Stephen: thanks for your consent and the book review. I have the oher one. John
On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 5:09 PM, Stephen Paul King < [email protected]> wrote: > Dear Folks, > > I agree with John's most resent remark and his recommendation of the > books. Here is a nice review of Collapse of Chaos: > > http://www.thenewhumanities.net/books/Book%20Reviews44.html > > > On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 4:43 PM, John Mikes <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: >> *Bruno*, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate >> my input). >> *"JM: What IS the 'mind' you PRESERVE?"* >> *BM:* My consciousness. - It means that I can surivive in the usal >> clinical sense, >> the brain digital replacement. I don't need to define my >> consciousness to >> say yes to a doctor. No more than I need to define "pain" to >> the doctor who >> look at me. I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the >> doctor is serious. >> >> *JM:Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do >> not * >> *duplicate. It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than >> knowable * >> *within today's inventory.* >> >> *BM: *No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for >> the truth of >> comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then >> Plato-Plotin >> gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted. >> (his theology and physics). >> ( >> Bruno, *M Y consciousness is (my) 'response to relations'* whatever >> show up. >> It includes lots of unknown items (with unknowable qualia?) beside the >> ones >> handled WITHIN my brain. >> So I do not trust the 'doctor's digital contraption to include *ME - >> (total) - o*nly my >> temporary brainfunction, i.e. knowledge-base of mine as of today. Your >> "true" >> theology is a mystery to me. How "true" can it be? >> Devising our physical world is a human effort due to the temporary status >> of our >> inventory. To think beyond it is sci-fi (cf my ref. to Liz about Jack >> Cohen and J. >> Stewart's "Collapse of Chaos" and "Figment of Reality" - the >> Zarathustrans). >> >> John M >> >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: >>> >>> Bruno, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input). >>> >>> What IS the *'mind'* you PRESERVE? >>> >>> >>> My consciousness. >>> It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain >>> digital replacement. >>> I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor. >>> No more than I need to define "pain" to the doctor who look at me. >>> I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do >>> not duplicate. (It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than >>> knowable within today's inventory. >>> >>> >>> No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the >>> truth of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, >>> then Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is >>> refuted. (his theology and physics). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> I find 'mindcontent' different from 'mind' (what I don't really know) >>> and package it into 'mentality'. . >>> >>> I have no squalm against "arithmetical reality" - a notion deduced from >>> (human?) math-thinking. >>> >>> >>> Arithmetical Realism is the idea that human are correct when thinking >>> that the number relation are true even for the non humans. >>> It is not because a human believe in x, that x is necessarily false for >>> non humans. Anyway, it because I can conceive that AR is false, that I >>> politely put it in the bag of the hypotheses. >>> >>> >>> >>> What I mean as 'reality' (if it 'exists' - another 'if' to explain) is a >>> belief that it SHOULD be - as most of us think of the world. No evidence, >>> no facts. >>> >>> Physical World (and whatever pertains to it: like 'physixs') is an >>> up-to-date explanation of yesterday's knowledge of some phenomena we >>> adjusted up to our capabilities in a 'world'-image we derived. >>> >>> >>> Yes, but that is why I do not assume anything being both primitive and >>> physical. You make my point. >>> But I need to start from some assumptions, and I use 2+2=4, and the "yes >>> doctor", which links computer science and theology. The physics is then >>> explanied constructively by the theology of the true machine, with true >>> some technical precise sense (due to Tarski). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Existence is loosly identified in my vocabulary: whatever we MAY think >>> of DOES exist in our mind (see above). Not necessarily in formats we are >>> (capable of) handling. 3p evidence? who said so? >>> >>> >>> Eventually we have to look at nature to try to refute the theory. But >>> you are right, it is not 3p evidence, but only (with comp) 1p-plural >>> sharable evidences. >>> >>> >>> Time? I can't walk without crutches. My crutches don't walk alone. >>> >>> >>> ? >>> >>> >>> >>> Axioms? a reversed logic, not the theorems (theories?) are >>> axiom-dependent, the axioms are made to facilitate the theoretical 'dasein' >>> of theorems. Artificially. >>> >>> and so on. >>> >>> >>> ? If you use agnosticism to demolish all theories, you kill science, and >>> will get the authoritative arguments instead, like the pseudo sciences and >>> religions. >>> On the contrary, I think that agnosticism should favor the theoretical >>> approach, as it remains modest and NEVER pretends to provide truth, only >>> light and shadows on the unknown. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> John M >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 17 Jan 2014, at 23:24, John Mikes wrote: >>>> >>>> Stathis and List: >>>> >>>> from time to time it is useful to recall what we are thinking behind >>>> 'words'. Is the *'brain'* as used in this exchange indeed* >>>> 'brainfunction'*? (ref. to "functionalism vs computationalism") >>>> To 'preserve *mind*' begs the question how it is differentiated in >>>> this exchange? >>>> >>>> >>>> ? >>>> "preserve minds" means that it is not differentiated. Thinks about you >>>> after the WM-duplication, before you open the door of the reconstitution >>>> box. >>>> Then the differentiation occurs when opening the door, as your "same >>>> mind" is put in two different alternate context (Washington and Moscow). