On 2/16/2014 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Feb 2014, at 19:10, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/16/2014 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But of course if you're trying to ascertain the nature of personal identity none of
this matters, it doesn't matter if the predictions were correct or not.
We are not trying to ascertain the nature of personal identity at all. I can be
amnesic on who I am for example. the question is about the expectation of some unique
1p experience I will live soon. By comp I know that it must be W, or M, but not both,
nor none.
But that's the ambiguity I see. When you ask the H-man, "Where do you think you
will be?"
The H-man has a diary. He must predict what will happen from his first person
experience, when he pushes on the button, and then open a door. He must write the
result, which can only be "W", or "M", but not both, in his diary, and compare that
result with the prediction.
See my last reply to John Clark.
There is no ambiguity, you need only distinguish carefully the 3p description, from the
1p experiences.
he has to provide some interpretation to the word "you". My immediate, intuitive
thought was, "I expect to be in both places."
That is the 3-1 view. You go out of your body, and you look at you reconstituted in both
place. That is the correct 3-1 view indeed.
yet, to answer the question asked, you need to reintegrate the body, and as it has been
duplicated, you need to dovetail a little bit on the two 1-views itself. And in this
case, both can see that "both city" was wrong, as both can see they are in only one city.
Which depends on what is meant by "I".
You might reread the thread, or just the paper. The 1-I, or 1-view, or 1p view, is the
content of the personal diary taken by the experiencer, and the 3-view are view by
outsider, which means here that they are not entering in the duplication boxes.
If "I" is just conscious experience then there are two "I"s and neither is the H-man
because they're not experiencing Helsinki. So "I" must be experiences and memory.
For UDA, even just the memory is enough, and the honesty in the confirmation and
refutation game, also.
No, just memory can't be enough because then there is no difference.
Then the M-man and the W-man are both "I" the H-man, in which case the H-man should
answer "Both".
Again, that is the correct 3-1 view. But the question is asked on the 1-1 views, which
are the 1-views.
But it is your insistence that the H-man write either M or W but not "both" as his
expectation. So then one must ask "Why not both?". The answer is obviously, "They are
physically different and will start to form different memories due to their interaction
with their environment - otherwise there would continue to be only one person (at least
that's our best theory).
Brent
The reason why I insist in that 1p/3p distinction is to avoid any ambiguity. In the 3p
you are all of them, in the 1-p you remain always only one of them. (them = the
relative copies).
Again see my last post to John Clark.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
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