On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote:
*Bruno*, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my
input).
*"JM: What IS the 'mind' you PRESERVE?"*
*BM:* My consciousness. - It means that I can surivive in the usal
clinical sense,
the brain digital replacement. I don't need to define my
consciousness to
say yes to a doctor. No more than I need to define "pain" to
the doctor who
look at me. I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the
doctor is serious.
*JM:Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do
not *
*duplicate. It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than
knowable *
*within today's inventory.*
*BM: *No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the
truth of
comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then
Plato-Plotin
gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted.
(his theology and physics).
(
Bruno, *M Y consciousness is (my) 'response to relations'* whatever show
up.
It includes lots of unknown items (with unknowable qualia?) beside the ones
handled WITHIN my brain.
So I do not trust the 'doctor's digital contraption to include *ME -
(total) - o*nly my
temporary brainfunction, i.e. knowledge-base of mine as of today. Your
"true"
theology is a mystery to me. How "true" can it be?
Devising our physical world is a human effort due to the temporary status
of our
inventory. To think beyond it is sci-fi (cf my ref. to Liz about Jack Cohen
and J.
Stewart's "Collapse of Chaos" and "Figment of Reality" - the
Zarathustrans).
John M
On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote:
>
> Bruno, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input).
>
> What IS the *'mind'* you PRESERVE?
>
>
> My consciousness.
> It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain digital
> replacement.
> I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor.
> No more than I need to define "pain" to the doctor who look at me.
> I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious.
>
>
>
>
> Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do not
> duplicate. (It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than
> knowable within today's inventory.
>
>
> No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the truth
> of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then
> Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted.
> (his theology and physics).
>
>
>
>
> I find 'mindcontent' different from 'mind' (what I don't really know) and
> package it into 'mentality'. .
>
> I have no squalm against "arithmetical reality" - a notion deduced from
> (human?) math-thinking.
>
>
> Arithmetical Realism is the idea that human are correct when thinking that
> the number relation are true even for the non humans.
> It is not because a human believe in x, that x is necessarily false for
> non humans. Anyway, it because I can conceive that AR is false, that I
> politely put it in the bag of the hypotheses.
>
>
>
> What I mean as 'reality' (if it 'exists' - another 'if' to explain) is a
> belief that it SHOULD be - as most of us think of the world. No evidence,
> no facts.
>
> Physical World (and whatever pertains to it: like 'physixs') is an
> up-to-date explanation of yesterday's knowledge of some phenomena we
> adjusted up to our capabilities in a 'world'-image we derived.
>
>
> Yes, but that is why I do not assume anything being both primitive and
> physical. You make my point.
> But I need to start from some assumptions, and I use 2+2=4, and the "yes
> doctor", which links computer science and theology. The physics is then
> explanied constructively by the theology of the true machine, with true
> some technical precise sense (due to Tarski).
>
>
>
>
> Existence is loosly identified in my vocabulary: whatever we MAY think of
> DOES exist in our mind (see above). Not necessarily in formats we are
> (capable of) handling. 3p evidence? who said so?
>
>
> Eventually we have to look at nature to try to refute the theory. But you
> are right, it is not 3p evidence, but only (with comp) 1p-plural sharable
> evidences.
>
>
> Time? I can't walk without crutches. My crutches don't walk alone.
>
>
> ?
>
>
>
> Axioms? a reversed logic, not the theorems (theories?) are
> axiom-dependent, the axioms are made to facilitate the theoretical 'dasein'
> of theorems. Artificially.
>
> and so on.
>
>
> ? If you use agnosticism to demolish all theories, you kill science, and
> will get the authoritative arguments instead, like the pseudo sciences and
> religions.
> On the contrary, I think that agnosticism should favor the theoretical
> approach, as it remains modest and NEVER pretends to provide truth, only
> light and shadows on the unknown.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> John M
>
>
>
> On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 17 Jan 2014, at 23:24, John Mikes wrote:
>>
>> Stathis and List:
>>
>> from time to time it is useful to recall what we are thinking behind
>> 'words'. Is the *'brain'* as used in this exchange indeed*
>> 'brainfunction'*? (ref. to "functionalism vs computationalism")
>> To 'preserve *mind*' begs the question how it is differentiated in this
>> exchange?
>>
>>
>> ?
