On 10 Jan 2014, at 02:22, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Liz,
No, I don't agree with that at all. As I've said on a number of
occasions, reality is obviously computed because it exists.
So existence implies computability? Computability theory exists
because we can distinguish existence from computable existence.
What more convincing proof could there be? If Bruno's comp claims
reality is non-computable it's pure nonsense that is conclusively
falsified by the very existence of reality.
Comp predicts that you cannot compute if you will be reconstituted in
Washington or Moscow in the the self-duplication experiment, a bit
like QM explains that you cannot predict which slits a photon will go
through from your points of view when you look at it, in the
experiment of Young.
Bruno
Edgar
On Thursday, January 9, 2014 8:12:46 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
On 10 January 2014 13:51, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:
Liz and Terren,
I'm thinking more about this and think I've now changed my mind on
it. After all I (my mental state etc.) do continually change from
moment to moment yet I have no doubt I'm still me. I'm not the
'same' person, but I'm still me by all reasonable definitions.
Therefore assuming an exact momentary but SEPARATE clone, that clone
would no doubt tell everyone it was me, but the still extant me
would of course disagree.
Now assuming no 'ghost in the machine' or soul, for which no
evidence exists, and that our mental states and consciousness are
entirely a product of our biological bodies, then consider replacing
various parts with exact copies. If say a leg was replaced with an
exact copy (assuming instant healing to match the original) then I
doubt 'I' would notice any difference. So my brain was (could be)
instantaneously replaced with an exact copy with the exact neural
circuitry and neural states then I suppose 'I' would still think I
was me. I don't see why not.
So what's the point? I forgot what it was...
The point is that once you agree that your brain could in principle
be replaced with a copy, Bruno's "comp" arguments follow, with
various consequences (including reality being non-computable, I
think - but check with Bruno).
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