Edgar,

On 13 Jan 2014, at 13:52, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

Bruno,

You ask "where does mind come from?" Obviously it arises via evolution
like all biological structures.

Not only that is not obvious, but this might be false. It might be locally true for the human mind differentiation, but the roots of the human mind might start from something which logically precedes evolution and the terrestrial life.

Unless, as other have seen, you reify a singular finite non computable reality.





There should be no question about that.

You talk like if the mind-body problem has been solved. That is not the case.

That way of talking is ridiculous. You might find what you say obvious FOR YOU, but be polite and pedagogic, it might not be obvious to some other.

To say that something is obvious is equivalent with: if you don't believe X, you are dumb, retard, stupid, doomed, etc.

It is nothing but an argument per authority through conditional insulting.

"obvious" can be used only to mean that it is an axiom of the theory, or that is very close to an axiom, "close" in the small number of deductive applications of inference rule(s).




Is it some sort of mystery in your 'comp'?

Evolution might explain the local appearance of persons, but this does not solve the more conceptual problem of the origin of the mind, and what is it. If we assume comp (my brain can be substituted with a computer suitably engrammed) then the mind-body problem leads to a "belief in body" problem in arithmetic. Not a mystery, but an interesting problem which explains the possible origin of the physical laws.



And I'm using "computable" and "computations" in the STANDARD sense it's used in computer science, as the output of running computer programs. I find it strange you would disagree with that....

You might confuse computer science, and the art to implement universal numbers relatively to universal subpart of the physical reality (computer engineering) . In both case we refer to two universal numbers, and the physical reality approximates very well the universal number relative behavior, but not better, nor differently, than in all computations emulated in arithmetic.

Computable concerns functions from N to N (or equivalent like N^n to N), and is, accepting Church thesis, a purely arithmetical notion. It has nothing to do with physics, a priori.

Your use is not the use of the theoretical computer scientists, but of the Aristotelian theologian which assumes, like you, some "reality" having physical aspect, like your "present moment".

Only computers compute.

I have no clue what you mean by 'reality, 'our, 'present 'moment. Sorry.
It looks like unclear phenomenology to me.

Bruno




Edgar


On Friday, January 10, 2014 3:14:40 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jan 2014, at 20:20, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

Terren,

Receiving a prosthetic brain is a (probably insurmountable) technical problem. There could certainly be one functionally equivalent to mine but it wouldn't be mine because it wouldn't have the exact same history. If it did it would be mine in the first place rather than some prosthetic one.


I don't know what that statement about Bruno's UDA actually says, and I don't think it's relevant, because his axioms, and therefore his conclusions, apply to human rather than reality math. Bruno's comp is most certainly NOT my computational reality.



"MY" comp is he idea that the brain or the body is Turing emulable (the rest is derived from that assumption). We have asked you if your theory allow someone to surivive with an artificial brainn but you never answered. Also I asked you to develop what you mean by "computational", as indeed it is clear that you are using the word "computational" in a non standard (and unknown) sense.

Lastly, it is self-evident that "the physical world as we experience it IS computable."

How could that be self-evident? Also, with the standrad meaning of computable, this would entaill "comp" in "my" (standard) sense.



How else would it come about if it wasn't being computed by our minds?

Where does our mind come from?


That should be obvious..

Nothing is obvious.


Everything that exists, everything in the entire universe, is computable because it IS being computed.

Why?



Otherwise it would not exist....

If that's what Bruno claims, it's dead wrong...

?

What is referred by "that"?

Bruno




Edgar



On Thursday, January 9, 2014 1:51:07 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
Hi Edgar,

OK, so I think you are would say "yes" to the doctor who would save you from a life-threatening brain disorder by giving you a prosthetic brain that replicates your biological brain at some level.

If so, Bruno's UDA proves that the physical world as we experience it is not computable.

Terren



On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:
Terren,

First, it will only detract, not help, to try to shoehorn my theories into standard categories. It's an entirely new theory.

