Edgar, It may not be necessary to produce an exact replica of the brain. I mean that is more or less implied by choosing a level of substitution... if you're substituting at a relatively coarse-grained level such as neurons, then you are betting that most of the intracellular details of a neuron are not important for capturing the essence of "you". So if you won't say 'yes' to the doctor and the only reason is because he can't make something "exactly you", then you are betting that comp is not true. In which case, you effectively sabotage your own theory, in which people are computed by an underlying reality. The requirement for exactness seems a bit argumentative, considering that the version of me today is not the "exact me" of yesterday, yet my consciousness and identity are not meaningfully impacted by that.
I think what you miss by not actually attempting to understand Bruno's argument is that the laws of physics, including those "elemental laws", are captured by computations in the universal dovetailer in much the same way that your theory expresses reality as a computation. We experience a physical world because we are embedded in those computations as well. AFAICT the only significant difference between your theory and the UDA is that you are positing one single, universal "absolute" computational reality as fundamental, while the UDA posits that there are an infinity of such computational realities that emerge from a fundamental ontology based on nothing more than natural numbers and the relationships between them. You are much closer to the UDA than you realize, I think. Terren On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 3:20 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edgaro...@att.net> wrote: > Terren, > > I understand very well that's what the 'yes dr.' scenario is but it's an > impossibility to be exactly 'me' for the reasons I pointed out. You can't > come up with a hypothetical scenario which isn't actually physically > possible and make a correct deduction about reality on that basis. > > We know what reality math is by studying what actually computes real > natural processes. It is NOT at all the same as human math. What actually > computes real natural processes may be little more than the particle > property interaction conservation laws, and the laws that bind particles in > matter. Most of the (very small part) of human math that describes natural > processes probably does not actually compute them. For example the laws of > motion may describe natural processes but probably don't actually compute > them. The actual computations likely take place only at the elemental > level, and the mathematical descriptions at the aggregate levels are not > computational but likely just aggregate consequences of the elemental laws. > > I attempt to describe reality itself in terms of what appear to be its > self-evident attributes, such as actuality, realness, absoluteness (it is > absolute because there is nothing else than what actually exists), its > presence, its happening (things continually happen within it), its being, > its existence... I call this OE to denote what has those attributes. There > is obviously nothing else that does.... > > If there is a better way you can suggest than actually observing the real > actual presence of reality and discerning its fundamental attributes and > describing it by those attributes then what is it? > > Edgar > > > > On Thursday, January 9, 2014 2:56:08 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: > >> >> Edgar, >> >> The "yes doctor" scenario is just a means of discovering whether you'd >> have faith that a digital copy of yourself, in principle, would still be >> "you" enough to perhaps avoid certain death. If you say yes, in principle I >> could be substituted, then you are betting that comp is true. >> >> My question for you is, how could you know what "reality math" is? >> Wouldn't the process of discovering the properties of reality math be >> identical to the processes mathematicians use to discover the properties of >> human math? At the end of the day it seems like a distinction that makes >> no difference... especially since it is clear that human math does a >> remarkable job of capturing the physical laws as we know them. >> >> I'm also not sure where your certainty about the fundamental nature of >> reality comes from... the way you express it leaves little room for doubt, >> which is an odd stance considering that it's something we would need to >> take on faith, regardless of what your theory is. It comes across as >> dogmatic or religious... is that your intent? >> >> Terren >> >> >> On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote: >> >>> Terren, >>> >>> Receiving a prosthetic brain is a (probably insurmountable) technical >>> problem. There could certainly be one functionally equivalent to mine but >>> it wouldn't be mine because it wouldn't have the exact same history. If it >>> did it would be mine in the first place rather than some prosthetic one. >>> >>> >>> I don't know what that statement about Bruno's UDA actually says, and I >>> don't think it's relevant, because his axioms, and therefore his >>> conclusions, apply to human rather than reality math. Bruno's comp is most >>> certainly NOT my computational reality. >>> >>> Lastly, it is self-evident that "the physical world as we experience it >>> IS computable." How else would it come about if it wasn't being computed by >>> our minds? That should be obvious.. Everything that exists, everything in >>> the entire universe, is computable because it IS being computed. Otherwise >>> it would not exist.... >>> >>> If that's what Bruno claims, it's dead wrong... >>> >>> Edgar >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, January 9, 2014 1:51:07 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Edgar, >>>> >>>> OK, so I think you are would say "yes" to the doctor who would save you >>>> from a life-threatening brain disorder by giving you a prosthetic brain >>>> that replicates your biological brain at some level. >>>> >>>> If so, Bruno's UDA proves that the physical world as we experience it >>>> is not computable. >>>> >>>> Terren >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Terren, >>>>> >>>>> First, it will only detract, not help, to try to shoehorn my theories >>>>> into standard categories. It's an entirely new theory. >>>>> >>>>> Yes, everything, including computers, Xperiences according to its >>>>> actual form structure. A computer with sufficient self-monitoring and >>>>> other >>>>> human simulating forms would approximate organismic consciousness >>>>> sufficient to satisfy a Turing test, including questions about how it felt >>>>> and what it was sensing of its environment. >>>>> >>>>> It's easy to understand by thinking of it this way. Imagine >>>>> constructing a human biological robot piecewise by putting together all >>>>> the >>>>> actual purely inorganic chemicals of a human body in the right >>>>> arrangements. Obviously the result would be a fully functioning human >>>>> being >>>>> with normal human consciousness and experience. >>>>> >>>>> One doesn't need to add any mysterious metaphysical soul, >>>>> consciousness or anything to that constructed biological robot to make it >>>>> human. It is the actual physical components, acting together that gives it >>>>> its humanness. Therefore any robot of sufficient complexity with >>>>> sufficient self-monitoring circuits will be conscious