On 17 Jan 2014, at 23:24, John Mikes wrote:
Stathis and List:
from time to time it is useful to recall what we are thinking behind
'words'. Is the 'brain' as used in this exchange indeed
'brainfunction'? (ref. to "functionalism vs computationalism")
To 'preserve mind' begs the question how it is differentiated in
this exchange?
?
"preserve minds" means that it is not differentiated. Thinks about you
after the WM-duplication, before you open the door of the
reconstitution box.
Then the differentiation occurs when opening the door, as your "same
mind" is put in two different alternate context (Washington and Moscow).
Then again 'intelligence' is a flexible item (I start from "inter" -
"lego" = to read between the lines, not to stick to the (written?)
words proper).
OK.
In fact this is my criteria for a theory. The theory is 100% invariant
with respect to the choice of wording.
When we write the theory in first order logic, this is guarantied.
The theory
x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)
x *0 = 0
x*s(y) = x*y + x
is equivalent with the theory (assuming the equality axiom for elise
(that "x elise x", "x elise y implies y elise x", etc.)
variable1 paul johnson elise variable1
variable1 paul hercule(variable2) elise hercule(variable1 paul
variable2)
variable1 claude johnson elise johnson
variable1 claude hercule(varable2) elise (variable1 claude varable2 )
paul variable1
So if you want to see if your theory does not introduce implicit
intuition through the choice of some wording, just change all words ...
In mathematics, we are always left with "only relata", like in
Mermin's QM.
That is why I am not happy when Stephen says that it assumes
existence. It could have said that it assumes popiutyscaptle. I need
some axiom on that to say anything ...
The advantage of proceeding like this is that when you prove a theorem
it will be true in all possible interpretations of the theory.
Bruno
The 'non-computable physics' in Penrose's brain begs the question:
"STILL" or "NOT AT ALL"?
Is the acceptance of the NEW a mindfunction only, (increasing the
knowledge-base), or can be done by a hypercomputer as well (without
proper programming for the so far unknowables' input???)
And I hate the references to 'zombies', whatever one thinks about
them.
I stick to my common sense in my agnosticism.
John Mikes
On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 7:28 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com
> wrote:
On 16 January 2014 23:08, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> On 16 Jan 2014, at 09:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like
the Intel
>>> CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the
sense that
>>> a
>>> computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost
>>> certainly
>>> correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but
rather, that a
>>> computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or
body, or
>>> entire planet and all the people on it.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>
>>
>> I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
>> metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the
brain
>> is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
>> digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the
behaviour of
>> any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),
>> including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
>> that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
>> using a computer. The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if
>> physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not
computable.
>> Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain
rarely
>> figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if
there
>> is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
>> computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.
>
>
> OK. But in a non standard sense of functionalism, as in the
philosophy of
> mind, functionalism is used for a subset of computationalism.
Functionalism
> is computationalism with some (unclear) susbtitution level in mind
(usually
> the neurons).
>
> Now, I would like to see a precise definition of "your"
functionalism. If
> you take *all* functions, it becomes trivially true, I think. But
any
> restriction on the accepted functions, can perhaps lead to some
interesting
> thesis. For example, the functions computable with this or that
oracles, the
> continuous functions, etc.
Briefly, computationalism is the idea that you could replace the brain
with a Turing machine and you would preserve the mind. This would not
be possible if there is non-computable physics in the brain, as for
example Penrose proposes. But in that case, you could replace the
brain with whatever other type of device is needed, such as a
hypercomputer, and still preserve the mind. I would say that is
consistent with functionalism but not computationalism. The idea that
replicating the function of the brain by whatever means would not
preserve the mind, i.e. would result in a philosophical zombie, is
inconsistent with functionalism.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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