Not sure I see the relevance, except to corroborate the idea
(notwithstanding Bruno's comments) that mine and Glak's worlds would be
separated as a result of the measure of stable continuations of those
worlds... or were you making a different point?

Terren
On Jan 10, 2014 5:13 PM, "meekerdb" <[email protected]> wrote:

>  On 1/10/2014 8:57 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>
>
>  It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined - but
> only for a particular point of view.  So I, Terren, experience one and only
> one physics, because my consciousness is the selection criteria among the
> infinity of computations going through my state. But what about Glak, a
> being in an alternative physics?  Glak's consciousness selects a
> unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak
> experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I
> experience.
>
>
> But then if you ask, "Why do not I, Terren, become Glak and vice-versa?"
> you see that the answer must be that it would be an improbable continuation
> of my brain states to suddenly instantiate a different physics and
> experience being Glak.  This is like the "white rabbit problem", except in
> the form of why don't I turn into a white rabbit, that Bruno keeps saying
> must have a solution (if comp is true).
>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to [email protected].
> To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to