On 10 Jan 2014, at 02:53, LizR wrote:
On 10 January 2014 14:22, Edgar L. Owen <edgaro...@att.net> wrote:
Liz,
No, I don't agree with that at all. As I've said on a number of
occasions, reality is obviously computed because it exists. What
more convincing proof could there be?
One that explains why that has to be so would be a good start.
If Bruno's comp claims reality is non-computable it's pure nonsense
that is conclusively falsified by the very existence of reality.
The point is that certain assumptions lead to certain conclusions.
If the conclusions invalidate the assumptions, then the correct
response is to throw out the original assumptions as invalid. Bruno
starts from the assumption that consciousness is a form of
computation and draws certain inferences. This isn't what comp
"claims" it's what the argument shows, given the assumptions. The
only way to falsify it is to show that one of the assumptions is
wrong, or that there is a flaw in the reasoning that leads to the
conclusions.
Yes. At least if we want to do science and see the others criticizing
the work. the problem of Edgar is that he believes that some things
are obvious.
Bruno
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