On 10 Jan 2014, at 01:51, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

Liz and Terren,

I'm thinking more about this and think I've now changed my mind on it. After all I (my mental state etc.) do continually change from moment to moment yet I have no doubt I'm still me. I'm not the 'same' person, but I'm still me by all reasonable definitions.

OK, and that ois the point needed to make "experimental science" secure, and then we can use comp to derive physics from arithmetic;



Therefore assuming an exact momentary but SEPARATE clone, that clone would no doubt tell everyone it was me, but the still extant me would of course disagree.

Now assuming no 'ghost in the machine' or soul, for which no evidence exists, and that our mental states and consciousness are entirely a product of our biological bodies, then consider replacing various parts with exact copies. If say a leg was replaced with an exact copy (assuming instant healing to match the original) then I doubt 'I' would notice any difference. So my brain was (could be) instantaneously replaced with an exact copy with the exact neural circuitry and neural states then I suppose 'I' would still think I was me. I don't see why not.

So what's the point? I forgot what it was...

OK, you said yes to the doctor, and agree with step zero. See the 8 steps to see the point, here:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

or here, if the link is still working:
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2013.03.014

Bruno


Edgar

On Thursday, January 9, 2014 5:01:48 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 1/9/2014 1:15 PM, LizR wrote:
On 10 January 2014 09:20, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:
Terren,

I understand very well that's what the 'yes dr.' scenario is but it's an impossibility to be exactly 'me' for the reasons I pointed out. You can't come up with a hypothetical scenario which isn't actually physically possible and make a correct deduction about reality on that basis.

The no-cloning theorem means that if the correct substitution level is the quantum level (or below), then it is physically impossible for us to create a digital copy of a brain that creates the same state of consciousness, in which case the above objection is valid.

However, it isn't clear that this is the substitution level. Max Tegmark has suggested that the brain is essentially a classical computer (rather than quantum) which may in principle put the level above the quantum. If he's right, then making a copy of a brain at the right level becomes possible, albeit beyond present technology, and thought experiments may legitimately use that idea (because it's possible in principle). Personally I don't agree, I think that any copy made above the quantum level isn't guaranteed to be the same, while a quantum recreation is guaranteed by the laws of physics to be identical. So assuming the substitution level is the quantum level cuts out a host of possible objections.

But a lot depends on what you mean by "the same". As Terren points out, no one is exactly the same from minute-to-minute or day-to- day. They are similar enough that we denominate them the same person, even Gabby Gifford is still "the same person" to a pretty good approximation.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to