On 10 January 2014 11:01, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>  On 1/9/2014 1:15 PM, LizR wrote:
>
> On 10 January 2014 09:20, Edgar L. Owen <edgaro...@att.net> wrote:
>
>> Terren,
>>
>>  I understand very well that's what the 'yes dr.' scenario is but it's
>> an impossibility to be exactly 'me' for the reasons I pointed out. You
>> can't come up with a hypothetical scenario which isn't actually physically
>> possible and make a correct deduction about reality on that basis.
>>
>>   The no-cloning theorem means that if the correct substitution level is
> the quantum level (or below), then it is physically impossible for us to
> create a digital copy of a brain that creates the same state of
> consciousness, in which case the above objection is valid.
>
> However, it isn't clear that this *is *the substitution level. Max
> Tegmark has suggested that the brain is essentially a classical computer
> (rather than quantum) which may in principle put the level above the
> quantum. If he's right, then making a copy of a brain at the right level
> becomes possible, albeit beyond present technology, and thought experiments
> may legitimately use that idea (because it's possible in principle).
> Personally I don't agree, I think that any copy made above the quantum
> level isn't *guaranteed* to be the same, while a quantum recreation is 
> *guaranteed
> by the laws of physics to be identical*. So assuming the substitution
> level is the quantum level cuts out a host of possible objections.
>
>
> But a lot depends on what you mean by "the same". As Terren points out, no
> one is exactly the same from minute-to-minute or day-to-day.  They are
> similar enough that we denominate them the same person, even Gabby
> Gifford is still "the same person" to a pretty good approximation.
>

I  covered that topic (at some length) further down the post.

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