On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 10:35 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 18 Jan 2014, at 17:54, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > Dear Bruno, > > > On Sat, Jan 18, 2014 at 5:54 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> On 17 Jan 2014, at 20:38, Stephen Paul King wrote: >> >> >> >> You argue that my stipulation of a dualism is a violation of Occam's >> razor, ala Step 8 of UDA. I disagree, Occam's razon tells us that we must >> eliminate all *unnecessary* entities. My reasoning is that we need both >> logic and physics to have a viable comp theory. >> >> >> >> Then you have to find a flaw in the UDA. >> > > I do not claim that UDA is "flawed". > > > Of course you do. UDA proves (modulo a remaining bit of Occam in step 8, > of course) that we cannot assume any physics. And here you said that we > need both logic and physics. Not we should not need it, but we cannot use > it. > > I assume Pratt's dualism. It solves the problem of the relation between numbers and physics for me and has additional benefits such as an interaction mechanism for minds that are mutually exclusive at the 1p level. It does not contractive UD strongly and does not require any primitive mentality (via AR) nor physicality. Distinctions vanish in the ontological ground. My argument for this last remark follows G. Spenser-Brown's LoF. > > > I claim it is incomplete and based on a false premise. The problem is the > assumption that one can reason as if the physical world does not exist and > discuss ideas that imply the existence of Becoming and measures there of > (time) all the while using axioms that forbid their existence. > > > The axioms forbids its primitive existence, not its existence. Indeed comp > would be regulated if it predict the non existence of the physical realm. > Comp forbids only its "assumed" existence. It says that the physical realm > existence *has to be* derived from arithmetic, and it shows how, making > comp testable. > > So your "flaw" is not a flaw. You are confusing primitive existence with > existence. > > > We have differing ideas of existence. > > It is the sound of one hand clapping in a mind that cannot imagine air. > The UDA can be useful and it is interesting, but it is a castle built in > midair and expected to float free because the designer does not admit the > existence of gravity. > > > >> Please don't talk like if I was a philosopher. I am not. I provide >> something which is wrong, perhaps, but then you have to find the flaw. But >> it is a result, and it is only one step in formulating a problem. I don't >> argue for the truth of something, just the validity of a proof/argument. >> And, yes, the problem, once formulated, give sthe obvious general >> (platonist) shape of the solution. >> > > I am a philosopher and thus I speak as one. You need to understand that > the Platonist ontology has a big problem: it has no explanation for > Becoming. It attempts to disregard it as an illusion and neglects to > explain the persistence of the illusion. > > > What is missing the the actual explanation? The illusion is a direct > consequence of comp, and the persistence of the illusion is entirely > explained by the comp physics, or if it misses something, necessarily, then > comp is shown wrong. But you have to prove that it misses that thing > explicitly. That is what UDA proves. It submit a problem and a beginning of > a solution, which gives already rise of the subjective time. the objective > time is still an open problem, but space, particles, energy, hamiltonian, > etc. are all also part of the problem. > I submit Prof Hitoshi Kitada's Local Time theory for a solution the the problem of time. A paper is currently being prepared that reformulates it into the language of linear transformation. It is hoped that this will make it easier to understand. > > I am not a philosopher defending the truth of comp. I am a logician > proving that if comp is correct, physics becomes a theorem. I am not > deriving physics, I am proving that physics must be derivable, and indeed > derivable from the arithmetical self-reference; I got already the entire > propositional physics. > > > > > >> >> >> Numbers alone are like signs with no referents. >> >> >> This is false, and even refuted by neurophysiology. the part of the brain >> handling the signs seems quite different from the parts of the brain >> handling the numbers. >> I think you confuse the sign used to denote the numbers with the numbers. >> > > The very fact that this string of letters has a meaning to you is my > proof: Numbers or any other sign or symbol has a semantic referent that > cannot be said to not exist. > > > That's my point, given that I was saying that numbers are not symbol. > *You* are the one just continuing to confuse numbers with the symbol > denoting