On 09 Jan 2014, at 18:50, Stephen Paul King wrote:

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Dear Bruno, I have to agree with Alberto on this point.

`Alberto was only missing step seven. You can comment my answer to`

`Alberto.`

On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 09 Jan 2014, at 16:30, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But the UD argument predict that all the possible universes with all possible laws will be produced. Where?AR does not restrict the types of physical laws of universes that itcan represent, so barring a separate mechanism I cannot see howAlberto's claim is false!

See my answer to Alberto, or reread the UDA.

What is what makes our physical laws "unique determined" by COMP?' That happens already at the step seven. Could you be more specific as to how?I assume there that you, here and now, live in a physical universewhich run a universal dovetailer, without ever stopping.Assuming comp, how do you predict "exactly", after step six, theexperience of dropping a pen in the air?What is the probability that you will see falling on the ground?I think that Alberto is considering the character of physical laws,not probability distributions of particular processes that obey suchlaws.

It is computation. that are not physical processes at all.

`To avoid the consequence that physics is uniquely defined in`

`arithmetic for all universal machine, you need to reify matter and`

`mind with non computable attributes.`

You believe (because you assume comp and agreed up to step 6) thatyour next immediate future first person state is determined by theFPI on all the emulations of your actual states appearing in the UD*(the complete execution of the UD). This involves infinitely manycomputations (that should be an easy exercise in computer science:all functions are implemented by infinitely many programs).To compute the exact probability of the event "the "pen fall on theground", you must seek the ratio or proportion of all computationgoing through your states where you see the pen falling on thegrounds, among all computations going through your states.How can we generate probability distributions unless there is anunambiguous measure on the space of possible universes that canobtain from the infinitely many computations?

`Exactly! probabilities exists only if there is a non ambiguous`

`measure. So if comp is true, and if this does not make the moon`

`evaporating, it means the measure exists.`

`I also give the math of the "measure one". The logic of the "certainty`

`case", and it is a quantum logic.`

Computations is an arithmetical notion, and your actual state isgiven by a relative number, encode locally by the doctor. The entireUD is itself definable in arithmetic. So, in that step seven, ifcomp is correct or believed by a rational agent, the rational agenthad to believe that physics, all physical predictions, is reduced toone "simple law": basically a measure on the relative computations.Physics has been reduced, in principle (of course) to a statisticalsum on all first person valid relative computations.It has always been my claim that the Doctor can only exist withinsome subset of universes that have persistence of matter.

`Then you can deduce from the UDA that comp is incompatible with your`

`theory.`

This would exclude, for example, universes that do not containmatter or do not persist for more than an instant. AFAIK, nothing inAR acts to partition up the universes into those that containDoctors and those that do not.

Define "universe" in the comp theory.

Below our substitution level, physics is not given by "onecomputation" (or one universal numbers). Physics is given by aninfinity made of almost all computations. It involves a competitionamong all universal numbers. "Almost all" means all those validatingyour first person experience.Yes, but not just one "physics"! The level of substitution is itselfinduced by and emergent from physical laws,

Reread step seven.

thus cannot be assumed prior to the mechanism that selects forparticular physical laws.

`You are assuming a physical primitive universe. I do not. I am`

`agnostic on this. But don't add an assumption in a reasoning, that is`

`terribly confusing.`

`If you understand the reasoning, and still assume a physical primitive`

`universe, then comp is non valid in your theory. You have to say no to`

`the digitalist doctor.`

Then the math shows that the case of "probability one", for thatstatistics on first person valid computations obeys a quantum logic.Not necessarily! It only shows FPI.

?

There are many "quantum logics". Which one are you considering?

The one isolated in the UDA and AUDA. I get three of them, actually.

I would like to see how you obtain the general non-commutativity ofobservable operators from AR.It has always seemed to me that you assume that physics isclassical and this has always bothered me, given that we have verygood evidence that our common universe IS NOT Classical.

`I have never assumed physics to be classical. You should read the`

`text. On the contrary I show how much comp makes the physical reality`

`quantum like, both in UDA and in arithmetic (AUDA).`

In fact comp gives a criteria to distinguish geography (whichdepends on many indexicals) and physics, which appears to beindexical independent. Physics is even independent of the choice ofthe base of the phi_i.How? What does it depend on? Maybe I do not know your definition of"physics"...

