Hi Bruno, Unfortunately I don't have enough familiarity with the math to follow you here. It is something I'd like to become fluent in one of these days but unfortunately I barely have enough time these days to read this list.

However one thing still nags me. I don't find it hard to imagine that given enough computational power, we could simulate a universe with alternative physics, that leads within the simulation to intelligent, conscious life forms, eventually. So Glak appears in our simulation. And if we can simulate it, well, it's already in the UD*, as well as the infinite computations going through Glak's state. The only way I can resolve this with your reply is that I fear you have to say conscious beings cannot exist in alternative physics simulations, but I'd love to be wrong here. Terren On Jan 10, 2014 1:27 PM, "Bruno Marchal" <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 10 Jan 2014, at 17:57, Terren Suydam wrote: > > > Bruno, > > It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined - but > only for a particular point of view. > > > Yes, but it is a very general one. It is the particular view of any > (universal) machine. It has to be the same for any person capable of being > incarnated/implemented through a finitely describable body relatively to > some universal numbers. > > All what you will add, by consciousness differentiation is local, > historical, and geographical. > > > > So I, Terren, experience one and only one physics, because my > consciousness is the selection criteria among the infinity of computations > going through my state. > > > Consciousness select you in the consistent extension, OK. But the > extensions themselves are provided by the infinitely many competing > universal numbers/computations below you substitution level, and the > constraints of the observation seen from the self (captured by the > intensional variant of G and G*, in the math). > > > > > But what about Glak, a being in an alternative physics? > > > If Glak mind obeys to the laws of Boole, and if Glak as a finite body, and > if he is self-referentially correct, then we share with Glak the same > sigma_1 true sentences, and he figures it out (by Bp & Dt) in the same way, > so we have the same physics. If Glak shows us an electron heaver than ours, > we can conclude that the mass of an electron is not a necessity, but a > contingency, a geographical fact, and there might be a law given the mass > electron relatively to that type of accessible physics (given that we > succeed in talking with Glak). > > > > > > > Glak's consciousness selects a unique/invariant physics for Glak, > > > OK, but it does it with some stability, and then Everett suggest that we > are multiplied collectively, and so do share most of our histories locally. > > Better to bet that we do have a collective comp first person plural > reality. > > > > but that emergent physical universe Glak experiences is characterized by > laws that are different from what I experience. > > > It is a different place, but comp suggest it will have the same law, > probably the same constant. But we get three physics, and they can be quite > alternated type of reality. It is like the electron might be heavier in > Heaven apparently :) > I suspect the three physics to be related to possible altered state of > consciousness here. The "soul" ("& p") resides in three hypostases (S4Grz1, > X1, X1*). > > Without incompleteness, such comp physics would have collapsed into > classical logic, and physics would have been without law, the "multiverse > would be smooth and and still more multiple, in the high continua, > inconsistent. That does not exist, thanks to inompleteness. The laws of > prediction of events are the same for all creature, but perhaps with some > variants. > > Bruno > > > Terren > > > On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 5:28 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> On 10 Jan 2014, at 09:58, LizR wrote: >> >> On 10 January 2014 21:54, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:45, LizR wrote: >>> >>> On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is >>>> (locally) Lorentz invariant. If it is, then c is just a unit conversion >>>> factor between the + and - signature terms. It's value is arbitrary, like >>>> "how many feet in a mile", which is why it is now an exact number in SI >>>> units. >>>> >>> Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to 1. >>> >>> So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution - namely >>> the one we experience? So is this an alternative to the WAP - we experience >>> a universe compatible with our existence because such a universe has to >>> drop out of the interations of conscious beings in Platonia? >>> >>> >>> It is not the same. WAP use a form of ASSA, where comp uses only RSSA. >>> (Absolute versus Relative self sampling assumptions). >>> >>> Ah, I don't quite understand that but I feel like a dim light migvht >> have appeared. >> >> >>> We might revise step seven, as this should be understood from it. Any >>> TOE (that is any first order logical specification of any universal system >>> taken in the ontology) must give rise to the same physics, at least for >>> each pints of view. It gives the same theology, more generally, and physics >>> is defined through it. >>> >> >> Remind me, which is step 7? >> >> >> In steps 0-6, you grasped that from a first person perspective we are >> unaware of the reconstitution delays, that they does not change the >> probability calculus (if it exists) and that this remains true for the >> change between "physical implementation" and "physical virtual >> implementation". >> >> In step 7, you are supposed to be in a physical universe containing a >> never stopping execution of a UD. So it is like in step six, except that >> the indeterminacy domain is infinite. You can realize then that to predict >> (in a conceptual and in an exact way) any first person experience you can >> have, like when doing a pizza, you need to apply the "probability calculus" >> on all your "reconstitutions" in the UD* (the complete running of the UD). >> So physics is reduced to that probability calculus on all your >> computations. OK? >> >> >> >> >> >>> We can come back on this. >>> >> >> Yes please. This is very interesting! >> >> >> Thanks. tell me if you (re)saw the step 7 point. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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