2014/1/12, Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com>: > 2014/1/10, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: >> >> On 10 Jan 2014, at 13:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote: >> >>> 2014/1/10, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: >>>> >>>> On 10 Jan 2014, at 10:52, Alberto G. Corona wrote: >>>> >>>>> 2014/1/10, Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com>: >>>>>> 2014/1/10, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 09 Jan 2014, at 23:00, Stephen Paul King wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Dear LizR, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> That is the key question that remains, IMHO, unanswered. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It is answered, completely. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Stephen, LizR >>>>>> >>>>>> From what I can understand, once cleared from >>>>>> arithmetic-logic-metaphysic misticism, the determination of the >>>>>> laws >>>>>> from infinite "competitive" computations follow Solomonoff's >>>>>> theorem >>>>>> of inductive inference. >>>>>> >>>>>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomonoff >>>>>> 's_theory_of_inductive_inference >>>>>> >>>>>> Or it should. But the problem is that Bruno did not gives a weight >>>>>> for >>>>>> each computation in order to stablish the outcome of what the >>>>>> pencil >>>>>> does in the air. Neither the algorithmic complexity of each >>>>>> computation (Solomonoff) nor any other. Therefore, it is a >>>>>> complete >>>>>> chaos cut by some magic 1p collapse of computations, following QM >>>>>> fashion. And there is where the aritmetic-logic-metaphysic >>>>>> mysticism >>>>>> does his job. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ... Job that I do not know how it is possible if a computation that >>>>> does everithing OK until it convert the pencil in a fat female >>>>> soprano >>>>> (with big algorithmic complexity) is equally compatible with all >>>>> my 1p >>>>> observations until that moment, is equally probable than the >>>>> computation with much less algorithmic complexity that does its job >>>>> right and moves the pencil gracefully without emitting molesting >>>>> noises. >>>>> >>>>> So anything goes >>>> >>>> Yes, that is the white rabbit problem. Most of my earlier posts on >>>> this list has consisted in explaining why algorithmic complexity >>>> cannot work. It surely plays some role, but we have to extract it >>>> from >>>> the redundancy, no imposed it, as this would mock the consciousness >>>> invariance, and the FPI invariance which follows from comp. >>>> Of course, if you think you can eliminate the white rabbit with only >>>> algorithmic complexity, please do, but you will have to explain why >>>> the 'non algorithmically simple programs' do no more interfere with >>>> the FPI global indeterminacy, and by the delay invariance for the 1p >>>> experiences, that does not seem obvious at all. >>>> You do seem close to grasp the problem. >>> >>> In any case the problem is in your theory. >> >> >> That is the result. Yes, it is a problem for comp (which is just >> mechanism after Church, Kleene, Turing, Post). >> Then, using the most classical theory of knowledge, the problem >> becomes a problem in arithmetic. >> >> >> >>> QM predict a infinite small >>> probability for white rabbits, while yours infer a decent amount of >>> them until some cut criteria emerges. And that is not my work, but >>> yours. >> >> QM predict all this by using comp, or an unintelligible dualist theory >> of observation. >> >> Yes, with comp we must derive the wave or the matrix from self- >> observation, itself extracted from arithmetical self-references >> (Gödel, Löb, Solovay). >> >> >> >> >>> >>> What is FPI? >> >> First Person Indeterminacy. UDA step 3. >> >> >> >>> Although it often seems so, this is not a group devoted >>> to obtaining a certification on Bruno Marchall comp theories. >> >> >> I have a theorem in a theory (or class of theories extended in an >> effective sense). >> >> >> >>> You >>> have to be more didactic and can not rely on your writings when asking >>> concrete questions. If the number of acronyms + theology, logic and >>> psychologic concepts mixed in single statements grows when the >>> conversation gets more concrete, then it is no surprise that people >>> don´t understand you. >> >> Who does not understand? If you have a problem of understanding, just >> ask. The subject matter (the mind-body problem) is everything but >> simple. Yet we can reason, even get startling conclusions from >> admitting very weak form of mechanism. >> >> >> >> >>> There are many didactic tricks that you refuse >>> to use like metaphors and examples. >> >> I avoid metaphor indeed, but that is the custom in science. Examples? >> You can find them in the textbook. And/or you can ask any one when you >> feel the need. >> >> >> >>> And this gives to me the >>> impression that you are hiding consciously or uncosnciously a great >>> flaw. >> >> ? >> >> >> >>> >>> And my observation