>> "preserve minds" means that it is not differentiated. Thinks about you
>> after the WM-duplication, before you open the door of the reconstitution
>> box.
>> Then the differentiation occurs when opening the door, as your "same
>> mind" is put in two different alternate context (Washington and Moscow).
>>
>>
>>
>> Then again* 'intelligence'* is a flexible item (I start from "inter" -
>> "lego" = to read between the lines, not to stick to the (written?) words
>> proper).
>>
>>
>> OK.
>>
>> In fact this is my criteria for a theory. The theory is 100% invariant
>> with respect to the choice of wording.
>>
>> When we write the theory in first order logic, this is guarantied.
>>
>> The theory
>>
>> x + 0 = x
>> x + s(y) = s(x + y)
>>
>> x *0 = 0
>> x*s(y) = x*y + x
>>
>> is equivalent with the theory (assuming the equality axiom for elise
>> (that "x elise x", "x elise y implies y elise x", etc.)
>>
>> variable1 paul johnson elise variable1
>> variable1 paul hercule(variable2) elise hercule(variable1 paul variable2)
>>
>> variable1 claude johnson elise johnson
>> variable1 claude hercule(varable2) elise (variable1 claude varable2 )
>> paul variable1
>>
>> So if you want to see if your theory does not introduce implicit
>> intuition through the choice of some wording, just change all words ...
>>
>> In mathematics, we are always left with "only relata", like in Mermin's
>> QM.
>>
>> That is why I am not happy when Stephen says that it assumes existence.
>> It could have said that it assumes popiutyscaptle. I need some axiom on
>> that to say anything ...
>>
>> The advantage of proceeding like this is that when you prove a theorem it
>> will be true in all possible interpretations of the theory.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> The *'non-computable physics'* in Penrose's brain begs the question:
>> *"STILL"
>> or "NOT AT ALL"?*
>> Is the acceptance of the* NEW* a *mind*function only, (increasing the
>> knowledge-base), or can be done by a hypercomputer as well (without proper
>> programming for the so far unknowables' input???)
>> And I hate the references to *'zombies',* whatever one thinks about
>> them.
>> I stick to my common sense* in my agnosticism*.
>>
>> John Mikes
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 7:28 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
>> <[email protected]>wrote:
>>
>>> On 16 January 2014 23:08, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>> >
>>> > On 16 Jan 2014, at 09:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>> >
>>> >> On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> >>>
>>> >>> The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the
>>> Intel
>>> >>> CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the sense
>>> that
>>> >>> a
>>> >>> computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost
>>> >>> certainly
>>> >>> correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather,
>>> that a
>>> >>> computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body,
>>> or
>>> >>> entire planet and all the people on it.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Jason
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
>>> >> metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the brain
>>> >> is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
>>> >> digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour of
>>> >> any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),
>>> >> including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
>>> >> that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
>>> >> using a computer. The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if
>>> >> physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not computable.
>>> >> Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely
>>> >> figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if there
>>> >> is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
>>> >> computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > OK. But in a non standard sense of functionalism, as in the philosophy
>>> of
>>> > mind, functionalism is used for a subset of computationalism.
>>> Functionalism
>>> > is computationalism with some (unclear) susbtitution level in mind
>>> (usually
>>> > the neurons).
>>> >
>>> > Now, I would like to see a precise definition of "your" functionalism.
>>> If
>>> > you take *all* functions, it becomes trivially true, I think. But any
>>> > restriction on the accepted functions, can perhaps lead to some
>>> interesting
>>> > thesis. For example, the functions computable with this or that
>>> oracles, the
>>> > continuous functions, etc.
>>>
>>> Briefly, computationalism is the idea that you could replace the brain
>>> with a Turing machine and you would preserve the mind. This would not
>>> be possible if there is non-computable physics in the brain, as for
>>> example Penrose proposes. But in that case, you could replace the
>>> brain with whatever other type of device is needed, such as a
>>> hypercomputer, and still preserve the mind. I would say that is
>>> consistent with functionalism but not computationalism. The idea that
>>> replicating the function of the brain by whatever means would not
>>> preserve the mind, i.e. would result in a philosophical zombie, is
>>> inconsistent with functionalism.
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>>> an email to [email protected].
>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to [email protected].
>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to [email protected].
>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to [email protected].
> To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to [email protected].
> To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
