On 09 Jan 2014, at 20:20, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Terren,
Receiving a prosthetic brain is a (probably insurmountable)
technical problem. There could certainly be one functionally
equivalent to mine but it wouldn't be mine because it wouldn't have
the exact same history. If it did it would be mine in the first
place rather than some prosthetic one.
I don't know what that statement about Bruno's UDA actually says,
and I don't think it's relevant, because his axioms, and therefore
his conclusions, apply to human rather than reality math. Bruno's
comp is most certainly NOT my computational reality.
"MY" comp is he idea that the brain or the body is Turing emulable
(the rest is derived from that assumption).
We have asked you if your theory allow someone to surivive with an
artificial brainn but you never answered.
Also I asked you to develop what you mean by "computational", as
indeed it is clear that you are using the word "computational" in a
non standard (and unknown) sense.
Lastly, it is self-evident that "the physical world as we experience
it IS computable."
How could that be self-evident? Also, with the standrad meaning of
computable, this would entaill "comp" in "my" (standard) sense.
How else would it come about if it wasn't being computed by our minds?
Where does our mind come from?
That should be obvious..
Nothing is obvious.
Everything that exists, everything in the entire universe, is
computable because it IS being computed.
Why?
Otherwise it would not exist....
If that's what Bruno claims, it's dead wrong...
?
What is referred by "that"?
Bruno
Edgar
On Thursday, January 9, 2014 1:51:07 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
Hi Edgar,
OK, so I think you are would say "yes" to the doctor who would save
you from a life-threatening brain disorder by giving you a
prosthetic brain that replicates your biological brain at some level.
If so, Bruno's UDA proves that the physical world as we experience
it is not computable.
Terren
On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Edgar L. Owen <[email protected]> wrote:
Terren,
First, it will only detract, not help, to try to shoehorn my
theories into standard categories. It's an entirely new theory.
Yes, everything, including computers, Xperiences according to its
actual form structure. A computer with sufficient self-monitoring
and other human simulating forms would approximate organismic
consciousness sufficient to satisfy a Turing test, including
questions about how it felt and what it was sensing of its
environment.
It's easy to understand by thinking of it this way. Imagine
constructing a human biological robot piecewise by putting together
all the actual purely inorganic chemicals of a human body in the
right arrangements. Obviously the result would be a fully
functioning human being with normal human consciousness and
experience.
One doesn't need to add any mysterious metaphysical soul,
consciousness or anything to that constructed biological robot to
make it human. It is the actual physical components, acting together
that gives it its humanness. Therefore any robot of sufficient
complexity with sufficient self-monitoring circuits will be
conscious according to the design of its form structure, just as the
human robot is, and just as WE are.
Edgar
On Thursday, January 9, 2014 12:39:40 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
OK, that's actually pretty close to my own thinking on
consciousness. FWIW I don't see all that big of a difference between
what you've articulated regarding Xperience and what has been
articulated by panpsychist philosophy. I agree with your point about
the limitations of labels, but if they can help us categorize
systems of thought they can be helpful. And I would certainly
categorize your theory in the pansychist "realm".
That aside, I gather that if you built a robot that had the proper
mental simulation of its world, based on its own sensory apparatus,
with the complex feedback systems necessary, that robot would
EXperience as well?
Terren
On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:29 PM, Edgar L. Owen <[email protected]>
wrote:
Terren,
I don't find the panpsychism label useful. Mine is an entirely new
and independent theory.
The way it works starting from the beginning:
At the fundamental level reality consists only of computationally
interacting information forms made real by occurring in the reality
of being.
Every form can be said to 'experience' the other forms with which it
interacts via changes in its own form. At the generic non-organismic
level I call this Xperience. In fact in this interpretation the
universe can be said to consist of Xperience only. Things and events
are a subsidiary distinction both included in the concept of
Xperience.
To answer your question in this sense a rock does Xperience the
interaction of its information forms with other information forms,
as do all information forms that make up the universe.
When it comes to organismic awareness we have a particular subset of
Xperience we call EXperience in which some of the forms that are
altered are those in that organism's internal mental simulation of
reality. These are functionally no different than feedback forms on
modern automobiles etc. that enable these devices to monitor
(Xperience) their own states except in biological systems they are
enormously more complex and detailed. The working of such biological
self-monitoring systems is what we call experience.
So organismic EXperience is simply a specialized subset of the all
pervasion phenomenon of Xperience that occurs in biological
organisms with complex self monitoring systems associated with their
internal mental simulations of the actual computational external
reality they exist within.
So everything in the universe can be said to Xperience whatever its
forms computationally interact with, but only biological information
forms can be properly said to EXperience other forms, and then they
always internally interprete and embellish that experience as some
personal variant of a classical material world, something which does
not actually exist expect in their internal mental simulations of
the true external information world.
So to categorize Xperience as to what is actually occurring we
examine the type of forms themselves to see what they actually do
rather than trying to impose arbitrary human categories upon them....
Edgar
On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 5:43:43 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
Edgar,
Thanks for clarifying. Your theory sounds like a spinoff of
panpsychism... would you say a rock is capable of experiencing? If
not, what is the theoretical difference between a rock and a baby
that demarcates what is capable of experiencing, and what isn't?
Terren
On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 2:58 PM, Edgar L. Owen <[email protected]> wrote:
Terren,
All human babies are automatically consciousness. They are conscious
of whatever input data they have. I don't see the point of your
question which is why I didn't answer before...
Edgar
On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 2:42:24 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
On the contrary, I replied with a question that went unanswered.
It was a question about whether a human baby, fed a stream of
virtual sense data as in the movie The Matrix, could be considered
conscious in your theory, as you seemed to suggest that
consciousness was a property of reality, as a function somehow of
"ontological energy".
Terren
On Jan 8, 2014 1:49 PM, "Edgar L. Owen" <[email protected]> wrote:
Telmo,
Thanks for the link but see my new topic "A theory of consciousness"
of a few days ago which no one has even commented on and which is
much more reasonable and explanatory.
Edgar
On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 12:57:37 PM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote:
In case you haven't seen it...
http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1219
Seems like an attempt to recover materialism, which strikes me as
somewhat unexpected from Tegmark. Am I missing something?
Cheers,
Telmo.
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