2014-02-13 12:29 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: > > On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > > 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: > >> >> On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> >> >> 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: >> >>> >>> On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: >>> >>> On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote: >>>> >>>> That doesn't follow. If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in >>>> some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics. >>>> >>>> Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this >>>> is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all >>>> universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different >>>> geographies. >>>> >>> >>> So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, >>> according to comp? >>> >>> >>> Not completely, as you will still have all the computations >>> approximating all possible geographical reality, including those without >>> observers, and in that sense, those "realities" exist, but they might not >>> be first person plural sharable, and if you could explore one, they can >>> violate our physics below our substitution level (which witnesses the >>> infinitely many computations, something that one computation can only >>> approximate). Your question can depend if a quantum universal dovetailer >>> win the "a measure battle", so that the computations going through you >>> states are asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows them >>> to exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic Principle" ?) >>> >>> >>> Is that not tautological? >>> >>> >>> >>> If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early >>> universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers >>> create it (somehow) ? >>> >>> >>> We select them. See above. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your >>>> theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of. That >>>> makes it impossible to test. >>>> >>>> Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than >>>> evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more. >>>> It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to >>>> find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ >>>> Theaetetus). But this needs more on "AUDA", so let us not anticipate >>>> everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to >>>> AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner >>>> and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in >>>> decent condition. >>>> >>>> I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something >>> like "comp predicts whatever physics we've got!" >>> >>> >>> This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. But >>> thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we can >>> observe ([]p & <>t), so comp(+Theaetetus) is not refuted yet, and is the >>> only theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp >>> predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all >>> from what we observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can >>> compare the comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp. >>> >> >> I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because >> whatever you could measure about reality could just be "geographical" and >> so comp is always in accordance with whatever measure... if not, could you >> precisely point on a specific thing that would invalidate comp ? >> >> >> If all the "hypostases" (points of view) modalities were collapsing into >> CPL, then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical laws, and >> everything would be geographical. This would predict that we can "travel" >> in the universe/multiverse, and observe anything logically consistent. >> >> This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in "Forever Undecided" >> (page 47): >> >> "The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that holds >> for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study all possible >> state of affairs". >> >> Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is those >> observations which led us to believe that there are physical laws, and laws >> means that something is true everywhere in our universe (or should means >> that, if that set is not empty). Indeed we believe that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2 >> are laws, that is are true, not only everywhere, but even in all branch of >> the universal wave. >> > > > But it can't be true everywhere with comp, > > > > > It must be true at the physical level, about the "real" (by comp) physical > reality. > > > because, I can write a virtual world where this does not hold, and as it > is a virtual world, an infinity of computations approximate it at any level > in the UD deployement (like our reality).... hence, that "virtual" world is > as real as ours by UDA (and not so virtual)... > > > It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real physics. >
Why, it is as real IMHO, because it is also implemented by an infinity of computations... why would our reality be more real ? Peter Jones realness ingredient ? > > > > > hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. > > > So if you extract "F= KmM/r^2" from comp, and you refute it ostensibly (by > flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are dreaming > (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented on the > real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in > a non computable). > I think you can't conclude anything, because as I point out, any measure you made is geographical under comp hence no measure can invalidate it. > > You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we are > at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher level). > OK? > Ok... but it is no more comp. The "we are at the base level of physics" is the same thing as primitive matter, Peter Jones realness ingredient. Quentin > (I think se have discussed this before, but it is OK to come back, as > this is not so easy). > > In all case it is better than physics, which only compresses information, > without justifying its existence and the modality of the compression, still > less justifying a non communicable part of it (the physical sensation) or > linking sensation and bodies in ad hoc ways without taking the FPI into > account. With comp we don't have so much choice. That we might be dreaming > is also true for physics (and that's why I often forget to mention the > higher level dream, when I say that comp is refutable---that is universally > true). > > Up to now, Everett-QM confirms comp, and Theaetetus *and* that we are not > dreaming or in a simulation. > > Bruno > > > > > > > Quentin > > >> >> But comp justifies this: the modalities of provability and observation >> does not collapse, and so there are universal (in a strong sense) laws or >> physical truth. Among those already predicted by comp, is the Many-worlds >> aspect of reality, which appears under the substitution level, and the >> existence of indeterminacy and non-cloning. In particular, without QM, I >> would probably tend to believe that comp is not plausible. >> >> But comp gives the whole mathematics of observability, which leads to >> infinitely many testable propositions. For example, a form of Bell's >> inequality can be described in the logic Z1*, and, well, it is still open >> if Z1* violates it. (because it is intractable, despite the fact that Z1* >> is decidable, but it would be miraculous that Z1* proves it, for some >> reason to lengthy to develop here). But the point is that if Z1* proves >> that Bell inequality, then the fact that nature violates it would refute >> comp. Z1* (and/or S4Grz1, X1*) is (are) supposed to formalize the entire >> quantum logic, so we can compare directly the quantum logics and the >> quantum logic of comp. >> >> Some hope comes from a paper by Rawling and Selesnick(*), which use >> quantum logic, and even the modal logic B, which is the modal form of >> quantum logic (by a result due to Goldblatt), to implement a quantum NOR. >> All this can be tested in Z1*, and normally we can test the existence of >> quantum computation in Z1* (or in his quantified extension qZ1*). Imagine >> that someone can prove that qZ1* cannot emulate a quantum computer, and >> imagine we succeed in implementing a quantum computation, then comp (+ >> Theaetetus) is refuted. >> Yesterday (!), I have been sent new papers on quantum logic, which shows >> that the field has progressed, notably with respect of quantum computing, >> and this suggest that the best way to refute comp, or improve the knowledge >> theory, will come from the ability of qS4Grz1, or qZ1*, or qX1*, to >> simulate a quantum computer. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> (*) J. P. Rawling and S. A. Selesnick. Orthologic and Quantum Logic : >> Models and Computational >> Elements. Journal of the ACM, 47(4) :721–751, 2000. >> >> >> >> >> >> Regards, >> Quentin >> >>> >>> >>> >>> However I see that isn't so, so I will be interested to know how it's >>> testable - if I ever make it to understanding AUDA. >>> >>> >>> I hope to be able to explain enough so that you understand the main line >>> on this. >>> Meanwhile, more explanation, notably in my answer to Brent. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. 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