On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 7:24 AM, Stephen Paul King < [email protected]> wrote:
> Dear Bruno, > > No, time is observer dependent as well as observers supply the > measures. Recall that I see time as a local measure of change. Change > itself is not observer dependent, it flows eternally as the "potential to > Be" of Becoming. > Physical change is observer dependent particularly in a multiverse where everything is physical. > > > On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 5:00 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 27 Jan 2014, at 01:36, Stephen Paul King wrote: >> >> >> Like I have written previously, I am past the point of buying the idea >> that there is a Reality out there independent of us that we passively come >> to experience. I am tired of explanations that ask us to believe that >> change is an illusion that somehow persists. >> >> >> >> Is that not contradictory? You are asking us to believe in a time >> independent to us, and to not believe in a reality independent to us. >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Can we try a different set of concepts? >> >> >> On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 7:28 PM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 27 January 2014 12:48, Stephen Paul King >>> <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> Dear LizR, >>>> : >>>> "the idea of time as a steady progression from past to future is >>>> wrong. I know very well we feel this way about it subjectively. But we're >>>> the victims of a confidence trick..." >>>> >>>> What other implication does Hoyle's phrasing have? His entire >>>> discussion of the pigeon holes is to point out that there is no a priori >>>> order of the holes, it is a subjective delusion that we obtain because of >>>> our inability to see the whole lot. >>>> >>> >>> His implication seems to me to be that the subjective experience of time >>> can be explained as a phenomenon caused by the order of the pigeon holes, >>> together with certain rules linking them together. The rules are basically >>> equivalent to thermodynamics (unsurprisingly, we wouldn't get consciousness >>> in a universe without an entropy gradient). As one of his characters >>> explains... >>> >>> John went on, 'All right, let's come now to the contents of the pigeon >>> holes. Suppose you choose one of them, say the 137th. You find in it a >>> story, as you might find one of those little slips of paper in a Christmas >>> cracker <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christmas_cracker>. But you also >>> find statments about the stories you'll find in other pigeon holes. You >>> decide to check up on whether these statements about the stories in the >>> other pigeon holes are right or not. To your surprise you find the >>> statments made about earlier pigeon holes, the 136th, the 135th, and so on, >>> are substantially correct. But when you compare with the pigeon holes on >>> the other side, the 138th, the 139th,...you find things aren't so good. You >>> find a lot of contradictions and discrepancies. This turns out to be the >>> same wherever you happen to look, in every pigeon hole. The statements made >>> about pigeon holes on the other side are at best diffuse and at the worst >>> just plain wrong. Now let's translate this parable into the time problem. >>> We'll call the particular pigeon hole, the one you happen to be examining, >>> the present. The earlier pigeon holes, the ones for which you find >>> substantially correct statements, we call the past. The later pigeon holes, >>> the ones for which there isn't too much in the way of correct statments, >>> we'll call the future. Let me go on a bit further. What I want to suggest >>> is that the actual world is very much like this. Instead of pigeon holes we >>> talk about states.' >>> >>> Note that the description he gives of the 137th hole applies to *all*the >>> holes - so the present is whichever hole you happen to look in. From >>> the subjective, "inside" view, all moments are the present when they're >>> being experienced, and we only experience a flow of time because of their >>> contents (a fact which Memento guy illustrates nicely, of course). >>> >>> This is a description of a capsule theory of identity. Hoyle introduces >>> a flashlight, but then shows that the order in which the flashlight is used >>> is irrelevant - the 1st person view from inside the pigeon-holes is of >>> continuous subjective experience. In fact, the existence or nonexistence of >>> the flashlight is irrelevant to the subjective experience. The flashlight >>> was introduced so the characters could think about "sampling" each pigeon >>> hole, as though they could somehow stand outside time - take the "bird's >>> eye view". But of course in reality they can only take the internal, >>> "frog's eye view". >>> >>> Hence, imho, Hoyle is saying that it is the order of the boxes and the >>> laws relating their contents that gives rise to the subjective experience >>> of time. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >>> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe >>> . >>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >>> [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Kindest Regards, >> >> Stephen Paul King >> >> Senior Researcher >> >> Mobile: (864) 567-3099 >> >> [email protected] >> >> http://www.provensecure.us/ >> >> >> “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of >> the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain >> information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and >> exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as >> attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are >> hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of >> this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this >> message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message >> immediately.” >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >> [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > > -- > > Kindest Regards, > > Stephen Paul King > > Senior Researcher > > Mobile: (864) 567-3099 > > [email protected] > > http://www.provensecure.us/ > > > “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of > the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain > information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and > exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as > attorney work product. 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