according to the >>>>> design of its form structure, just as the human robot is, and just as WE >>>>> are. >>>>> >>>>> Edgar >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, January 9, 2014 12:39:40 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> OK, that's actually pretty close to my own thinking on consciousness. >>>>>> FWIW I don't see all that big of a difference between what you've >>>>>> articulated regarding Xperience and what has been articulated by >>>>>> panpsychist philosophy. I agree with your point about the limitations of >>>>>> labels, but if they can help us categorize systems of thought they can be >>>>>> helpful. And I would certainly categorize your theory in the pansychist >>>>>> "realm". >>>>>> >>>>>> That aside, I gather that if you built a robot that had the proper >>>>>> mental simulation of its world, based on its own sensory apparatus, with >>>>>> the complex feedback systems necessary, that robot would EXperience as >>>>>> well? >>>>>> >>>>>> Terren >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:29 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net>wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Terren, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't find the panpsychism label useful. Mine is an entirely new >>>>>>> and independent theory. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The way it works starting from the beginning: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> At the fundamental level reality consists only of computationally >>>>>>> interacting information forms made real by occurring in the reality of >>>>>>> being. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Every form can be said to 'experience' the other forms with which it >>>>>>> interacts via changes in its own form. At the generic non-organismic >>>>>>> level >>>>>>> I call this Xperience. In fact in this interpretation the universe can >>>>>>> be >>>>>>> said to consist of Xperience only. Things and events are a subsidiary >>>>>>> distinction both included in the concept of Xperience. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> To answer your question in this sense a rock does Xperience the >>>>>>> interaction of its information forms with other information forms, as do >>>>>>> all information forms that make up the universe. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> When it comes to organismic awareness we have a particular subset >>>>>>> of Xperience we call EXperience in which some of the forms that are >>>>>>> altered >>>>>>> are those in that organism's internal mental simulation of reality. >>>>>>> These >>>>>>> are functionally no different than feedback forms on modern automobiles >>>>>>> etc. that enable these devices to monitor (Xperience) their own states >>>>>>> except in biological systems they are enormously more complex and >>>>>>> detailed. >>>>>>> The working of such biological self-monitoring systems is what we call >>>>>>> experience. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So organismic EXperience is simply a specialized subset of the all >>>>>>> pervasion phenomenon of Xperience that occurs in biological organisms >>>>>>> with >>>>>>> complex self monitoring systems associated with their internal mental >>>>>>> simulations of the actual computational external reality they exist >>>>>>> within. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So everything in the universe can be said to Xperience whatever its >>>>>>> forms computationally interact with, but only biological information >>>>>>> forms >>>>>>> can be properly said to EXperience other forms, and then they always >>>>>>> internally interprete and embellish that experience as some personal >>>>>>> variant of a classical material world, something which does not actually >>>>>>> exist expect in their internal mental simulations of the true external >>>>>>> information world. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So to categorize Xperience as to what is actually occurring we >>>>>>> examine the type of forms themselves to see what they actually do rather >>>>>>> than trying to impose arbitrary human categories upon them.... >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Edgar >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 5:43:43 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Edgar, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks for clarifying. Your theory sounds like a spinoff of >>>>>>>> panpsychism... would you say a rock is capable of experiencing? If >>>>>>>> not, >>>>>>>> what is the theoretical difference between a rock and a baby that >>>>>>>> demarcates what is capable of experiencing, and what isn't? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Terren >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 2:58 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net>wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Terren, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> All human babies are automatically consciousness. They are >>>>>>>>> conscious of whatever input data they have. I don't see the point of >>>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>> question which is why I didn't answer before... >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Edgar >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 2:42:24 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On the contrary, I replied with a question that went unanswered. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It was a question about whether a human baby, fed a stream of >>>>>>>>>> virtual sense data as in the movie The Matrix, could be considered >>>>>>>>>> conscious in your theory, as you seemed to suggest that >>>>>>>>>> consciousness was a >>>>>>>>>> property of reality, as a function somehow of "ontological energy". >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Terren >>>>>>>>>> On Jan 8, 2014 1:49 PM, "Edgar L. Owen" <edga...@att.net> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Telmo, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Thanks for the link but see my new topic "A theory of >>>>>>>>>>> consciousness" of a few days ago which no one has even commented on >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> which is much more reasonable and explanatory. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Edgar >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 12:57:37 PM UTC-5, telmo_menezes >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> In case you haven't seen it... >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1219 >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Seems like an attempt to recover materialism, which strikes me >>>>>>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>> somewhat unexpected from Tegmark. Am I missing something? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers, >>>>>>>>>>>> Telmo. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the >>>>>>>>>>> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from >>>>>>>>>>> it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com >>>>>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group >>>>>>>>>>> /everything-list. >>>>>>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out >>>>>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>>>> send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>> send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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