On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 6:54:38 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 04 Feb 2014, at 14:32, ghi...@gmail.com <javascript:> wrote: > > > On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 9:43:39 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 03 Feb 2014, at 22:40, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: >> >> >> On Friday, January 17, 2014 9:59:36 PM UTC, Brent wrote: >>> >>> On 1/17/2014 2:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 16 Jan 2014, at 19:04, meekerdb wrote: >>> >>> On 1/16/2014 12:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> The body does not produces consciousness, it only make it possible for >>> consciousness to forget the "higher self", and deludes us (in some sense) >>> in having a "little ego" embedded in some history. >>> >>> >>> Sounds like wishful thinking. >>> >>> >>> That is very subjective. It sounds to me, and to some other people, >>> (apparently many), that it looks more like some terrifying thinking. >>> >>> >>> I agree. But your choice of words gives the opposite impression. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Why "higher"? Why not "lower". >>> >>> >>> Yes, why not. The standard term is "higher". >>> >>> >>> Exactly - it is very subjective. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Why not diffused into the infinite threads of the UD? >>> >>> >>> Why not indeed? Is that a problem? Not sure to see your point. >>> >>> >>> My point is that you imply we should be happy with the implications of >>> comp because it implies we really have a "higher self" that we've merely >>> forgotten and that we are deluded in having a "little ego". Just consider >>> how different it sounds to say we have forgotten our real "lower self" and >>> we deluded in thinking our ego is significant. >>> >>> Brent >>> >> >> This is very true. I find it strange how much bias of various kinds gets >> built into this comp business. It surely can't be possible that a learned >> scholar like Bruno doesn't stop to consider whether he's loading terms in >> distortive ways. There's no way this is a language issue, the issue is far >> too basic. >> >> >> I hope Bruno takes your advice and tests his choice next time, by >> considering its negative. >> >> >> Can you be more specific, and may be quote my answer to Brent. I don't >> want the comp implications to make me happy. On the contrary I make the >> hypotheses precise, and then I derive everything by logic and arithmetic. >> If I distorted anything, I would be please you could make a specific >> remark. >> I don't even see what negative position you are mentioning. >> > > > Hi Bruno - I don't think I was being negative in the negative sense. If > that's the impression perhaps I should keep an eye on my style and see if I > can avoid such impressions. > > Bruno I'm commenting directly on what Brent just said in the line above. > You used the term "higher" self. So, the suggestion is that you're > building in a bias that your theory doesn't reach to. > > > > OK. My fault. I was alluding to the self of the universal person, > described by the arithmetical hypostases. usually I use "higher self" more > in the context of the some entheogenic experience. The higher self is, > basically, you, when you forget completeley who you are, or when you > dissociate completely from yourself, like in OBE, some lucid or non lucid > dreams, etc. > Yeah I see what you're saying and it's debatable whether it really is a problem using 'higher'. I just happened to have been thinking about all this just as I saw Brent and your discussion here. I had been reading a thread between you and some other chap in which these matters came up. Actually, I just read David Nyman? post, the last one on a different thread where he overviews your theory, which I found very helpful.
> > > > > Brent was illustrating this by suggesting that if you didn't agree, you > should try inserting the opposite of 'higher'. > > > Yes, the terrestrial self. The one who pays the bills, and answers mails, > and collects the shortcut to heaven ... > > > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> Another bias is the way comp is presented as a hierarchy of acceptance of >> comp with words like 'courage' associated toward the higher end of >> acceptance, and very much the opposite associations going down the >> stack. We could talk forever about how individualistic people are, but the >> fact is there's a lot of evidence people can be very vulnerable to this >> sort of social/reputation type pressure. That said there's no sign it's >> purposeful or devious or anything like that, but even so. >> >> >> I have no problem with critics, except when they are so fuzzy it is not >> even clear they are related to anything I could have said. >> Comp needs courage, but then getting an heart operation too. I don't see >> what is the problem for you. >> > > Well look, all you had to do to see the point above was the usual read, > read what I was replying to, and figure. There