Re: Tegmark's New Book

Bruno Marchal Fri, 10 Jan 2014 02:50:02 -0800


On 09 Jan 2014, at 20:39, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

Bruno:
Sorry but I do not understood point seven when I read it and I do not
understand you now.


No problem. I am here to explain (or discover a flaw!).


I understand Solomonoff theorem about inductive inference that involve
infinite computations and probabilities, but Solomonoff  has a
selection criteria : the algoritmic complexity theorem uses the
algorithmic complexity as the weight or probability of each
computation and it has a clear formula for the probability of the
"next step" in a sequence, that is, to make an induction by means of
"competing" computations.

This does not work, as that type of informùation suppress all theredundancies existing in the arithmetical computations.


The metaphisics of solomonoff say something like: "the world is
governed by laws as simple as possible compatible with the phenomena
observed, but we must take into account unobserved phenomena that may
demand more complex algorithms so we apply a decreasing but not null
probability to all computations that predict the known facts"

That's what we need to do in comp, and it works, but only thanks tothe redundancy of the UD work, or arithmetic.(this is related to the creative/productive pairs of Emil Post, asopposd to the simple/immune pairs, by the same Emil Post, and laterrediscovered by Chaitin).The "algorithmic" information suppresses the "natural" weight (the onegiven by the FPI) on the computations.


For a moment I though that yours is a kind of solomonoff inductive
inference

It works with all kind of inductive inference. I use the generaltheory by Blum, Case and Smith. Explicitely so in "conscience andmecanism", but it is very easy, so I am quick on this on this list. Ican say more on this, but sometimes it is more distracting thaninformative.

translated into a numerical mysticism, as substance of
things instead as a method of induction or discovery of laws.

Just follow the reasoning. It is not a theory of inductive inference,but the (unique) machine (ideally correct one) theology, testable asit contains the physics.

But I do
not see your selection criteria

Your own consciousness. That is already the case in step 3. I do notsee what you don't see.

among infinite computations and no
procedure, no formula.

Quote my latest explanation to you or Edgar, or Stephen. Then AUDAgives the precise equations and the formula. But UDA gives thecomplete (less constructive) explanations, even the theoreticalprocedure to predict the behavior of a falling pen. What don't youunderstand? Are you sure you get well the first six steps?

And moreover, I do not understand your
metaphysics.

Which metaphysics? AR, or "yes doctor" ? Please try to make a specificcritics.There is no metaphysics, actually, only a precise assumption on therelation between consciousness and computation.


Bruno


2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:


On 09 Jan 2014, at 18:50, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Bruno,

I have to agree with Alberto on this point.





Alberto was only missing step seven. You can comment my answer to
Alberto.



On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:

On 09 Jan 2014, at 16:30, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

But the UD argument predict that all the possible universes with all
possible laws will be produced.


Where?

AR does not restrict the types of physical laws of universes that it
can represent, so barring a separate mechanism I cannot see how
Alberto's claim is false!


See my answer to Alberto, or reread the UDA.






What is what makes our physical laws
"unique determined" by COMP?'

That happens already at the step seven.

Could you be more specific as to how?



I assume there that you, here and now, live in a physical universe
which run a universal dovetailer, without ever stopping.

Assuming comp, how do you predict "exactly", after step six,  the
experience of dropping a pen in the air?
What is the probability that you will see falling on the ground?

I think that Alberto is considering the character of physical laws,
not probability distributions of particular processes that obey such
laws.


It is computation. that are not physical processes at all.

To avoid the consequence that physics is uniquely defined in
arithmetic for all universal machine, you need to reify matter and
mind with non computable attributes.




You believe (because you assume comp and agreed up to step 6) that
your next immediate future first person state is determined by the
FPI on all the emulations of your actual states appearing in the UD*
(the complete execution of the UD). This involves infinitely many
computations (that should be an easy exercise in computer science:
all functions are implemented by infinitely many programs).
To compute the exact probability of the event "the "pen fall on the
ground", you must seek the ratio or proportion of all computation
going through your states where you see the pen falling on the
grounds, among all computations going through your states.

How can we generate probability distributions unless there is an
unambiguous measure on the space of possible universes that can
obtain from the infinitely many computations?


Exactly! probabilities exists only if there is a non ambiguous
measure. So if comp is true, and if this does not make the moon
evaporating, it means the measure exists.

I also give the math of the "measure one". The logic of the"certainty

case", and it is a quantum logic.




Computations is an arithmetical notion, and your actual state is
given by a relative number, encode locally by the doctor. The entire
UD is itself definable in arithmetic. So, in that step seven, if
comp is correct or believed by a rational agent, the rational agent
had to believe that physics, all physical predictions, is reduced to
one "simple law": basically a measure on the relative computations.
Physics has been reduced, in principle (of course) to a statistical
sum on all first person valid relative computations.


It has always been my claim that the Doctor can only exist within
some subset of universes that have persistence of matter.


Then you can deduce from the UDA that comp is incompatible with your
theory.

This would exclude, for example, universes that do not contain
matter or do not persist for more than an instant. AFAIK, nothing in
AR acts to partition up the universes into those that contain
Doctors and those that do not.


Define "universe" in the comp theory.




Below our substitution level, physics is not given by "one
computation" (or one universal numbers). Physics is given by an
infinity made of almost all computations. It involves a competition
among all universal numbers. "Almost all" means all those validating
your first person experience.