`The science of justifying the sharable events in our neighborhood, or`

`the science of the "3p" measurable number predictions (which actually`

`will appear to be 1p plural only).`

There is no "real" (ontic) physical reality, but still a *unique*(yet relative, conditional) measure on consistent enumerableextensions on all computations (going through your current states).I agree with this.

`Then physics is unique. Physics is what makes the pen dropped in the`

`air falling on the ground. That is reduced into an arithmetical`

`problem, by comp.`

(Unless comp is false or that we are manipulated through a normalsimulation).Physics is transformed into the study of a lawful precisearithmetical phenomenon of a type "first person plural experience".Not unless we are only considering a solipsistic observer!

Not at all. We don't know that. Everett confirms comp + non solipsism.

To obtain physics we need some means to define interactions andcommunications between multiple separable observers.

`Then you are doing just physics, and completely miss the comp`

`explanation of the origin of physics and consciousness. You might need`

`to (re)study the UDA.`

This is a Bodies (plural) problem.

`And comp translated that very problem into a measure problem on all`

`computations. That is what makes comp interesting: it translates that`

`body problem in a problem in arithmetic.`

Each observer can be shown to have FPI by your argument, but that isabout it. Everything else requires more assumptions, like maybe somekind of ASSA.You have to understand all this by yourself. Reread with attentionand concentration all UDA steps, as they are all used at once in thestep seven.Step seven can be confusing to even the highly attentive andintelligent among us.

`Just say what you don't understand. As I said, step seven used the`

`fact that you are familiar with the 1p/3p distinction and with the six`

`preceding steps.`

You don't need to believe in comp to understand the reasoning. Bruno

Bruno 2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: On 09 Jan 2014, at 12:23, Alberto G. Corona wrote: "But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a statistical sum on an infinity of computations" Uniquely determined? That is like saying that The Buckingham Palace is uniquely determined by the statistical sum of a infinity of pieces of lego thrown in the site by infinite B52 bombers. You might confuse geography and physics. The (sigma_1) arithmetic is the same for all, and the laws of physics must be given by the same laws for any universal machine. Comp makes physics invariant for all machine-observers, and entirely determined by the unique measure on all computation, as seen from the 1p view. This should be clear from the UD-Argument. Comp makes the primitive universe into a fairy tle, but by doing so, it makes the physics much more solid (indeed physics is deduced from addition and multiplication only, with comp at the meta-level). Bruno 2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: On 08 Jan 2014, at 23:53, LizR wrote: On 9 January 2014 11:40, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: On 1/7/2014 10:36 PM, LizR wrote: Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he describes as "what data feels like when it's being processed" - hardly a detailed theory. He starts his Mathematical Universe Hypothesis from the opposite pole to Bruno, so to speak. I wonder if it's possible for a particular mathemathical object to drop out of comp - after all, we do appear to live in a universe with a specific set of laws of physics. Are these the only ones that could be generated by comp (or generated by the existence of conscious beings in Platonia) ? Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp with the MUH to get the full story! I think to be conscious you need memory and a sense of time passage (although Bruno disputes this when he comes back from a salvia trip). To escape solipism there must be objects your perceive, some of which act like you, and on which you can act (c.f. Dr Johnson). That implies that there must be a quasi-classical world in order to support consciousness (at least human-like consciousness). Those all seem like reasonable criteria. I imagine they could be fulfilled by a variety of physical laws (e.g. it probably wouldn't make a huge difference to the existence of human beings if light travelled 10% faster or slower). So presumably comp covers all possible physical laws which create conscious beings... But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a statistical sum on an infinity of computations, and is unique (modulo that multiplication by three, as physics appears in three hypostases). And the determination is based on the FPI, and so physics is NOT a priori Turing emulable. The evidence that physics seems computable is a problem for comp, not an evidence for it. Fortunately the *apparent* "collapse" might be non-computable enough for comp to be correct. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups"Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send anemail to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Alberto. --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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