But the UD argument predict that all the possible universes with all possible laws will be produced. What is what makes our physical laws "unique determined" by COMP?'
2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: > > On 09 Jan 2014, at 12:23, Alberto G. Corona wrote: > >> "But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a >> statistical sum on an infinity of computations" >> >> Uniquely determined? That is like saying that The Buckingham Palace >> is uniquely determined by the statistical sum of a infinity of pieces >> of lego thrown in the site by infinite B52 bombers. > > You might confuse geography and physics. The (sigma_1) arithmetic is > the same for all, and the laws of physics must be given by the same > laws for any universal machine. Comp makes physics invariant for all > machine-observers, and entirely determined by the unique measure on > all computation, as seen from the 1p view. This should be clear from > the UD-Argument. Comp makes the primitive universe into a fairy tle, > but by doing so, it makes the physics much more solid (indeed physics > is deduced from addition and multiplication only, with comp at the > meta-level). > > Bruno > > > > >> >> 2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: >>> >>> On 08 Jan 2014, at 23:53, LizR wrote: >>> >>>> On 9 January 2014 11:40, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> On 1/7/2014 10:36 PM, LizR wrote: >>>> Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he describes >>>> as "what data feels like when it's being processed" - hardly a >>>> detailed theory. He starts his Mathematical Universe Hypothesis from >>>> the opposite pole to Bruno, so to speak. I wonder if it's possible >>>> for a particular mathemathical object to drop out of comp - after >>>> all, we do appear to live in a universe with a specific set of laws >>>> of physics. Are these the only ones that could be generated by comp >>>> (or generated by the existence of conscious beings in Platonia) ? >>>> Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp with the MUH to get the >>>> full story! >>>> >>>> I think to be conscious you need memory and a sense of time passage >>>> (although Bruno disputes this when he comes back from a salvia >>>> trip). To escape solipism there must be objects your perceive, some >>>> of which act like you, and on which you can act (c.f. Dr Johnson). >>>> That implies that there must be a quasi-classical world in order to >>>> support consciousness (at least human-like consciousness). >>>> >>>> Those all seem like reasonable criteria. I imagine they could be >>>> fulfilled by a variety of physical laws (e.g. it probably wouldn't >>>> make a huge difference to the existence of human beings if light >>>> travelled 10% faster or slower). So presumably comp covers all >>>> possible physical laws which create conscious beings... >>> >>> >>> But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a >>> statistical sum on an infinity of computations, and is unique (modulo >>> that multiplication by three, as physics appears in three >>> hypostases). >>> And the determination is based on the FPI, and so physics is NOT a >>> priori Turing emulable. The evidence that physics seems computable is >>> a problem for comp, not an evidence for it. Fortunately the >>> *apparent* >>> "collapse" might be non-computable enough for comp to be correct. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>> send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything- >>> [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> -- >> Alberto. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >> send an email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
