On 15 Feb 2014, at 14:10, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2014-02-15 10:01 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>:

I don't beg the question, I don't see a problem generating a virtual world where F=ma does not hold true... that world exists in an infinity of versions in the UD deployment as our own reality... You have no point proving our own reality could not be a "dream" in that sense... The only thing that should render our own reality "more" real, is that it certainly requires less rules than a reality where F=ma is false...

Not at all. By the invariance of the first person, the number of rules and the complexity of the explanations/programs is not relevant. If not I would have solve the measure problem by an appeal to Kolmogorov or Chaitin complexity. But this cannot work. It is only in the "self-multiplication" factors that the laws of physics can become stable. nature use linearity, and the discovery of arithmetical quantum logic confirms up to now that fact. It makes the Everett multiplication of populations (the first person plural) protecting comp from solipsism.




All pieces of dreams are consistent with the actual state of a sentient being. That is the origin of the white rabbits. if our brain is a universal machine, we can can be failed, and are actually failed in infinities of computations. UDA made the laws of physics in a probability calculus, assuming the measure exist: that is: a law of physics is what multiplies the normal histories again the aberrant one.

Yes but you don't have that measure nor a way to calculate it,

I do. That's what Z1* & Co. are supposed to provide. It is technically complex to do, but everything is explained here. the rest are pure open problem in math.



you don't know it and you can't know that our reality does win the measure battle.

I make this testable, of course I need definitions (of belief, knowledge, observation, in the ideal case of the self-referentially correct machine needed to extract the "correct" physics).



Anyway the fact that almost anything is possible (with different proportion as a measure is assumed), means that *no* measure can invalidate computationalism...

Then no measure can invalidate Everett QM for the same reason. Comp and QM makes both physics into a statistics.


I don't think MWI is falsifiable either...

Of course. We can only falsifies the statistics.







computationalism is a metaphysical stands and up to now in your argumentation I see nothing that could falsify comp... You always say to compare physics to comp physics, but it's a dead end, no contradiction can be inferred from that.

I cannot make sense of that. That opinion was widely hold before 1991, as X1* and Z1* was believed to collapse the modal logic, due to the fact that the "& p" and "p->[]p" seemed to impose simultaneously antisymmetry and symmetry, but the nuances brought eventually by incompleteness eventually refuted, amazingly enough, that collapse. That is important as it makes comp distinguishing clearly comp physical laws from comp possible geographies.

What are comp physical laws then ? if it is an "open problem" because calculus is intractable... then comp is not falsifiable, you can't use falsifiability argument if such falsification is intractable.

The comp + theatetus comp theory of observable is Z1*. A quantum logic has already been derived. A theorem prover has been implemented.




And I still don't understand how comp can sort geographical laws from deeper laws.


The FPI makes consciousness differentiating on the infinite computations existing in arithmetic. Geography is the not materialist necessity, or the materialist contingency. In arithmetic this correspond to the diamond of some of the material hypostases defined by the intensional variant []p & <>p, or []p & <>t.










This can be translated in computer science/arithmetic, and the case of probability one can be studied by its logic. This, all Löbian machine can understand by "introspection" (self-reference) and so the physics is derivable from self-reference only, and then tested with the observation. Then the result is that a physical (lawful) physical reality does exist, with a fundamental logic which is already enough quantum-like to let us hope to have an equivalent of Gleason theorem, and in that case the white rabbit problem is solved *only* by the quantum logic we observe. The infinity of computational consistent relative state obeys the same logic in an artificial simulation and in the physics, emerging (or not) from the sum on UD*.



That one is determined by computer science. The case of the "probability one" logic is given by the arithmetical quantization.





so it is below the substitution level, because the level is finite or comp is false.


If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma,

How would it proves that ?

By showing that Z1* gives the good type of quantum logic, enough to assure Gleason theorem, and derive the measure from some canonical (Hilbertian) semantics. Z1* is already able to decide if the Hilbert space is finitely dimension, or infinitely dimensional. Then dimension is related to the probability calculus (by works by many quantum logicians), and normally, arithmetic add infinitely many constraints at the first order modal logic level. It might be hard, but I do thing that qZ1* is able to decide if "F=ma" is valid or not in the worlds of the comp multiverses". Nobody said it was simple, especially that such question is complex for reasonable theorem provers.

