Bruno, It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined - but only for a particular point of view. So I, Terren, experience one and only one physics, because my consciousness is the selection criteria among the infinity of computations going through my state. But what about Glak, a being in an alternative physics? Glak's consciousness selects a unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I experience.

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Terren On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 5:28 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 10 Jan 2014, at 09:58, LizR wrote: > > On 10 January 2014 21:54, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:45, LizR wrote: >> >> On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>> >>> I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is >>> (locally) Lorentz invariant. If it is, then c is just a unit conversion >>> factor between the + and - signature terms. It's value is arbitrary, like >>> "how many feet in a mile", which is why it is now an exact number in SI >>> units. >>> >> Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to 1. >> >> So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution - namely >> the one we experience? So is this an alternative to the WAP - we experience >> a universe compatible with our existence because such a universe has to >> drop out of the interations of conscious beings in Platonia? >> >> >> It is not the same. WAP use a form of ASSA, where comp uses only RSSA. >> (Absolute versus Relative self sampling assumptions). >> >> Ah, I don't quite understand that but I feel like a dim light migvht have > appeared. > > >> We might revise step seven, as this should be understood from it. Any TOE >> (that is any first order logical specification of any universal system >> taken in the ontology) must give rise to the same physics, at least for >> each pints of view. It gives the same theology, more generally, and physics >> is defined through it. >> > > Remind me, which is step 7? > > > In steps 0-6, you grasped that from a first person perspective we are > unaware of the reconstitution delays, that they does not change the > probability calculus (if it exists) and that this remains true for the > change between "physical implementation" and "physical virtual > implementation". > > In step 7, you are supposed to be in a physical universe containing a > never stopping execution of a UD. So it is like in step six, except that > the indeterminacy domain is infinite. You can realize then that to predict > (in a conceptual and in an exact way) any first person experience you can > have, like when doing a pizza, you need to apply the "probability calculus" > on all your "reconstitutions" in the UD* (the complete running of the UD). > So physics is reduced to that probability calculus on all your > computations. OK? > > > > > >> We can come back on this. >> > > Yes please. This is very interesting! > > > Thanks. tell me if you (re)saw the step 7 point. > > Bruno > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.