On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>:
On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true.
So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it
ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is
false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not
by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done by
the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable).
I think you can't conclude anything, because as I point out, any
measure you made is geographical under comp hence no measure can
invalidate it.
I guess you mean any "measurement" I made is geographical.
I agree that the making of the measurement is geographical, but what
I measure might be physically universal, unless physics is only
geography, but that is already refuted by comp, thanks to the non
collapse of the modal logic brought by the intensional variants.
Comp here already predicts that *there* is a physical part common to
all geographies, and that is what I call "physical laws", as the
rest will be sort of contingencies.
You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus +
we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a
higher level). OK?
Ok... but it is no more comp. The "we are at the base level of
physics" is the same thing as primitive matter, Peter Jones
realness ingredient.
Not at all. By definition of that realness ingredient, it cannot be
tested, except trivially by being "conscious", as all virtual being
not implemented in physics are non-conscious in that Peter Jones
theory. This makes Peter Jones "realness" neither confirmable nor
refutable (and thus pseudo-religious somehow, or just a reification
philosophical mistake).
But in our case, that "realness" (defined by the satisfiability of
comp + theaetetus + "non-dream") is *refutable*. That is why I
explained (to Brett Hall, notably) that a computationalist can test
if he belongs to an (higher order, physical (in the comp sense))
simulation.
If you program that simulation, and I am the simulated observer, I
can derive the physical laws from comp (without doing any
observation) and compare it to what I observe. If that fits, I can't
conclude anything (and my 1p will overlap on reality and the
simulation. I still derived the correct laws of physics), but if I
find a discrepancy (and if you don't mess with my virtual brain so
that I stay "correct") then I can conclude that (~comp V ~Theaetetus
V ~simulation).
As long as you don't specify anything measurable that can be use to
claim a discrepancy... you can't do that...
I give an infinity of such specification. If my environment obeys to
the physics Z1*, qZ1*, I can't conclude anything, but I will still
derive the correct laws, either by introspection, or by observation.
If my environment does not obey to Z1*, I am in an artificial
simulation.
Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown,
It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation, which
is already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic).
the fact that I could write a virtual world where it does not hold,
imply that this virtual world exists in the UD deployement in an
infinity of computations which interfere like our reality, no
difference here...
The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the
artificial simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics, which
does not result from the interference below the subst. level.
If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, it
will looks "dreamy" to me, I will see that I am not in a real (comp)
physical reality, I will see the discrepancy.
so by the same point as our "real" world, a conscious being in my
virtual world (if a UD exists, and in platonia of course it exists),
then at the next step he will be out *my* virtual world but not the
consistent extension of it where F=m*a still does not hold true...
hence F=m*a cannot be universal in this context and cannot be use to
invalidate comp... so as long as you can't say precisely what kind
of measurement would invalidate comp or what exactly comp physics
encompass (IMO not much except multiplicity of worlds), I can't see
a way to falsify it, and certainly not by a measurement. If you
think otherwise, please state what kind of measurement you think
would qualify.
*All* physical measurement can refute comp V simulation in principle,
as anything physical can be both derived in comp, and then tested.
Of course, if there were no physical laws, and that all number
relations measured by physicists are contingent, then that would be a
pity for the notion of physical laws. But then comp would predict that
those geographical laws have to be accessible and we should be able to
derive information on those relations. It would just made the
multiverse very smooth, and its global mathematical structure should
still be derivable from comp and arithmetic, although the testing
would been harder to do. The logic of Matter (observable) would be
equal to the logic of Thought (boolean logic, classical logic, Boole
laws of thought).
Empirically, we don't see that at all, and empirically we have
introduced the notion of physical *law*, and indeed those laws on the
observable are obeying a non boolean logic, quantum logic.
And then qZ1*, the comp logic of the observation with probability one
(which empirically obeys a quantum logic) does NOT collapse into
classical logic, and does obey a quantum logic.
So comp guaranties that there are quantum physical laws, correct for
all geographies, again (point above) under the condition they emerge
*directly* from the sum on all computations, and not from the dream or
simulation of a universal machine supported by that geography.
