Dear Folks, I agree with John's most resent remark and his recommendation of the books. Here is a nice review of Collapse of Chaos:
http://www.thenewhumanities.net/books/Book%20Reviews44.html On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 4:43 PM, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote: > On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: > *Bruno*, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my > input). > *"JM: What IS the 'mind' you PRESERVE?"* > *BM:* My consciousness. - It means that I can surivive in the usal > clinical sense, > the brain digital replacement. I don't need to define my > consciousness to > say yes to a doctor. No more than I need to define "pain" to > the doctor who > look at me. I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the > doctor is serious. > > *JM:Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do > not * > *duplicate. It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than > knowable * > *within today's inventory.* > > *BM: *No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the > truth of > comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then > Plato-Plotin > gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted. > (his theology and physics). > ( > Bruno, *M Y consciousness is (my) 'response to relations'* whatever show > up. > It includes lots of unknown items (with unknowable qualia?) beside the > ones > handled WITHIN my brain. > So I do not trust the 'doctor's digital contraption to include *ME - > (total) - o*nly my > temporary brainfunction, i.e. knowledge-base of mine as of today. Your > "true" > theology is a mystery to me. How "true" can it be? > Devising our physical world is a human effort due to the temporary status > of our > inventory. To think beyond it is sci-fi (cf my ref. to Liz about Jack > Cohen and J. > Stewart's "Collapse of Chaos" and "Figment of Reality" - the > Zarathustrans). > > John M > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: >> >> Bruno, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input). >> >> What IS the *'mind'* you PRESERVE? >> >> >> My consciousness. >> It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain >> digital replacement. >> I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor. >> No more than I need to define "pain" to the doctor who look at me. >> I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious. >> >> >> >> >> Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do not >> duplicate. (It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than >> knowable within today's inventory. >> >> >> No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the truth >> of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then >> Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted. >> (his theology and physics). >> >> >> >> >> I find 'mindcontent' different from 'mind' (what I don't really know) and >> package it into 'mentality'. . >> >> I have no squalm against "arithmetical reality" - a notion deduced from >> (human?) math-thinking. >> >> >> Arithmetical Realism is the idea that human are correct when thinking >> that the number relation are true even for the non humans. >> It is not because a human believe in x, that x is necessarily false for >> non humans. Anyway, it because I can conceive that AR is false, that I >> politely put it in the bag of the hypotheses. >> >> >> >> What I mean as 'reality' (if it 'exists' - another 'if' to explain) is a >> belief that it SHOULD be - as most of us think of the world. No evidence, >> no facts. >> >> Physical World (and whatever pertains to it: like 'physixs') is an >> up-to-date explanation of yesterday's knowledge of some phenomena we >> adjusted up to our capabilities in a 'world'-image we derived. >> >> >> Yes, but that is why I do not assume anything being both primitive and >> physical. You make my point. >> But I need to start from some assumptions, and I use 2+2=4, and the "yes >> doctor", which links computer science and theology. The physics is then >> explanied constructively by the theology of the true machine, with true >> some technical precise sense (due to Tarski). >> >> >> >> >> Existence is loosly identified in my vocabulary: whatever we MAY think of >> DOES exist in our mind (see above). Not necessarily in formats we are >> (capable of) handling. 3p evidence? who said so? >> >> >> Eventually we have to look at nature to try to refute the theory. But you >> are right, it is not 3p evidence, but only (with comp) 1p-plural sharable >> evidences. >> >> >> Time? I can't walk without crutches. My crutches don't walk alone. >> >> >> ? >> >> >> >> Axioms? a reversed logic, not the theorems (theories?) are >> axiom-dependent, the axioms are made to facilitate the theoretical 'dasein' >> of theorems. Artificially. >> >> and so on. >> >> >> ? If you use agnosticism to demolish all theories, you kill science, and >> will get the authoritative arguments instead, like the pseudo sciences and >> religions. >> On the contrary, I think that agnosticism should favor the theoretical >> approach, as it remains modest and NEVER pretends to provide truth, only >> light and shadows on the unknown. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> John M >> >> >> >> On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 17 Jan 2014, at 23:24, John Mikes wrote: >>> >>> Stathis and List: >>> >>> from time to time it is useful to recall what we are thinking behind >>> 'words'. Is the *'brain'* as used in this exchange indeed* >>> 'brainfunction'*? (ref. to "functionalism vs computationalism") >>> To 'preserve *mind*' begs the question how it is differentiated in this >>> exchange? >>> >>> >>> ? >>> "preserve minds" means that it is not differentiated. Thinks about you >>> after the WM-duplication, before you open the door of the reconstitution >>> box. >>> Then the differentiation occurs when opening the door, as your "same >>> mind" is put in two different alternate context (Washington and Moscow). >>> >>> >>> >>> Then again* 'intelligence'* is a flexible item (I start from "inter" - >>> "lego" = to read between the lines, not to stick to the (written?) words >>> proper). >>> >>> >>> OK. >>> >>> In fact this is my criteria for a theory. The theory is 100% invariant >>> with respect to the choice of wording. >>> >>> When we write the theory in first order logic, this is guarantied. >>> >>> The theory >>> >>> x + 0 = x >>> x + s(y) = s(x + y) >>> >>> x *0 = 0 >>> x*s(y) = x*y + x >>> >>> is equivalent with the theory (assuming the equality axiom for elise >>> (that "x elise x", "x elise y implies y elise x", etc.) >>> >>> variable1 paul johnson elise variable1 >>> variable1 paul hercule(variable2) elise hercule(variable1 paul >>> variable2) >>> >>> variable1 claude johnson elise johnson >>> variable1 claude hercule(varable2) elise (variable1 claude varable2 ) >>> paul variable1 >>> >>> So if you want to see if your theory does not introduce implicit >>> intuition through the choice of some wording, just change all words ... >>> >>> In mathematics, we are always left with "only relata", like in Mermin's >>> QM. >>> >>> That is why I am not happy when Stephen says that it assumes existence. >>> It could have said that it assumes popiutyscaptle. I need some axiom on >>> that to say anything ... >>> >>> The advantage of proceeding like this is that when you prove a theorem >>> it will be true in all possible interpretations of the theory. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> The *'non-computable physics'* in Penrose's brain begs the question: >>> *"STILL" >>> or "NOT AT ALL"?* >>> Is the acceptance of the* NEW* a *mind*function only, (increasing the >>> knowledge-base), or can be done by a hypercomputer as well (without proper >>> programming for the so far unknowables' input???) >>> And I hate the references to *'zombies',* whatever one thinks about >>> them. >>> I stick to my common sense* in my agnosticism*. >>> >>> John Mikes >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 7:28 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com >>> > wrote: >>> >>>> On 16 January 2014 23:08, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >>>> >>>> > >>>> > On 16 Jan 2014, at 09:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> > >>>> >> On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>> >>>> >>> The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the >>>> Intel >>>> >>> CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the >>>> sense that >>>> >>> a >>>> >>> computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost >>>> >>> certainly >>>> >>> correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather, >>>> that a >>>> >>> computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body, >>>> or >>>> >>> entire planet and all the people on it. >>>> >>> >>>> >>> Jason >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational >>>> >> metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the >>>> brain >>>> >> is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a >>>> >> digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour >>>> of >>>> >> any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable), >>>> >> including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means >>>> >> that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie >>>> >> using a computer. The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if >>>> >> physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not >>>> computable. >>>> >> Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely >>>> >> figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if >>>> there >>>> >> is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates >>>> >> computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism. >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > OK. But in a non standard sense of functionalism, as in the >>>> philosophy of >>>> > mind, functionalism is used for a subset of computationalism. >>>> Functionalism >>>> > is computationalism with some (unclear) susbtitution level in mind >>>> (usually >>>> > the neurons). >>>> > >>>> > Now, I would like to see a precise definition of "your" >>>> functionalism. If >>>> > you take *all* functions, it becomes trivially true, I think. But any >>>> > restriction on the accepted functions, can perhaps lead to some >>>> interesting >>>> > thesis. For example, the functions computable with this or that >>>> oracles, the >>>> > continuous functions, etc. >>>> >>>> Briefly, computationalism is the idea that you could replace the brain >>>> with a Turing machine and you would preserve the mind. This would not >>>> be possible if there is non-computable physics in the brain, as for >>>> example Penrose proposes. But in that case, you could replace the >>>> brain with whatever other type of device is needed, such as a >>>> hypercomputer, and still preserve the mind. I would say that is >>>> consistent with functionalism but not computationalism. The idea that >>>> replicating the function of the brain by whatever means would not >>>> preserve the mind, i.e. would result in a philosophical zombie, is >>>> inconsistent with functionalism. >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Stathis Papaioannou >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ "This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. 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