Dear Brent and LizR, Could it be that we are really discussing the Word Problem? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Word_problem_for_groups
Note the relation to computations, via the use of recursively enumerable sets! A pair of words, as defined in the Wiki article, could represent the content of a pair of observers (each defined per Bruno's theoretical construction as the intersection of an infinity of computations). On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 2:04 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > On 1/12/2014 12:55 AM, LizR wrote: > > On 12 January 2014 19:53, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to interpret, >> they mainly make models. By a model is meant a mathematical construct >> which, with the addition of certain verbal interpretations, describes >> observed phenomena. The justification of such a mathematical construct is >> solely and precisely that it is expected to work. >> --—John von Neumann >> > How does one know which mathematical construct to try out, to see if it > will work? Surely interpretation becomes necessary at some point. > > > Von Neumann recognizes above that some interpretation is necessary for the > application of mathematics, "the addition of certain verbal > interpretations". Which mathematics to try may be suggested by the > interpretation of some earlier theories, which is what I see as useful > about metaphysics - it may suggest improved physics. > > But the interesting thing about this quote, which I think is generally > overlooked, is that even those theories/models we think of a providing > "good explanations" only seem that way because of familiarity. We think > easily of gravity as explaining the orbit of the Moon. But in the 17th > century it prompted the question, "But what is pushing on the Moon to > provide the force?" Now we say there is no force, it's just a distortion > of space, so the Moon is just going in a "straight line". So the > observable facts stay the same, the predictions become a little more > accurate, but the ontological "explanation" varies drastically. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.