and calculate" (or shut up and pray) ontology.

With materialism you just have a "brute fact" - well, maybe that's it, maybe there is just a brute, unexplained fact. But us ape descended life forms like to look for explanations even beneath the apparent brute facts!

But "Everything happens" is just as useless as "God did it".

1) "everything happens" is just inconsistent.

Show of hands: Who agrees with this? I do!

2), with comp, we have a solid notion of everything (the UD*), but it does not explain anything, it is used on the contrary to show how to reduce the mind-body problem into a "belief problem" in pure arithmetic. And this explain the quantum aspect of nature, but not yet the "symplectic" aspect of nature.

I could agree with this as well, if an explanation of interaction is offered for arithmetic...

There are two explanations. One conceptual and easy, and the second one relying on the FPI.

The simple one is that the UD emulates all possible universal machine executions but also all possible interactions between them, relatively to all universal machine. Unless you talk about non Turing emulable interactions, all interactions exist, "trivially" in arithmetic.

The question is just why the quantum tensorial braid, or some à-la Girard Geometry of interaction GOI, or at least a quantum universal system, emerge(s) in the limit of the global (on the UD*) FPI.

A universal machine can emulate a couple of interacting machines, if only by dovetailing on each of them, so interactions exist in arithmetic. The harder problem is to derive the *physical* interaction which should be the one which win the FPI global competition.

To keep clean the separation between true (but not rationally justifiable) and rationally justifiable, that is through G and G*, we have to extract those tensor from the machine's interview on the p_sigma_1 sentences. The existence of the arithmetical quantizations gives hope that this can been done. Normally Z1*, X1*, S4Grz1 should define a quantum computer or topology. This is currently mathematically testable (but hard).

The technical problem? Improved the theorem prover for the Z1*, X1*, S4Grz1. Develop the math of their quantified modal extensions. From the Russian solutions to Boolos questions, those first order modal logic have been shown to be, unlike the propositional level, quite undecidable. The contrary would have been astonishing. The miracle is that this is true for the propositional level, where we can meta- axiomatize completely the non provable part of the machine's "theology" (including the propositional physics).

To assume interaction as primitive or anything physical is a sort of treachery with respect to the computationalist mind-body problem. Of course you *can* do that, as some intermediary help, but for this, as I told you, I keep an eye on Girard, and BCI extended combinatory algebra.



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