is only one reference to you > in Brent's comment. > > What I'm referring to here, is that part of your theory, or your reading > of comp, appears to grade people by the extent they accept your theory. > > > Only the understanding is graded. That's what we do in math and science. > I'll take that on board. It seemed more than that when I read the thread I saw it in. But that could have been a local thing, or maybe I read too much into it. > > > > > That's alright. But as I was saying, there's a risk that arguments like > that in an environment where other people are making up their mind about > your theory, can bias the process due to them experiencing a kind of > social/peer pressure to accept the theory. > > > Not at all. That is why I insist so much that I am not selling a theory. I > am not sure at all that comp is true. All the contrary. I am a > mathematician, and I just prove a theorem, which is that IF comp is true, > then Plato is mandatory, and Aristotle is refuted, and this in a testable > way. > I'm absolutely in agreement you are not selling. If that had been the case for me, and I decided to say something, I would have wanted to frame it literally in those terms as "you're selling". I had to tell my vet he was selling a year or too back. He didn't talk to me for ages! That really wasn't the suggestion. It's just useful to know when there are these potential psychological accelerators in the structure. Clearly the one I mentioned - even if I'm right - was one of your findings from comp, and important enough to be a small section of the landscape. It wasn't a case of imagining Bruno sitting there craftily thinking "I'll try this device and if that doesn't work I'll freakin' hypnotize the lot of them' No I mean seriously, you're about as close to someone like that as I am from the planet Neptrune. > > The miracle is that with comp, some "philosophical" or "theological" > question can be translated into arithmetical problems. > > You have to accept that in the same sense that you have to accept that if > the axiom of elementary arithmetic are correct, then, x^2 = 2* y^2 has NO > non trivial solution. > > I might be wrong, but people saying it is wrong are usually > computationalist who do believe "religiously" in the Aristotelian dogma > (indeed believed by many fundamentalist, in Islam, Christianity, and even > more among the fundamentalists atheists). > It's going to take me absolutely ages to get the point of understanding everything well enough to be able to say whether you are - for me - right or wrong. Like I mentioned before though I think...I have done a study of your theory structure. And I think I mentioned that, in my personal view, it's one the best I've ever seen. It's magnificent. I want to tell you about it sometime. Presumably you'll know...but sometimes structure is even better than someone knows because some of it happens as a result of personal character, so can be inexplicit/unrealized. I don't think yours will be though because the same theme is repeated again and again, which tends to look conscious. > > For the normal usual agnostic scientists, it is just a theorem in > theoretical cognitive science, or in arithmetical philosophy, or in > computer science. > > It is a result in science. And there are some evidence of peer/pressure to > ignore this, but I think this is not even related to the result itself. It > is modest, and it looks radical only to people having dogma in the field. > > My real goal is the same as Gödel. To illustrate that some *hypotheses* > make it possible to tackle "theological" questions, like afterlife, god, > reincarnation, in a purely mathematical way. > > Nobody is asked to accept anything by faith. Only to validate or > invalidate a deductive reasoning. > > > > > > After all, who wants to be at the bottom rung of the hierarchy. > > This is pretty well understood stuff. I meancults, and pressure-scams, use > the same kind of thing - obviously in their case malign and purposeful - to > induce a pressured environment to push people through to whatever they have > in store. > > I think I'm making really vanilla observations here. I'm not suggesting > there's anything deliberate. I might not be right. Maybe you don't want to > talk about it. Maybe you don't think it matters. I don't mind. I wasn't > planning to launch a campaign. It was just something I'd been thinking > about and I saw Brent's comment and decided to pass comment. > > > I just try to share my passion for some fundamental questions, and > advertise the scientific method and the tools and discoveries, we inherit > when we assume computationalism. > Yep..in my books your brilliant. I love the stuff you say. I feel like I relate to the position you're in. Agreement...I don't agree with anything anymore because I'm that far into a theory now. I 'm probably still years away from fruit....and obviously it could all be a huge pile of steaming horseshit. Doesn't matter on the inside much...I'm still experiencing the isolation and bizarre consequences and