On 1/9/2014 1:15 PM, LizR wrote:
On 10 January 2014 09:20, Edgar L. Owen <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

    Terren,

    I understand very well that's what the 'yes dr.' scenario is but it's an
    impossibility to be exactly 'me' for the reasons I pointed out. You can't 
come up
    with a hypothetical scenario which isn't actually physically possible and 
make a
    correct deduction about reality on that basis.

The no-cloning theorem means that if the correct substitution level is the quantum level (or below), then it is physically impossible for us to create a digital copy of a brain that creates the same state of consciousness, in which case the above objection is valid.

However, it isn't clear that this /is /the substitution level. Max Tegmark has suggested that the brain is essentially a classical computer (rather than quantum) which may in principle put the level above the quantum. If he's right, then making a copy of a brain at the right level becomes possible, albeit beyond present technology, and thought experiments may legitimately use that idea (because it's possible in principle). Personally I don't agree, I think that any copy made above the quantum level isn't /guaranteed/ to be the same, while a quantum recreation is /guaranteed by the laws of physics to be identical/. So assuming the substitution level is the quantum level cuts out a host of possible objections.

But a lot depends on what you mean by "the same". As Terren points out, no one is exactly the same from minute-to-minute or day-to-day. They are similar enough that we denominate them the same person, even Gabby Gifford is still "the same person" to a pretty good approximation.

Brent

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