[]<>A is written in a Z logic, so in G it is equivalent to []([]A V <>A) & <>([]A V<>A), so the ultimate arithmetical propositions are rather complex.





It can't, the proof is that there *can be* environments where F! =ma which also results from an infinity of computations.

it will looks "dreamy" to me,

No argument there proving that.

I hope that what I explain above has clarified.

No... what you clarified was already known,

I have clarified that Bell's inequality violation is (most plausibly) a law,

if it is "most plausibly", you haven't clarified anything...

For the contingent reason that it is still intractable. But the formal theory and the theorems (or non theorems) are there. And given that B violates the inequality, you can bet that the B^- (B without necessitation) + some arithmetical constraints will violate too.




it is or it isn't but "most plausibly" is not a clarification...

Yes. But that is just an open problem. The theorem prover get a memory overflow, simply. Meanwile, some open questions have been solved, but most others remain.





and that, actually, all quantum tautologies are already either laws or precise open problems, and explained why arithmetic must give all constraints (by UDA) so that some "Gleason theorem" can be used.

I am not sure I understand what you seem missing.

I'm don't feel I'm missing anything, I challenge your view that UDA is falsifiable.

? You mean comp?

Yes

UDA is a reasoning: it is valid or not.

I think it is valid, but that doesn't render comp falsifiable.


Hmm... OK. But it makes AUDA conclusion testable, that is, in its natural comp sense, it makes comp + Theaetetus falsifiable. But AUDA is only an arithmetical version of UDA made possible by Church Thesis and Gödel's embedding of a reasoner on arithmetic in arithmetic.





AUDA is the translation in arithmetic. It makes comp + the classical theory of knowledge falsifiable. Indeed physics is entirely given by qZ1* and/or qX1*, with some "harmonic" part given by S4Grz1.

I can hardly imagine something more falsifiable.

You should have precise testing for a thing to be falsifiable, if it is only calculus but they are intractable in practice, I hardly call that falsifiable.


Well the tractable propositions showing that we get a quantum logic have of course been already solved.

I will submit the open problems to some technical journal, someday. One open problem has been solved.


Nevertheless, the point was in using computer science to translate a problem of philosophy or theology into a problem in arithmetic, or related to structured subset of the arithmetical truth. Comp is what makes that possible.

Not to solve it.

You can contest the classical logic of knowledge (the modal logics, T and S4). If you want.

But you can't contest that Theatetus on Gödel's beweisbar gives S4Grz, nor can you contest that the consistency-weakening on it, which is implictly implied by the FPI, leads to a B^- logic, defining arithmetical quantizations.

This uses non trivial results in the literature, like Solovay theorems, or Goldblatt results on B and minimal quantum logic, and some others. The Z and X logics are also graded, with intensional nuances []^n p & <>^m t. With m > n, it still gives quantum logics, and this can be handy in the prospection of a quantum computer or topology (from the internal infinite limit of the FPI)

It is a matter of work to show if nature depart from it or not. Yet we keep the assurance of definiteness, as we never depart from Arithmetical Truth.

You might way we progress in the thread with Liz to make a specific critics, but it is a matter of facts that the logics Z1* can be tested, have been tested, and up to now, due to QM, comp+theaetetus fits.

And with a simple lexicon, we get a cute, toy perhaps, arithmetical interpretation of Plato-Pythagorean and Plotinia, even Proclusian theology.

What does that mean? May be that those guy were not bad in looking inward, like AUDA illustrates that any sound universal machine can be as well.

Best,
Bruno



Regards,
Quentin


In 1991, when I found the "material intelligible and sensible hypostases (the Z and X logic), I predicted that they would be refuted in the year, by me or my students or colleagues. This did not happened, despite their many efforts. Later I predicted it would be refuted by experts in quantum logic before 2000. But up to now, nature confirms the arithmetical quantizations, extracted from S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*, and they corroborate formally the fact that the comp laws physics are quantum laws, despite we loose the necessitation rule in the corresponding (to B) modal logic B^-

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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