them. > > Umm, Im my thesis, numbers and the symbols are a form of Stone duals, not to be confused. > > > >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Why assume a primitive time, when both the physical time and the >>> subjective time can be retrieved from the indexicals. >>> >> >> I do not assume or stipulate a primitive time. >> >> >> I still don't know what you assume. Don't tell me "existence" as that >> means nothing. >> I have repeatedly explained my definition of Existence. It is the same as >> what is used in Objectivism. Existence is all that exists. It is not a >> property nor dependent/contingent on a theory. You are strictly using the >> abstract definition of existence as a logician/mathematician. It is as if >> you can only see the trees and not the forrest. >> >> >> >> >> All notions of time vanish in the limit just as the ability to >> distinguish properties vanishes in the same limit of the neutral ground. I >> cannot count things that I cannot distinguish nor can I see without eyes. >> >> My ontology starts and ends with a undivided Whole with no particular >> properties of entities that make distinctions, so neither numbers, not time >> nor physical systems exist as primitives. All are co-emergent and >> co-defining. >> >> >> >> How could anything emerge from such an amorphous and vague assumption? >> > > Do you comprehend Standish's Theory of Nothing? > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Remember, I assume that Becoming is fundamental, >> >> >> >> What does mean "becoming" without an assumption of time. >> > > Time is a measure of the quantity of becoming. Becoming itself has no > particular measure associated with it. The key word is "particular". It has > all possible measures as possible aspects. This makes us interpret Plato's > Forms are an accumulation of all possible projections of those Forms. > >> >> >> >> >> ala Heraclitus, as an axiom. You take AR as an axiom >> >> >> No. I take elementary arithmetic as an axiom in the TOE. AR is just what >> we need to define computations in the UDA. It is assumed by all scientists. >> > > Sure, and they too have a problem understanding time. I understand time > because I have dropped the unstated axiom that Becoming is an illusion. > >> >> >> >> >> and then have a lacuna (open problem as a result). I have no such a >> "arithmetic body" problem. >> >> >> But that problem is what make comp non trivial, and it is what explains >> the origin of physics. >> It you don't have that problem, then you can no more derive physics, and >> have to assume it, as apparently you do in practice indeed. that is a >> weakness, not an advantage. >> > > > I like weak theories! > > > > by "weak" I meant not "weak" in the logical sense, but weak in the sense > of being defectuous. > > > > > We can generalize by weakening and deforming axiomatic systems. My thesis > is very non trivial because it makes more predictions than yours! For one > thing, we can build on Pratt and Kauffman's ideas and predict the > non-existence of p-zombies and p-ghosts. A p-ghost is a mathematical entity > that has not means of physical expression. It cannot be represented by some > finite configuration of matter, such as an equation on a chalkboard. > If a mathematical theorem cannot be written down on paper or equivalent, > would you say that it merely exists? > > > In which theory? I will never say that something exist out of the frame of > a theory. > > > > Yes, if existence is necessary possibility. > > > In which modal logic? "necessary" is a contentious word on which nobody > agree, except for the Gödel's predicate in math. > > > > > So, why do you have a problem with my definition of Existence? > > > I have not see it. Which is it? > > > > Maybe you insist that theorems can have particular properties merely > because they exist in some abstract theory and ignore the fact that you can > communicate about that theory to minds other than your own. You are being > crypto-solipsistic here! > > > The total contrary. I attribute mind to all Löbian machines, and explains > exactly how they can communicate to each other, and why they all agrees on > many things, and "disagree" or differentiate on many (more geographical) > things. > > > >> >> >> >>> >>> I don't need that hypothesis, and I think, modestly, that the UDA shows >>> that we just *can't *use it to explain machine's subjective time and >>> reality. >>> >> >> But you actually do need it, Bruno. >> >> >> Then there is a flaw in UDA. Where? >> > > In the initial assumption that a theory does not need to be communicated > by physical interactions. > > > > You confuse the meta-level with the ontological level of the theory. Why > don't you say that Eibstein is directly shown wrong because he use the > assumption that his papers can be published and read? > > > > > Your use of classical