2014-02-15 10:01 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: > > I don't beg the question, I don't see a problem generating a virtual world > where F=ma does not hold true... that world exists in an infinity of > versions in the UD deployment as our own reality... You have no point > proving our own reality could not be a "dream" in that sense... The only > thing that should render our own reality "more" real, is that it certainly > requires less rules than a reality where F=ma is false... > > > Not at all. By the invariance of the first person, the number of rules and > the complexity of the explanations/programs is not relevant. If not I would > have solve the measure problem by an appeal to Kolmogorov or Chaitin > complexity. But this cannot work. It is only in the "self-multiplication" > factors that the laws of physics can become stable. nature use linearity, > and the discovery of arithmetical quantum logic confirms up to now that > fact. It makes the Everett multiplication of populations (the first person > plural) protecting comp from solipsism. > > > > >> All pieces of dreams are consistent with the actual state of a sentient >> being. >> That is the origin of the white rabbits. if our brain is a universal >> machine, we can can be failed, and are actually failed in infinities of >> computations. UDA made the laws of physics in a probability calculus, >> assuming the measure exist: that is: a law of physics is what multiplies >> the normal histories again the aberrant one. >> > > Yes but you don't have that measure nor a way to calculate it, > > > I do. That's what Z1* & Co. are supposed to provide. It is technically > complex to do, but everything is explained here. the rest are pure open > problem in math. > > > > you don't know it and you can't know that our reality does win the measure > battle. > > > I make this testable, of course I need definitions (of belief, knowledge, > observation, in the ideal case of the self-referentially correct machine > needed to extract the "correct" physics). > > > > Anyway the fact that almost anything is possible (with different > proportion as a measure is assumed), means that *no* measure can invalidate > computationalism... > > > Then no measure can invalidate Everett QM for the same reason. Comp and QM > makes both physics into a statistics. > > I don't think MWI is falsifiable either...
> > > > computationalism is a metaphysical stands and up to now in your > argumentation I see nothing that could falsify comp... You always say to > compare physics to comp physics, but it's a dead end, no contradiction can > be inferred from that. > > > I cannot make sense of that. That opinion was widely hold before 1991, as > X1* and Z1* was believed to collapse the modal logic, due to the fact that > the "& p" and "p->[]p" seemed to impose simultaneously antisymmetry and > symmetry, but the nuances brought eventually by incompleteness eventually > refuted, amazingly enough, that collapse. That is important as it makes > comp distinguishing clearly comp physical laws from comp possible > geographies. > What are comp physical laws then ? if it is an "open problem" because calculus is intractable... then comp is not falsifiable, you can't use falsifiability argument if such falsification is intractable. And I still don't understand how comp can sort geographical laws from deeper laws. > > > > > >> >> This can be translated in computer science/arithmetic, and the case of >> probability one can be studied by its logic. This, all Löbian machine can >> understand by "introspection" (self-reference) and so the physics is >> derivable from self-reference only, and then tested with the observation. >> Then the result is that a physical (lawful) physical reality does exist, >> with a fundamental logic which is already enough quantum-like to let us >> hope to have an equivalent of Gleason theorem, and in that case the white >> rabbit problem is solved *only* by the quantum logic we observe. >> The infinity of computational consistent relative state obeys the same >> logic in an artificial simulation and in the physics, emerging (or not) >> from the sum on UD*. >> >> >> >> >>> That one is determined by computer science. The case of the >>> "probability one" logic is given by the arithmetical quantization. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> so it is below the substitution level, because the level is finite or >>> comp is false. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, >>>> >>> >>> How would it proves that ? >>> >>> >>> By showing that Z1* gives the good type of quantum logic, enough to >>> assure Gleason theorem, and derive the measure from some canonical >>> (Hilbertian) semantics. Z1* is already able to decide if the Hilbert space >>> is finitely dimension, or infinitely dimensional. Then dimension is related >>> to the probability calculus (by works by many quantum logicians), and >>> normally, arithmetic add infinitely many constraints at the first order >>> modal logic level. >>> It might be hard, but I do thing that qZ1* is able to decide if "F=ma" >>> is valid or not in the worlds of the comp multiverses". >>> Nobody said it was simple, especially that such question is complex for >>> reasonable theorem provers. >>> >>> []<>A is written in a Z logic, so in G it is equivalent to []([]A V <>A) >>> & <>([]A V<>A), so the ultimate arithmetical propositions are rather >>> complex. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> It can't, the proof is that there *can be* environments where F!=ma >>> which also results from an infinity of computations. >>> >>> >>>> it will looks "dreamy" to me, >>>> >>> >>> No argument there proving that. >>> >>> >>> I hope that what I explain above has clarified. >>> >> >> No... what you clarified was already known, >> >> >> I have clarified that Bell's inequality violation is (most plausibly) a >> law, >> > > if it is "most plausibly", you haven't clarified anything... > > > For the contingent reason that it is still intractable. But the formal > theory and the theorems (or non theorems) are there. > And given that B violates the inequality, you can bet that the B^- (B > without necessitation) + some arithmetical constraints will violate too. > > > > > it is or it isn't but "most plausibly" is not a clarification... > > > Yes. But that is just an open problem. The theorem prover get a memory > overflow, simply. Meanwile, some open questions have been solved, but most > others remain. > > > > > > >> and that, actually, all quantum tautologies are already either laws or >> precise open problems, and explained why arithmetic must give all >> constraints (by UDA) so that some "Gleason theorem" can be used. >> >> I am not sure I understand what you seem missing. >> > > I'm don't feel I'm missing anything, I challenge your view that UDA is > falsifiable. > > > ? You mean comp? > Yes > UDA is a reasoning: it is valid or not. > I think it is valid, but that doesn't render comp falsifiable. > AUDA is the translation in arithmetic. It makes comp + the classical > theory of knowledge falsifiable. Indeed physics is entirely given by qZ1* > and/or qX1*, with some "harmonic" part given by S4Grz1. > > I can hardly imagine something more falsifiable. > You should have precise testing for a thing to be falsifiable, if it is only calculus but they are intractable in practice, I hardly call that falsifiable. Regards, Quentin > > In 1991, when I found the "material intelligible and sensible hypostases > (the Z and X logic), I predicted that they would be refuted in the year, by > me or my students or colleagues. This did not happened, despite their many > efforts. > Later I predicted it would be refuted by experts in quantum logic before > 2000. But up to now, nature confirms the arithmetical quantizations, > extracted from S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*, and they corroborate formally the fact > that the comp laws physics are quantum laws, despite we loose the > necessitation rule in the corresponding (to B) modal logic B^- > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
