On 08 Jan 2014, at 23:53, LizR wrote:

On 9 January 2014 11:40, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 1/7/2014 10:36 PM, LizR wrote:
Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he describes as "what data feels like when it's being processed" - hardly a detailed theory. He starts his Mathematical Universe Hypothesis from the opposite pole to Bruno, so to speak. I wonder if it's possible for a particular mathemathical object to drop out of comp - after all, we do appear to live in a universe with a specific set of laws of physics. Are these the only ones that could be generated by comp (or generated by the existence of conscious beings in Platonia) ? Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp with the MUH to get the full story!

I think to be conscious you need memory and a sense of time passage (although Bruno disputes this when he comes back from a salvia trip). To escape solipism there must be objects your perceive, some of which act like you, and on which you can act (c.f. Dr Johnson). That implies that there must be a quasi-classical world in order to support consciousness (at least human-like consciousness).

Those all seem like reasonable criteria. I imagine they could be fulfilled by a variety of physical laws (e.g. it probably wouldn't make a huge difference to the existence of human beings if light travelled 10% faster or slower). So presumably comp covers all possible physical laws which create conscious beings...

But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a statistical sum on an infinity of computations, and is unique (modulo that multiplication by three, as physics appears in three hypostases). And the determination is based on the FPI, and so physics is NOT a priori Turing emulable. The evidence that physics seems computable is a problem for comp, not an evidence for it. Fortunately the *apparent* "collapse" might be non-computable enough for comp to be correct.



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