You can in principle derived from all finite multiverse which consists
in counter example to negated theorem of qZ1* build a graph of Stern
Gerlach device refuting comp. We can compare the empirical quantum
logics with the comp quantum logic. Up to now it fits.
It would not have fitted, I would have concluded, from comp, that we
are in a normal, artificial simulation, like Boström, or like Tipler
Omega point. But apparently, until now, nature conforms to the comp
quantum logic and mathematics.
OK?
Let me speculate. I would not been astonished that the physics derived
from comp will be a quantum mathematics, with quantum numbers, and
that physics will be a sort of quantum group theory, and that some
group can manage the inflation of realities (like the unitary group,
by introducing a phase to the computations, and eliminates the
extravagant more lengthy (in the UD) path. I expect the SWE, or Dirac,
or DeWitt-Wheeler equation, but the Hamiltonian might be contingent,
or geographical, even if cosmic. The quantum vacuum does look like a
quantum universal dovetailer. But here I speculate.
Best,
Bruno
Regards,
Quentin
Then by being a classical computationalist (meaning that I bet
strongly on comp and the S4 theory of knowledge), I can bet as much
strongly that I am failed by some people through a simulation, a bit
like in some dream we can become lucid by keeping attention to the
detail of the dream. Can you find something equivalent for Peter
Jones "realness"? I doubt so.
Bruno
Quentin
(I think se have discussed this before, but it is OK to come back,
as this is not so easy).
In all case it is better than physics, which only compresses
information, without justifying its existence and the modality of
the compression, still less justifying a non communicable part of
it (the physical sensation) or linking sensation and bodies in ad
hoc ways without taking the FPI into account. With comp we don't
have so much choice. That we might be dreaming is also true for
physics (and that's why I often forget to mention the higher level
dream, when I say that comp is refutable---that is universally true).
Up to now, Everett-QM confirms comp, and Theaetetus *and* that we
are not dreaming or in a simulation.
Bruno
Quentin
But comp justifies this: the modalities of provability and
observation does not collapse, and so there are universal (in a
strong sense) laws or physical truth. Among those already
predicted by comp, is the Many-worlds aspect of reality, which
appears under the substitution level, and the existence of
indeterminacy and non-cloning. In particular, without QM, I would
probably tend to believe that comp is not plausible.
But comp gives the whole mathematics of observability, which leads
to infinitely many testable propositions. For example, a form of
Bell's inequality can be described in the logic Z1*, and, well, it
is still open if Z1* violates it. (because it is intractable,
despite the fact that Z1* is decidable, but it would be miraculous
that Z1* proves it, for some reason to lengthy to develop here).
But the point is that if Z1* proves that Bell inequality, then the
fact that nature violates it would refute comp. Z1* (and/or
S4Grz1, X1*) is (are) supposed to formalize the entire quantum
logic, so we can compare directly the quantum logics and the
quantum logic of comp.
Some hope comes from a paper by Rawling and Selesnick(*), which
use quantum logic, and even the modal logic B, which is the modal
form of quantum logic (by a result due to Goldblatt), to implement
a quantum NOR. All this can be tested in Z1*, and normally we can
test the existence of quantum computation in Z1* (or in his
quantified extension qZ1*). Imagine that someone can prove that
qZ1* cannot emulate a quantum computer, and imagine we succeed in
implementing a quantum computation, then comp (+ Theaetetus) is
refuted.
Yesterday (!), I have been sent new papers on quantum logic, which
shows that the field has progressed, notably with respect of
quantum computing, and this suggest that the best way to refute
comp, or improve the knowledge theory, will come from the ability
of qS4Grz1, or qZ1*, or qX1*, to simulate a quantum computer.
Bruno
(*) J. P. Rawling and S. A. Selesnick. Orthologic and Quantum
Logic : Models and Computational
Elements. Journal of the ACM, 47(4) :721–751, 2000.
Regards,
Quentin
However I see that isn't so, so I will be interested to know how
it's testable - if I ever make it to understanding AUDA.
I hope to be able to explain enough so that you understand the
main line on this.
Meanwhile, more explanation, notably in my answer to Brent.
Bruno
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