implications that a very different theory will do. Like yours. > > Of course this push the level of rigor high, and philosophers often > dislike that. > > It put the rigor at the level of convincing, not me, but all universal > machines. > > I try to share my awe on our ignorance, and the machine's ignorance, that > can develop when the machine look inward, in some angle. > > I hope you have followed the little introduction to modal logic, because, > thanks to a theorem due to Solovay, some modal logic will sum up well the > complexity of the questions, and partial solutions. > > > > >> >> I have manage all points in a deduction, so do you understand the >> definition of comp, and at which step do you have any problem? >> > > > This is really nothing to do with the definition of comp. I'm not > suggesting you are using an illegitimate argument in terms of comp. > > > OK. Thanks for making this precise. I appreciate. > > > I'm just pointing to the structure and mentioning that because there seems > to be value attaching up a hierarchy in terms of how much someone accepts > comp, it might not be appropriate in an environment where people are > deciding whether they accept comp. > > > ? > > Why? By using steps in the deduction, anyone interested in the consequence > of comp will graded themselves. > > Those understanding step 0. (that is not nothing, it is the definition of > comp, and what it means to assume something, then it uses naive and default > hypotheses, without mentionaing Church thesis and the needed (but very > weak) arithmetical realism. > > If you grasp this, you have 0/8. because that is really the starting point. > Then, it is a matter of curiosity to see, for me, if you are OK with the > argument that this leads to step 2 (the "in principle" possibility of > classical teleportation (relatively to some Turing universal environment). > > If you are OK, with this, you grade yourself 1/8. Why not. It is useful in > later discussion to know this. > > If you try to make your mind of comp (which I do not, at least publicly) > why would you not be interested in the consequences of comp, or, of that > type of comp, if you can provide an alternate hypothesis in the cognitive > sciences. > > It is a bit weird. it is like "don't tell me about the inexistence of > rational numbers before I make my mind on numbers". > > > > > Or if it's unavoidable, an appreciation of the risk of bias is worth > having on board because you might be able to minimize that. > > > There is a bias for the scientific method in the fundamentals, and > computationalism makes this possible, not in practice, but in theory on the > theoretical question. > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> Something else is that some people don't appear to stick to published >> work and consequences when someone less experienced is undecided. The issue >> there is that there's a good chance that less experienced person may not be >> able to distinguish this for himself, and may be assuming published work is >> being stuck to - a reasonable assumption in my view. >> >> A simple remedy would be to label non published...stuff that are still at >> insight stage or whatever, as personal opinion. >> >> >> ? >> >> I explain on this list only published and peer reviewed materials, or I >> say explicitly when that is not the case, with all the warnings (but that >> is rare). >> > > If I got that wrong, unreserved apology. > > > > No problem. It is the originality of the work: it looks like philosophy, > it handles, and formulate, a problem traditionally reserved to the > philosophers and theologian's territory. > Then amazingly some (rare) scientists acts like "philosophers" and > "theologians". > > it is more a battle for keeping curriculum and jobs, it happen all the > time in math when two fields get unified, that's life. > > Some student in philosophy told me once that I have not the right to > reason like that. I told her that if you put the cards on the table, you > are only really asking a question, but she remains convinced of the > contrary. philosophers ignore that science is doubt and modesty before all, > including a deep agnosticism in most matter. > > > > The reason I thought not was because....I mean, just that statement Brent > was talking about where you argue consciousness for a higher self, an > spirit or soul. I thought it was established by you and Brent your theory > doesn't establish that this self is 'higher'. > > > Agreed. > > > > > > But, to be honest, I didn't think the claim about our consciousness being > facilitated by the body, but that it pre-exists and continues to exist > after death. I dridn't think you say something like that in a peer journal > without extraordinary proof. > > > Comp does not prove immortality, but it refutes proofs of mortality. > > Then like QM without collapse, looking at the third person view, you have > a good qualitative seeing why proving mortality would be a dauntesc task > indeed. > > If an amoeba survives one duplication, she survives all duplications (old > formulation of comp/UDA). > > Comp makes us more ignorant, and notably extremely ignorant on question > like that. > > But if your read Lamettrie and Sade, you can see how the confusion of > mechanism and materialism get to a logic which eliminate persons, and feel > liberate from the fear of death by making it an absolute end. But both with > Everett QM, or simply, computationalism, we are just much more ignorant. > > Some scientists dislike the idea that with comp we can begin to realise > how much we are ignorant in "theology". But I thought that was obvious, > given that the subject is still taboo for many, and is still traditionally > reserved to a vague notion of authorized legal cults. > > That is normal. Humans does not et listen to themselves, and it will take > time for them listening to the machines. > They might wait for when the machine will lie, perhaps. > > > > > But if I got that wrong, I'm sorry. That said, the point still stands > about using loaded words like 'higher'. > > > > Honestly, that was a "salvia entheogenic" vocabulary. Let us say that I > defined the higher self by the three primary hypostases. The lower self is > the secondary hypostases. > > Follow the course on modal logic, then Solovay theorem, and then the > following will be precise, and somehiow justified by the UDA: > > The higher self: ([] is GOdel 1931 beweisbar (provability, in PA, say, > predicate). > > p (god, the one, truth (not definable by the machine)), > []p (the noùs, the intelligible, the eternal ideas, the rational beliefs, > the third person), > []p & p (the universal soul, the universal person, the knower, the first > person). > > The lower self: > > []p & <>t (intelligible matter), > []p & <>t & p (sensible matter). > > You can read my paper on Plotinus. This is part of an interpretation of > Plotinus in purely arithmetical terms. > > Once a machine get enough induction ability, it inherits a quite non > trivial theology (defined by all true (arithmetical) propositions about it, > and its possibilities). > > All this concerns the ideal case of machines correct about themselves, at > the correct substitution level, or below. > > > > > As Brent said, these words have dramatic impacts on meaning. > > > This is because they are related to intimate conviction, but we have to go > through that by being clear on the points made. > > > > > > >> Let us focus on what you seem to not understand. What is it? >> > > Bruno, there's nothing wrong with my understanding. I haven't suggested > anything you've said is wrong by comp. I'm not talking about that at all. I > hope that's more clear now. > > > OK. No problem. > > > > >> I have really no clue, but you do seem a bit negative, without making any >> explicit points. >> > > All I can say about the negative charge, is that I wasn't but clearly that > was the impression for you, which doesn't help me either if I want you to > talk to me, so I will definitely try to keep an eye on how I'm presenting. > > > No problem. > > > > > However I think my points were explicit enough. I hope the clarification > was useful. Let me know if you want more information. I can't promise, but > I should think I could probably find you some information about > psychological devices involving building value judgements about individuals > based on their acceptance of something, into a process where people are > deciding whether they want to accept it. Or you could....there's a strong > cult link I think. > > > I think that with comp we can develop an understanding that we should not > try so much to use science on ourselves, but better follow our normal > intuitions, somehow. You know the problem of the millipede when asked how > he walks with so many legs. Looking inward asks for an amount of doing > nothing, which little machines like PA and ZF do well, without not being > distracted by the senses. > > > > > > >> That's a recurent problem that I have with some type of philosophers. >> > > Well now you're being negative. I'm not a philosopher. I wasn't mentioning > philosophical concerns. > > > No problem ghibbsa. And of course I do like philosophy, but not when > misused notably with respect to validity of a reasoning. > I have stopped a long time ago to do philosophy on this list, to avoid an > easy confusion. > > But thank you for reassuring me that you were not doing that. > > Some told me: "oh, but if you pretend to do science, it means to pretend > to be true". > Answer: on the contrary, I just interrogate the peers about a question of > validity, which is checkable. I have always believed to be false, I ask for > showing me where. > > The very idea is to show that comp (and its many weakening), in the > company of the oldest theory of knowledge, leads to testable prediction > (indeed all quantum tautologies). > > If nature violates a theorem of Z1* (the logic of the intelligible > matter). I am less sure I would say yes so easily to the doctor. > > Sorry of any misunderstanding of my part, > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