Yes, everything, including computers, Xperiences according to its actual form structure. A computer with sufficient self-monitoring and other human simulating forms would approximate organismic consciousness sufficient to satisfy a Turing test, including questions about how it felt and what it was sensing of its environment.

It's easy to understand by thinking of it this way. Imagine constructing a human biological robot piecewise by putting together all the actual purely inorganic chemicals of a human body in the right arrangements. Obviously the result would be a fully functioning human being with normal human consciousness and experience.

One doesn't need to add any mysterious metaphysical soul, consciousness or anything to that constructed biological robot to make it human. It is the actual physical components, acting together that gives it its humanness. Therefore any robot of sufficient complexity with sufficient self-monitoring circuits will be conscious according to the design of its form structure, just as the human robot is, and just as WE are.

Edgar




On Thursday, January 9, 2014 12:39:40 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
OK, that's actually pretty close to my own thinking on consciousness. FWIW I don't see all that big of a difference between what you've articulated regarding Xperience and what has been articulated by panpsychist philosophy. I agree with your point about the limitations of labels, but if they can help us categorize systems of thought they can be helpful. And I would certainly categorize your theory in the pansychist "realm".

That aside, I gather that if you built a robot that had the proper mental simulation of its world, based on its own sensory apparatus, with the complex feedback systems necessary, that robot would EXperience as well?

Terren


On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:29 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:
Terren,

I don't find the panpsychism label useful. Mine is an entirely new and independent theory.

The way it works starting from the beginning:

At the fundamental level reality consists only of computationally interacting information forms made real by occurring in the reality of being.

Every form can be said to 'experience' the other forms with which it interacts via changes in its own form. At the generic non- organismic level I call this Xperience. In fact in this interpretation the universe can be said to consist of Xperience only. Things and events are a subsidiary distinction both included in the concept of Xperience.

To answer your question in this sense a rock does Xperience the interaction of its information forms with other information forms, as do all information forms that make up the universe.

When it comes to organismic awareness we have a particular subset of Xperience we call EXperience in which some of the forms that are altered are those in that organism's internal mental simulation of reality. These are functionally no different than feedback forms on modern automobiles etc. that enable these devices to monitor (Xperience) their own states except in biological systems they are enormously more complex and detailed. The working of such biological self-monitoring systems is what we call experience.

So organismic EXperience is simply a specialized subset of the all pervasion phenomenon of Xperience that occurs in biological organisms with complex self monitoring systems associated with their internal mental simulations of the actual computational external reality they exist within.

So everything in the universe can be said to Xperience whatever its forms computationally interact with, but only biological information forms can be properly said to EXperience other forms, and then they always internally interprete and embellish that experience as some personal variant of a classical material world, something which does not actually exist expect in their internal mental simulations of the true external information world.

So to categorize Xperience as to what is actually occurring we examine the type of forms themselves to see what they actually do rather than trying to impose arbitrary human categories upon them....

Edgar



On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 5:43:43 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
Edgar,

Thanks for clarifying. Your theory sounds like a spinoff of panpsychism... would you say a rock is capable of experiencing? If not, what is the theoretical difference between a rock and a baby that demarcates what is capable of experiencing, and what isn't?

Terren


On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 2:58 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:
Terren,

All human babies are automatically consciousness. They are conscious of whatever input data they have. I don't see the point of your question which is why I didn't answer before...

Edgar



On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 2:42:24 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
On the contrary, I replied with a question that went unanswered.

It was a question about whether a human baby, fed a stream of virtual sense data as in the movie The Matrix, could be considered conscious in your theory, as you seemed to suggest that consciousness was a property of reality, as a function somehow of "ontological energy".

Terren

On Jan 8, 2014 1:49 PM, "Edgar L. Owen" <edga...@att.net> wrote:
Telmo,

Thanks for the link but see my new topic "A theory of consciousness" of a few days ago which no one has even commented on and which is much more reasonable and explanatory.

Edgar



On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 12:57:37 PM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote:
In case you haven't seen it...

http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1219

Seems like an attempt to recover materialism, which strikes me as
somewhat unexpected from Tegmark. Am I missing something?

Cheers,
Telmo.

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