On 09 Jan 2014, at 12:23, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

"But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a
statistical sum on an infinity of computations"

Uniquely determined?  That is like saying that The Buckingham Palace
is uniquely determined by the statistical sum of a infinity of pieces
of lego thrown in the site by infinite B52 bombers.

You might confuse geography and physics. The (sigma_1) arithmetic is the same for all, and the laws of physics must be given by the same laws for any universal machine. Comp makes physics invariant for all machine-observers, and entirely determined by the unique measure on all computation, as seen from the 1p view. This should be clear from the UD-Argument. Comp makes the primitive universe into a fairy tle, but by doing so, it makes the physics much more solid (indeed physics is deduced from addition and multiplication only, with comp at the meta-level).

Bruno





2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:

On 08 Jan 2014, at 23:53, LizR wrote:

On 9 January 2014 11:40, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 1/7/2014 10:36 PM, LizR wrote:
Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he describes
as "what data feels like when it's being processed" - hardly a
detailed theory. He starts his Mathematical Universe Hypothesis from
the opposite pole to Bruno, so to speak. I wonder if it's possible
for a particular mathemathical object to drop out of comp - after
all, we do appear to live in a universe with a specific set of laws
of physics. Are these the only ones that could be generated by comp
(or generated by the existence of conscious beings in Platonia) ?
Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp with the MUH to get the
full story!

I think to be conscious you need memory and a sense of time passage
(although Bruno disputes this when he comes back from a salvia
trip).  To escape solipism there must be objects your perceive, some
of which act like you, and on which you can act (c.f. Dr Johnson).
That implies that there must be a quasi-classical world in order to
support consciousness (at least human-like consciousness).

Those all seem like reasonable criteria. I imagine they could be
fulfilled by a variety of physical laws (e.g. it probably wouldn't
make a huge difference to the existence of human beings if light
travelled 10% faster or slower). So presumably comp covers all
possible physical laws which create conscious beings...


But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a
statistical sum on an infinity of computations, and is unique (modulo
that multiplication by three, as physics appears in three hypostases).
And the determination is based on the FPI, and so physics is NOT a
priori Turing emulable. The evidence that physics seems computable is
a problem for comp, not an evidence for it. Fortunately the *apparent*
"collapse" might be non-computable enough for comp to be correct.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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