teleportation metaphor in the UDA is not helpful. > > > It is not used at all in any metaphorical sense. "yes doctor" is > everything but metaphorical. > > > > > I understand your use of it as a pedagogical tool to explain FPI, but you > are ignoring the fact that my mind is not just some continuation of your, > it is more! > > > Why should ever be your mind a continuation of my? That would contradict > the FPI. The FPI is on the closest (computaionally) extension, like me in W > and me in M. It is different from the identity question, where we might > both be descendent of the same universal person. > > > > > >> >> >> >> The existence of the arithmetic body problem follows from the lack of >> that hypothesis! >> >> >> >> UDA shows explicitly that by adding that hypothesis, things get only >> worse. >> No, it solves the arithmetic body problem. Maybe you are in love with >> that problem and do not wish it to be solved by someone else. >> >> >> >> >> Additionally, you can discuss the UDA and we can argue about BECAUSE >> there is a fundamental Becoming. >> >> >> Proof? >> > > You can understand this sentence. QED. > > > > You confuse "the existence of becoming" with "the existence of a primitive > becoming". > > "I can understand this sentence" assumes (locally) some becoming, right, > but not necessarily a primitive becoming, which comp explains, indeed, > through variate arithmetical indexicals. > > > > > >> >> >> >> We do not need to assume particular measures or Hypostases other than 1) >> Existence cannot non-exist >> >> >> That has no meaning for me, except a vague link with Parmenides and >> Descartes. But it is not the type of expression I expect in science. It is >> not precise enough. I can interpret it in myriad of ways. >> > > Look for an interpretation where I am correct and not just the one where I > am incoherent. > > > That is what I always do. But sometimes I ask for something precise, > because the opponents is supposed to explain me a flaw. That has to be made > precise. You can't use *publicly* a philosophical statements to refute a > scientific reasoning.You can of course try to use your philosophical belief > to put the finger on the flaw. The philosophical belief is not by itself a > proof of invalidity. > > > > >> >> >> >> and 2) Becoming is Fundamental. >> >> >> That is only words. >> >> Or Numbers. > > > ? No, that is not number. > > > > >> >> >> When existence is dynamic instead of static , >> >> >> This assumes what I show an explanation for. >> > > I defined existence already, it is beyond theories. It allows for theories > to be meaningful and communicable. > > > > Aaaaahhhhh..... You mean God! > But we cannot even invoke that to invalidate a reasoning. You are doing > the Bergson/Goethe error. > > > > > >> >> >> we can obtain all of the notions of statics from the equivalence classes, >> symmetry groups, automorphisms and fixed points and so forth. >> >> >> But those are static to begin with. You explain the static from the >> static. >> > > Look at where the finger is pointing, it is not pointing strictly at > itself. > >> >> >> >> >> Consider Heraclitus' River where the level of the water never changes >> nor any other feature that you can detect remotely. Is it flowing or is it >> still? >> >>> >>> I appreciate you like comp, but you are not yet pushing the logic far >>> enough. >>> >> >> I am! I am dealing with problems that you refuse to see! >> >> >> You formulate the problem, but you take a problem as a defect, when a >> problem is what make a work into science. You seem to advocate bad >> philosophy here, I'm afraid. like Bergson, you prevent your own >> understanding of a *result* (not something debatable, but graspable or >> refutable). You seem not aware that I am not doing philosophy. >> > > > Bah! You do not grok Bergson. > > > I like Bergson very much. But his critics on Einstein's notion of time is > invalid, by erroneous use of his philosophy. > Most of Bergson is good philosophy, I think, just misemployed in that case. > > > > > That is a symptom of your ontology. You cannot imagine Parmenides to be > wrong! > > > Why. Here, I say that comp implies Parmenides (to be short). > > But comp necessarily implies that we can imagine comp wrong, so, you see, > if I was a believer in comp, I would certainly be able to imagine that > Parmenides is wrong. With comp public certainty is insanity. > > I imagine nothing, and all my beliefs are temporary, and are *always* (I > mean in the public research, not in my everyday life of course) presented > as working hypothesis. > > > > > > Bergson was not the only one that wrote of these ideas. There is A.N. > Whitehead, C.S. Peirce, all of the Cyberneticist, ... Why do I need to name > names? > > > Yes, why? > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. 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