Bruno, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input). What IS the *'mind'* you PRESERVE? Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do not duplicate. (It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than knowable within today's inventory. I find 'mindcontent' different from 'mind' (what I don't really know) and package it into 'mentality'. .
I have no squalm against "arithmetical reality" - a notion deduced from (human?) math-thinking. What I mean as 'reality' (if it 'exists' - another 'if' to explain) is a belief that it SHOULD be - as most of us think of the world. No evidence, no facts. Physical World (and whatever pertains to it: like 'physixs') is an up-to-date explanation of yesterday's knowledge of some phenomena we adjusted up to our capabilities in a 'world'-image we derived. Existence is loosly identified in my vocabulary: whatever we MAY think of DOES exist in our mind (see above). Not necessarily in formats we are (capable of) handling. 3p evidence? who said so? Time? I can't walk without crutches. My crutches don't walk alone. Axioms? a reversed logic, not the theorems (theories?) are axiom-dependent, the axioms are made to facilitate the theoretical 'dasein' of theorems. Artificially. and so on. John M On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 17 Jan 2014, at 23:24, John Mikes wrote: > > Stathis and List: > > from time to time it is useful to recall what we are thinking behind > 'words'. Is the *'brain'* as used in this exchange indeed* > 'brainfunction'*? (ref. to "functionalism vs computationalism") > To 'preserve *mind*' begs the question how it is differentiated in this > exchange? > > > ? > "preserve minds" means that it is not differentiated. Thinks about you > after the WM-duplication, before you open the door of the reconstitution > box. > Then the differentiation occurs when opening the door, as your "same mind" > is put in two different alternate context (Washington and Moscow). > > > > Then again* 'intelligence'* is a flexible item (I start from "inter" - > "lego" = to read between the lines, not to stick to the (written?) words > proper). > > > OK. > > In fact this is my criteria for a theory. The theory is 100% invariant > with respect to the choice of wording. > > When we write the theory in first order logic, this is guarantied. > > The theory > > x + 0 = x > x + s(y) = s(x + y) > > x *0 = 0 > x*s(y) = x*y + x > > is equivalent with the theory (assuming the equality axiom for elise (that > "x elise x", "x elise y implies y elise x", etc.) > > variable1 paul johnson elise variable1 > variable1 paul hercule(variable2) elise hercule(variable1 paul variable2) > > variable1 claude johnson elise johnson > variable1 claude hercule(varable2) elise (variable1 claude varable2 ) paul > variable1 > > So if you want to see if your theory does not introduce implicit intuition > through the choice of some wording, just change all words ... > > In mathematics, we are always left with "only relata", like in Mermin's QM. > > That is why I am not happy when Stephen says that it assumes existence. It > could have said that it assumes popiutyscaptle. I need some axiom on that > to say anything ... > > The advantage of proceeding like this is that when you prove a theorem it > will be true in all possible interpretations of the theory. > > Bruno > > > > The *'non-computable physics'* in Penrose's brain begs the question: *"STILL" > or "NOT AT ALL"?* > Is the acceptance of the* NEW* a *mind*function only, (increasing the > knowledge-base), or can be done by a hypercomputer as well (without proper > programming for the so far unknowables' input???) > And I hate the references to *'zombies',* whatever one thinks about them. > I stick to my common sense* in my agnosticism*. > > John Mikes > > > On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 7:28 PM, Stathis Papaioannou > <[email protected]>wrote: > >> On 16 January 2014 23:08, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> > >> > On 16 Jan 2014, at 09:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> > >> >> On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >> >>> The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the >> Intel >> >>> CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the sense >> that >> >>> a >> >>> computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost >> >>> certainly >> >>> correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather, >> that a >> >>> computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body, or >> >>> entire planet and all the people on it. >> >>> >> >>> Jason >> >> >> >> >> >> I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational >> >> metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the brain >> >> is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a >> >> digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour of >> >> any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable), >> >> including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means >> >> that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie >> >> using a computer. The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if >> >> physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not computable. >> >> Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely >> >> figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if there >> >> is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates >> >> computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism. >> > >> > >> > OK. But in a non standard sense of functionalism, as in the philosophy >> of >> > mind, functionalism is used for a subset of computationalism. >> Functionalism >> > is computationalism with some (unclear) susbtitution level in mind >> (usually >> > the neurons). >> > >> > Now, I would like to see a precise definition of "your" functionalism. >> If >> > you take *all* functions, it becomes trivially true, I think. But any >> > restriction on the accepted functions, can perhaps lead to some >> interesting >> > thesis. For example, the functions computable with this or that >> oracles, the >> > continuous functions, etc. >> >> Briefly, computationalism is the idea that you could replace the brain >> with a Turing machine and you would preserve the mind. This would not >> be possible if there is non-computable physics in the brain, as for >> example Penrose proposes. But in that case, you could replace the >> brain with whatever other type of device is needed, such as a >> hypercomputer, and still preserve the mind. I would say that is >> consistent with functionalism but not computationalism. The idea that >> replicating the function of the brain by whatever means would not >> preserve the mind, i.e. would result in a philosophical zombie, is >> inconsistent with functionalism. >> >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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