On 17 Jan 2014, at 21:26, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Bruno,

  You wrote:
"Physics emerges from the FPI on UD*. It is an open question if there is a winner program, but empirically we can bet that the winner, if it exists, can emulate a quantum universal machine. But it might be a quantum universal machine + an oracle, or a quantum machine defined on a ring, etc. We just still don't know."

Does the "winner" need to be absolute (over all possible tournaments of all possible computations) or could there be winners with respect to some finite tournaments on finite set of computations?


Below your substitution level, there is only one tournaments, and it is always (by step seven) on *all* computation going through the state of the Löbian machine doing the prediction.

The difference between geographies and physics might depend on the precise substitution level.

In fact comp allows us to make precise the difference between physics and geography, with interetsing slight variants.

Bruno






Think: Nash equilibria.

It seems to me that while there are no Absolute Winners, there can be "local winners" or "Victors" in tournament between computations in a finite set of computations that are "interacting" in some way.

Could this give us a coherent notion of a measure?



On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 3:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 17 Jan 2014, at 12:46, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Friday, 17 January 2014, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 16 Jan 2014, at 19:00, meekerdb wrote:

On 1/16/2014 12:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the Intel CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the sense that a computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost certainly correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather, that a computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body, or
entire planet and all the people on it.

Jason
I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the brain
is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour of
any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),

But Bruno concludes that physics is not computable. So does that imply one should say "no" to the doctor?

Comp explains that physics is not *entirely* computable, that is we cannot predict all sequences of observations. But that is already the case thanks to QM (with our without Everett). So no worry!

Are you referring to quantum indeterminacy? But isn't even that computable from a third person perspective, the UDA generating every branch of the multiverse?

The UD cannot generate a non computable sequence in one branch, or through one computation.

But the UD can dovetail on the coupling of one universal number multiplied (coupled with) a dovetailing on *all* sequences, making the indeterminacy recoverable statistically by the multiplied machines. (cf the iterated self-multiplication).

- Computable means generates by one program.

- FPI-recoverable means first person "experienceable" (in the comp usual sense) by a machine multiplied into infinity in the UD, or in arithmetic.

Physics emerges from the FPI on UD*. It is an open question if there is a winner program, but empirically we can bet that the winner, if it exists, can emulate a quantum universal machine. But it might be a quantum universal machine + an oracle, or a quantum machine defined on a ring, etc. We just still don't know.

Bruno









But without Everett, I would perhaps not even have dared to suggest that comp might be true.

And yes, the computable aspect of nature, even, with collapse, might eventually be a symptom that comp is false. but up to now, the most startling aspect of the observable reality confirms the most startling asoect of the consequence of computationalism.

Bruno


Brent

including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
using a computer. The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if
physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not computable.
Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely
figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if there
is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.



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