On 1/21/2014 4:13 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 10:18:32PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
But I see nothing that would imply that a rational agent is
predictable or that he could not make a random choice.
Brent
Because assuming that more than one choice is available, and that they
all having differing values of utility, making a random choice has
only a probability of 1/n of being the rational choice.
I can concede that making a random choice amongst options of equal
and optimal utility could satisfy the definition of rational as a
borderline case,
So what do you make of Nash's theorem which says every finite game has an equilibrium in a
*mixed* strategy?
Brent
but I like the picture of Robby the robot saying
"that doesn't compute" and promptly blowing a fuse. (Let me know if
I've got my SciFi wires crossed here, please).
But it is still the case that a strategy of sometimes choosing less optimal
actions at random can in some situations lead to a better payoff than
always playing the rational choice.
Cheers
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