is that no one understand you in what is original >>> in your theory. >> >> ? >> >> >> >> >>> Apart from the brilliant and interesting first steps. >>> That is why I read you with attention. >> >> Where precisely the flaw appears? >> >> >> >>> >>> But until now I don´t find a satisfactory explanation and you confess >>> that there is not, for the abundance of white rabbits in your theory. >> >> I am a scientist. I do not defend any theory. I just reduce the mind- >> body problem into a purely arithmetical "belief in body" problem. >> >> I illustrate that with computer science, and usual definitions in >> theology and metaphysics, when we assume comp, we can translate >> theological problem into problem of number theory or computer science. >> >> >> >> >> >>> You simply say: the fact that we have no fat soprano singers and white >>> rabbits aroud, and the fact that comp is true (sorry, it is a theory >>> that all of us must assume if we are gong to talk in this list) means >>> that comp have no such flaw and is a task of everyone to find how. >>> >>> No . It is a task of yourself. >> >> No. It is a task for all honest or correct universal machine trying to >> figure out why there is something and why does it hurt. >> >> May be you are not interested in fundamental question. We cannot know >> the truth, but we can try theories. Computationalism makes sense, as >> we don't know non computable laws in nature, except for the wave >> collapse, for those who believe it is physical. >> >> Even a quantum computer is Turing emulable, and I do not bound the >> substitution level. Then most of the consequences remains true for >> most of the "non-comp" machine's extensions. >> >> I don't know if comp is true or not, I just explains the consequences, >> and show their testability. >> >> >> >> >>> >>> From my side, I have my own explanation of why algorithmic complexity >>> plays a role in solomonoff theory of universal induction, without >>> taking it as an axiom .. And this is the computational nature of life. >>> That is not the immaterial computation of yours, but the material >>> computation subject to resource limits of biological systems. I did my >>> job. >>> >>> http://ilevolucionista.blogspot.com.es/2008/06/ockham-razor-and-genetic-algoritms-life.html >> >> I basically agree with that. >> Yet, such explanation relies on comp, I think, and all what I say is >> that with comp we must somehow extend that form of evolution for the >> laws of physics themselves, through a form of dream competitions, to >> put it roughly.

It does not reiles on comp in the way you mean. It does not need minds, Just with the existence of bacteria is enough. It relies in physical concepts like entropy and resources and time limits that are not in a comp Evolution is not a theory. It is a fact observed in nature. evolution is a doxatic term that hides a great misunderstanding of Natural selection. NS is the true theory, that is very complex and predictive: E. O. Wilson predicted the characteristics and climate and life of an hypothetical mammal that could live in colonies with a single reproductive queen. And this animal was found. Natural selection need at least two mechanism: variation and selection (and a mechanism of information transmission across generations). Your variation mechanism is known UD. What is the selection mechanism? > >> >> How can a Turing emulable process distinguish in the first person way >> a computation in nature from a computation in arithmetic? >> >>> >>> I simply ask for yours. >> >> UDA, the 8, or 7, steps gives a problem for any one accepting comp, >> including your's in the link provided, unless you can answer the >> question above. >> >> I am just illustrating that comp makes it possible to reason more >> rigorously, thanks to computer science and the mathematical discovery >> of the "universal" numbers/systems/interpreters/machines/theories/... >> >> UDA is the problem, and AUDA is the computer's response to that >> problem, already precise enough on some physics that it can be tested. >> (and up to now it fits, so comp+classical theory of knowledge is not >> yet refuted). >> >> I just take fully the consequence of two facts: the incompleteness >> theorem, and the fact that the machine can prove their own >> incompleteness theorem. >> >> I am not solving a problem, I am just saying that if comp is true; >> then there is a big door to push, in some different direction than the >> Aristotelian one, on the fundamental. >> >> Bruno >> >> >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Alberto. >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>> send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com >>>>> . >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>> send an >>>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything- >>>> l...@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Alberto. >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>> send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > -- > Alberto. > -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.