Terren, First, it will only detract, not help, to try to shoehorn my theories into standard categories. It's an entirely new theory.
Yes, everything, including computers, Xperiences according to its actual form structure. A computer with sufficient self-monitoring and other human simulating forms would approximate organismic consciousness sufficient to satisfy a Turing test, including questions about how it felt and what it was sensing of its environment. It's easy to understand by thinking of it this way. Imagine constructing a human biological robot piecewise by putting together all the actual purely inorganic chemicals of a human body in the right arrangements. Obviously the result would be a fully functioning human being with normal human consciousness and experience. One doesn't need to add any mysterious metaphysical soul, consciousness or anything to that constructed biological robot to make it human. It is the actual physical components, acting together that gives it its humanness. Therefore any robot of sufficient complexity with sufficient self-monitoring circuits will be conscious according to the design of its form structure, just as the human robot is, and just as WE are. Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 12:39:40 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: > > OK, that's actually pretty close to my own thinking on consciousness. FWIW > I don't see all that big of a difference between what you've articulated > regarding Xperience and what has been articulated by panpsychist > philosophy. I agree with your point about the limitations of labels, but if > they can help us categorize systems of thought they can be helpful. And I > would certainly categorize your theory in the pansychist "realm". > > That aside, I gather that if you built a robot that had the proper mental > simulation of its world, based on its own sensory apparatus, with the > complex feedback systems necessary, that robot would EXperience as well? > > Terren > > > On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:29 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net<javascript:> > > wrote: > >> Terren, >> >> I don't find the panpsychism label useful. Mine is an entirely new and >> independent theory. >> >> The way it works starting from the beginning: >> >> At the fundamental level reality consists only of computationally >> interacting information forms made real by occurring in the reality of >> being. >> >> Every form can be said to 'experience' the other forms with which it >> interacts via changes in its own form. At the generic non-organismic level >> I call this Xperience. In fact in this interpretation the universe can be >> said to consist of Xperience only. Things and events are a subsidiary >> distinction both included in the concept of Xperience. >> >> To answer your question in this sense a rock does Xperience the >> interaction of its information forms with other information forms, as do >> all information forms that make up the universe. >> >> When it comes to organismic awareness we have a particular subset of >> Xperience we call EXperience in which some of the forms that are altered >> are those in that organism's internal mental simulation of reality. These >> are functionally no different than feedback forms on modern automobiles >> etc. that enable these devices to monitor (Xperience) their own states >> except in biological systems they are enormously more complex and detailed. >> The working of such biological self-monitoring systems is what we call >> experience. >> >> So organismic EXperience is simply a specialized subset of the all >> pervasion phenomenon of Xperience that occurs in biological organisms with >> complex self monitoring systems associated with their internal mental >> simulations of the actual computational external reality they exist within. >> >> So everything in the universe can be said to Xperience whatever its forms >> computationally interact with, but only biological information forms can be >> properly said to EXperience other forms, and then they always internally >> interprete and embellish that experience as some personal variant of a >> classical material world, something which does not actually exist expect in >> their internal mental simulations of the true external information world. >> >> So to categorize Xperience as to what is actually occurring we examine >> the type of forms themselves to see what they actually do rather than >> trying to impose arbitrary human categories upon them.... >> >> Edgar >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 5:43:43 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >> >>> Edgar, >>> >>> Thanks for clarifying. Your theory sounds like a spinoff of >>> panpsychism... would you say a rock is capable of experiencing? If not, >>> what is the theoretical difference between a rock and a baby that >>> demarcates what is capable of experiencing, and what isn't? >>> >>> Terren >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 2:58 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote: >>> >>>> Terren, >>>> >>>> All human babies are automatically consciousness. They are conscious of >>>> whatever input data they have. I don't see the point of your question >>>> which >>>> is why I didn't answer before... >>>> >>>> Edgar >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 2:42:24 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>> >>>>> On the contrary, I replied with a question that went unanswered. >>>>> >>>>> It was a question about whether a human baby, fed a stream of virtual >>>>> sense data as in the movie The Matrix, could be considered conscious in >>>>> your theory, as you seemed to suggest that consciousness was a property >>>>> of >>>>> reality, as a function somehow of "ontological energy". >>>>> >>>>> Terren >>>>> On Jan 8, 2014 1:49 PM, "Edgar L. Owen" <edga...@att.net> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Telmo, >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks for the link but see my new topic "A theory of consciousness" >>>>>> of a few days ago which no one has even commented on and which is much >>>>>> more >>>>>> reasonable and explanatory. >>>>>> >>>>>> Edgar >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 12:57:37 PM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In case you haven't seen it... >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1219 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Seems like an attempt to recover materialism, which strikes me as >>>>>>> somewhat unexpected from Tegmark. Am I missing something? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Cheers, >>>>>>> Telmo. >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>> >>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> >> . >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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