On 19 Jan 2014, at 21:34, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Bruno,
On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 5:24 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 17 Jan 2014, at 21:26, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Bruno,
You wrote:
"Physics emerges from the FPI on UD*. It is an open question if
there is a winner program, but empirically we can bet that the
winner, if it exists, can emulate a quantum universal machine. But
it might be a quantum universal machine + an oracle, or a quantum
machine defined on a ring, etc. We just still don't know."
Does the "winner" need to be absolute (over all possible
tournaments of all possible computations) or could there be winners
with respect to some finite tournaments on finite set of
computations?
Below your substitution level, there is only one tournaments, and it
is always (by step seven) on *all* computation going through the
state of the Löbian machine doing the prediction.
Is this tournament eternal?
I would say that it is out of time. It is like 2+2=4. The category
"time" does not apply to "2+2=4". It does not make sense to ask if
2+2=4 is true at some moment. What can make sense, and makes sense in
arithmetic, will be statement like "relatively to the universal
numbers 456, the entity 678 comes to believe that "2+2=4" after
3456700023762 time-steps at about 10^(10^1000) UD-time step.
So the tournament is "eternal" in some poetical sense, but time is in
fact no relevant, as it is an internal relative notion, like in SR.
Can it be considered to be separable into subtournaments in a
relative sense?
This cannot be entirely excluded. What happens below the subst level
is still unknown. We know that there is a sort of statistical
competition between all (universal, or not actually) numbers, but we
cannot even exclude some role for non computable entities. One thing
should be sure: the measure, if it exists is unique (by step seven),
and even given by Bp & Dt. Now, if our level is very low, I can
conceive some notion of "subtournaments", but, with the definition of
physics provided, this would mean that we are in a multi-multiverse,
with clusters of different multiverses, and that would still be
clusters of geographies.
Bruno
The difference between geographies and physics might depend on the
precise substitution level.
In fact comp allows us to make precise the difference between
physics and geography, with interetsing slight variants.
OK. :-)
Bruno
Think: Nash equilibria.
It seems to me that while there are no Absolute Winners, there
can be "local winners" or "Victors" in tournament between
computations in a finite set of computations that are "interacting"
in some way.
Could this give us a coherent notion of a measure?
On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 3:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 17 Jan 2014, at 12:46, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Friday, 17 January 2014, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 16 Jan 2014, at 19:00, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/16/2014 12:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like
the Intel
CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the
sense that a
computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost
certainly
correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather,
that a
computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or
body, or
entire planet and all the people on it.
Jason
I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the
brain
is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the
behaviour of
any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),
But Bruno concludes that physics is not computable. So does that
imply one should say "no" to the doctor?
Comp explains that physics is not *entirely* computable, that is
we cannot predict all sequences of observations. But that is
already the case thanks to QM (with our without Everett). So no
worry!
Are you referring to quantum indeterminacy? But isn't even that
computable from a third person perspective, the UDA generating
every branch of the multiverse?
The UD cannot generate a non computable sequence in one branch, or
through one computation.
But the UD can dovetail on the coupling of one universal number
multiplied (coupled with) a dovetailing on *all* sequences, making
the indeterminacy recoverable statistically by the multiplied
machines. (cf the iterated self-multiplication).
- Computable means generates by one program.
- FPI-recoverable means first person "experienceable" (in the comp
usual sense) by a machine multiplied into infinity in the UD, or in
arithmetic.
Physics emerges from the FPI on UD*. It is an open question if
there is a winner program, but empirically we can bet that the
winner, if it exists, can emulate a quantum universal machine. But
it might be a quantum universal machine + an oracle, or a quantum
machine defined on a ring, etc. We just still don't know.
Bruno
But without Everett, I would perhaps not even have dared to
suggest that comp might be true.
And yes, the computable aspect of nature, even, with collapse,
might eventually be a symptom that comp is false. but up to now,
the most startling aspect of the observable reality confirms the
most startling asoect of the consequence of computationalism.
Bruno
Brent
including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
using a computer. The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if
physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not
computable.
Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely
figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if
there
is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.
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Kindest Regards,
Stephen Paul King
Senior Researcher
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[email protected]
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