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Then again* 'intelligence'* is a flexible item (I start from "inter" >>>> - "lego" = to read between the lines, not to stick to the (written?) words >>>> proper). >>>> >>>> >>>> OK. >>>> >>>> In fact this is my criteria for a theory. The theory is 100% invariant >>>> with respect to the choice of wording. >>>> >>>> When we write the theory in first order logic, this is guarantied. >>>> >>>> The theory >>>> >>>> x + 0 = x >>>> x + s(y) = s(x + y) >>>> >>>> x *0 = 0 >>>> x*s(y) = x*y + x >>>> >>>> is equivalent with the theory (assuming the equality axiom for elise >>>> (that "x elise x", "x elise y implies y elise x", etc.) >>>> >>>> variable1 paul johnson elise variable1 >>>> variable1 paul hercule(variable2) elise hercule(variable1 paul >>>> variable2) >>>> >>>> variable1 claude johnson elise johnson >>>> variable1 claude hercule(varable2) elise (variable1 claude varable2 ) >>>> paul variable1 >>>> >>>> So if you want to see if your theory does not introduce implicit >>>> intuition through the choice of some wording, just change all words ... >>>> >>>> In mathematics, we are always left with "only relata", like in Mermin's >>>> QM. >>>> >>>> That is why I am not happy when Stephen says that it assumes existence. >>>> It could have said that it assumes popiutyscaptle. I need some axiom on >>>> that to say anything ... >>>> >>>> The advantage of proceeding like this is that when you prove a theorem >>>> it will be true in all possible interpretations of the theory. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The *'non-computable physics'* in Penrose's brain begs the question: >>>> *"STILL" >>>> or "NOT AT ALL"?* >>>> Is the acceptance of the* NEW* a *mind*function only, (increasing the >>>> knowledge-base), or can be done by a hypercomputer as well (without proper >>>> programming for the so far unknowables' input???) >>>> And I hate the references to *'zombies',* whatever one thinks about >>>> them. >>>> I stick to my common sense* in my agnosticism*. >>>> >>>> John Mikes >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 7:28 PM, Stathis Papaioannou < >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 16 January 2014 23:08, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> > On 16 Jan 2014, at 09:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>> > >>>>> >> On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>> >>>>> >>> The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like >>>>> the Intel >>>>> >>> CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the >>>>> sense that >>>>> >>> a >>>>> >>> computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost >>>>> >>> certainly >>>>> >>> correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather, >>>>> that a >>>>> >>> computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or >>>>> body, or >>>>> >>> entire planet and all the people on it. >>>>> >>> >>>>> >>> Jason >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational >>>>> >> metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the >>>>> brain >>>>> >> is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a >>>>> >> digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour >>>>> of >>>>> >> any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable), >>>>> >> including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means >>>>> >> that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie >>>>> >> using a computer. The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if >>>>> >> physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not >>>>> computable. >>>>> >> Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely >>>>> >> figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if >>>>> there >>>>> >> is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates >>>>> >> computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism. >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > OK. But in a non standard sense of functionalism, as in the >>>>> philosophy of >>>>> > mind, functionalism is used for a subset of computationalism. >>>>> Functionalism >>>>> > is computationalism with some (unclear) susbtitution level in mind >>>>> (usually >>>>> > the neurons). >>>>> > >>>>> > Now, I would like to see a precise definition of "your" >>>>> functionalism. If >>>>> > you take *all* functions, it becomes trivially true, I think. But any >>>>> > restriction on the accepted functions, can perhaps lead to some >>>>> interesting >>>>> > thesis. For example, the functions computable with this or that >>>>> oracles, the >>>>> > continuous functions, etc. >>>>> >>>>> Briefly, computationalism is the idea that you could replace the brain >>>>> with a Turing machine and you would preserve the mind. This would not >>>>> be possible if there is non-computable physics in the brain, as for >>>>> example Penrose proposes. But in that case, you could replace the >>>>> brain with whatever other type of device is needed, such as a >>>>> hypercomputer, and still preserve the mind. I would say that is >>>>> consistent with functionalism but not computationalism. The idea that >>>>> replicating the function of the brain by whatever means would not >>>>> preserve the mind, i.e. would result in a philosophical zombie, is >>>>> inconsistent with functionalism. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Stathis Papaioannou >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >> [email protected]. >> >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > > -- > > Kindest Regards, > > Stephen Paul King > > Senior Researcher > > Mobile: (864) 567-3099 > > [email protected] > > http://www.provensecure.us/ > > > “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of > the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain > information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and > exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as > attorney work product. 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