On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input).
What IS the 'mind' you PRESERVE?
My consciousness.
It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain
digital replacement.
I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor.
No more than I need to define "pain" to the doctor who look at me.
I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious.
Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I
do not duplicate. (It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am
more than knowable within today's inventory.
No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the
truth of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is
true, then Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and
Aristotle is refuted. (his theology and physics).
I find 'mindcontent' different from 'mind' (what I don't really
know) and package it into 'mentality'. .
I have no squalm against "arithmetical reality" - a notion deduced
from (human?) math-thinking.
Arithmetical Realism is the idea that human are correct when thinking
that the number relation are true even for the non humans.
It is not because a human believe in x, that x is necessarily false
for non humans. Anyway, it because I can conceive that AR is false,
that I politely put it in the bag of the hypotheses.
What I mean as 'reality' (if it 'exists' - another 'if' to explain)
is a belief that it SHOULD be - as most of us think of the world.
No evidence, no facts.
Physical World (and whatever pertains to it: like 'physixs') is an
up-to-date explanation of yesterday's knowledge of some phenomena we
adjusted up to our capabilities in a 'world'-image we derived.
Yes, but that is why I do not assume anything being both primitive and
physical. You make my point.
But I need to start from some assumptions, and I use 2+2=4, and the
"yes doctor", which links computer science and theology. The physics
is then explanied constructively by the theology of the true machine,
with true some technical precise sense (due to Tarski).
Existence is loosly identified in my vocabulary: whatever we MAY
think of DOES exist in our mind (see above). Not necessarily in
formats we are (capable of) handling. 3p evidence? who said so?
Eventually we have to look at nature to try to refute the theory. But
you are right, it is not 3p evidence, but only (with comp) 1p-plural
sharable evidences.
Time? I can't walk without crutches. My crutches don't walk alone.
?
Axioms? a reversed logic, not the theorems (theories?) are axiom-
dependent, the axioms are made to facilitate the theoretical
'dasein' of theorems. Artificially.
and so on.
? If you use agnosticism to demolish all theories, you kill science,
and will get the authoritative arguments instead, like the pseudo
sciences and religions.
On the contrary, I think that agnosticism should favor the theoretical
approach, as it remains modest and NEVER pretends to provide truth,
only light and shadows on the unknown.
Bruno
John M
On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 17 Jan 2014, at 23:24, John Mikes wrote:
Stathis and List:
from time to time it is useful to recall what we are thinking
behind 'words'. Is the 'brain' as used in this exchange indeed
'brainfunction'? (ref. to "functionalism vs computationalism")
To 'preserve mind' begs the question how it is differentiated in
this exchange?
?
"preserve minds" means that it is not differentiated. Thinks about
you after the WM-duplication, before you open the door of the
reconstitution box.
Then the differentiation occurs when opening the door, as your "same
mind" is put in two different alternate context (Washington and
Moscow).
Then again 'intelligence' is a flexible item (I start from "inter"
- "lego" = to read between the lines, not to stick to the
(written?) words proper).
OK.
In fact this is my criteria for a theory. The theory is 100%
invariant with respect to the choice of wording.
When we write the theory in first order logic, this is guarantied.
The theory
x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)
x *0 = 0
x*s(y) = x*y + x
is equivalent with the theory (assuming the equality axiom for elise
(that "x elise x", "x elise y implies y elise x", etc.)
variable1 paul johnson elise variable1
variable1 paul hercule(variable2) elise hercule(variable1 paul
variable2)
variable1 claude johnson elise johnson
variable1 claude hercule(varable2) elise (variable1 claude
varable2 ) paul variable1
So if you want to see if your theory does not introduce implicit
intuition through the choice of some wording, just change all
words ...
In mathematics, we are always left with "only relata", like in
Mermin's QM.
That is why I am not happy when Stephen says that it assumes
existence. It could have said that it assumes popiutyscaptle. I need
some axiom on that to say anything ...
The advantage of proceeding like this is that when you prove a
theorem it will be true in all possible interpretations of the theory.
Bruno
The 'non-computable physics' in Penrose's brain begs the question:
"STILL" or "NOT AT ALL"?
Is the acceptance of the NEW a mindfunction only, (increasing the
knowledge-base), or can be done by a hypercomputer as well (without
proper programming for the so far unknowables' input???)
And I hate the references to 'zombies', whatever one thinks about
them.
I stick to my common sense in my agnosticism.
John Mikes
On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 7:28 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]
> wrote:
On 16 January 2014 23:08, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On 16 Jan 2014, at 09:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch <[email protected]>
wrote:
>>>
>>> The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like
the Intel
>>> CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the
sense that
>>> a
>>> computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost
>>> certainly
>>> correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but
rather, that a
>>> computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or
body, or
>>> entire planet and all the people on it.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>
>>
>> I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
>> metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the
brain
>> is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather
is a
>> digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the
behaviour of
>> any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),
>> including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
>> that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical
zombie
>> using a computer. The only way to avoid this conclusion would be
if
>> physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not
computable.
>> Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain
rarely
>> figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if
there
>> is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
>> computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.
>
>
> OK. But in a non standard sense of functionalism, as in the
philosophy of
> mind, functionalism is used for a subset of computationalism.
Functionalism
> is computationalism with some (unclear) susbtitution level in
mind (usually
> the neurons).
>
> Now, I would like to see a precise definition of "your"
functionalism. If
> you take *all* functions, it becomes trivially true, I think. But
any
> restriction on the accepted functions, can perhaps lead to some
interesting
> thesis. For example, the functions computable with this or that
oracles, the
> continuous functions, etc.
Briefly, computationalism is the idea that you could replace the
brain
with a Turing machine and you would preserve the mind. This would not
be possible if there is non-computable physics in the brain, as for
example Penrose proposes. But in that case, you could replace the
brain with whatever other type of device is needed, such as a
hypercomputer, and still preserve the mind. I would say that is
consistent with functionalism but not computationalism. The idea that
replicating the function of the brain by whatever means would not
preserve the mind, i.e. would result in a philosophical zombie, is
inconsistent with functionalism.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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