Yes, but not just one "physics"! The level of substitution is itself
induced by and emergent from physical laws,


Reread step seven.

thus cannot be assumed prior to the mechanism that selects for
particular physical laws.


You are assuming a physical primitive universe. I do not. I am
agnostic on this. But don't add an assumption in a reasoning, that is
terribly confusing.

If you understand the reasoning, and still assume a physicalprimitiveuniverse, then comp is non valid in your theory. You have to say noto

the digitalist doctor.



Then the math shows that the case of "probability one", for that
statistics on first person valid computations obeys a quantum logic.

Not necessarily! It only shows FPI.

There are many "quantum logics". Which one are you considering?


The one isolated in the UDA and AUDA. I get three of them, actually.

I would like to see how you obtain the general non-commutativity of
observable operators from AR.
 It has always seemed to me that you assume that physics is
classical and this has always bothered me, given that we have very
good evidence that our common universe IS NOT Classical.


I have never assumed physics to be classical. You should read the
text. On the contrary I show how much comp makes the physical reality
quantum like, both in UDA and in arithmetic (AUDA).




In fact comp gives a criteria to distinguish geography (which
depends on many indexicals) and physics, which appears to be
indexical independent. Physics is even independent of the choice of
the base of the phi_i.

How? What does it depend on? Maybe I do not know your definition of
"physics"...



The science of justifying the sharable events in our neighborhood, or
the science of the "3p" measurable number predictions (which actually
will appear to be 1p plural only).




There is no "real" (ontic) physical reality, but still a *unique*
(yet relative, conditional)  measure on consistent enumerable
extensions on all computations (going through your current states).

I agree with this.


Then physics is unique. Physics is what makes the pen dropped in the
air falling on the ground. That is reduced into an arithmetical
problem, by comp.




(Unless comp is false or that we are manipulated through a normal
simulation).
Physics is transformed into the study of a lawful precise
arithmetical phenomenon of a type "first person plural experience".

Not unless we are only considering a solipsistic observer!

Not at all. We don't know that. Everett confirms comp + nonsolipsism.

To obtain physics we need some means to define interactions and
communications between multiple separable observers.


Then you are doing just physics, and completely miss the comp

explanation of the origin of physics and consciousness. You mightneed

to (re)study the UDA.

This is a Bodies (plural) problem.


And comp translated that very problem into a measure problem on all
computations. That is what makes comp interesting: it translates that
body problem in a problem in arithmetic.

Each observer can be shown to have FPI by your argument, but that is
about it. Everything else requires more assumptions, like maybe some
kind of ASSA.



You have to understand all this by yourself. Reread with attention
and concentration all UDA steps, as they are all used at once in the
step seven.


Step seven can be confusing to even the highly attentive and
intelligent among us.


Just say what you don't understand. As I said, step seven used the

fact that you are familiar with the 1p/3p distinction and with thesix

preceding steps.

You don't need to believe in comp to understand the reasoning.

Bruno



Bruno






2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:

On 09 Jan 2014, at 12:23, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

"But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a
statistical sum on an infinity of computations"

Uniquely determined?  That is like saying that The Buckingham Palace

is uniquely determined by the statistical sum of a infinity ofpieces

of lego thrown in the site by infinite B52 bombers.

You might confuse geography and physics. The (sigma_1) arithmetic is
the same for all, and the laws of physics must be given by the same
laws for any universal machine. Comp makes physics invariant for all
machine-observers, and entirely determined by the unique measure on
all computation, as seen from the 1p view. This should be clear from
the UD-Argument. Comp makes the primitive universe into a fairy tle,

but by doing so, it makes the physics much more solid (indeedphysics

is deduced from addition and multiplication only, with comp at the
meta-level).

Bruno





2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:

On 08 Jan 2014, at 23:53, LizR wrote:

On 9 January 2014 11:40, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 1/7/2014 10:36 PM, LizR wrote:
Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he describes
as "what data feels like when it's being processed" - hardly a
detailed theory. He starts his Mathematical Universe Hypothesis from
the opposite pole to Bruno, so to speak. I wonder if it's possible
for a particular mathemathical object to drop out of comp - after
all, we do appear to live in a universe with a specific set of laws
of physics. Are these the only ones that could be generated by comp
(or generated by the existence of conscious beings in Platonia) ?
Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp with the MUH to get the
full story!

I think to be conscious you need memory and a sense of time passage
(although Bruno disputes this when he comes back from a salvia
trip).  To escape solipism there must be objects your perceive, some
of which act like you, and on which you can act (c.f. Dr Johnson).
That implies that there must be a quasi-classical world in order to
support consciousness (at least human-like consciousness).

Those all seem like reasonable criteria. I imagine they could be
fulfilled by a variety of physical laws (e.g. it probably wouldn't
make a huge difference to the existence of human beings if light
travelled 10% faster or slower). So presumably comp covers all
possible physical laws which create conscious beings...


But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a

statistical sum on an infinity of computations, and is unique(modulo

that multiplication by three, as physics appears in three
hypostases).
And the determination is based on the FPI, and so physics is NOT a

priori Turing emulable. The evidence that physics seems computableis

a problem for comp, not an evidence for it. Fortunately the
*apparent*
"collapse" might be non-computable enough for comp to be correct.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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