Ok, then you simply reject probability usage in both scenario... then you're consistent unlike John... but if you reject such usage, that's throwing an axe on MWI explanation... then I can't see how you could still agree with many world interpretation and reject probability, that's not consistent... unless of course, you reject MWI.
Quentin 2014-02-21 4:48 GMT+01:00 chris peck <[email protected]>: > Hi Liz > > > > > *>>Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you > to another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life. > Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be > "transported" :) A malfunction causes you to be duplicated and sent to both > destinations, but you will never meet your doppelganger in the other solar > system, or find out that he exists. Does this make any difference to how > you assign probabilities? If so, why?* > > My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar > system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I > don't know about the possibility of accidents. But, > If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then > the probabilities end up: > > Solar System A : 1 > Solar System B : small chance. > > Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small > chance) as far as I am concerned. > > Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of > their own, the probabilities end up: > > Solar System A : 1 > Solar System B : 1. > > So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an > unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up > to 1 in MWI scenarios. > > All the best > > Chris. > > > > > > ------------------------------ > From: [email protected] > To: [email protected] > > Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) > Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 20:45:39 +0100 > > > > On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59, John Clark wrote: > > On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > > I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last > week. > > > But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could > say exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed. > > > Well, if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: > we have to interview all the copies. > > > > > > >> and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he sees > neither Washington nor Moscow. > > > > So, this is my first post to you, > > > Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if > duplicating chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is. > > > On the contrary. It is always clear. In the 3p we are all copies, and in > the 1p we are one of them. > That is what they all say. They have they own permanent atomic memories > like "WWMWMM". Say. > > > > > > > > despite I remember having sent other post? > > > The question is ambiguous because lots and lots of people in addition to > Mr. I remember the exact same thing. > > > Obviously. We agree. But there is no ambiguity. By definition of 1p and > comp, we have to take all the copies 1p view into account. That is why if > the H-guy predicted "W v M", all its copies win the bet, and if he > predicted "W & M", all the copies admits this was wrong (even if correct > for the 3-1 view, but clearly false from their 1-views). > > > > > > > If Mr he sees neither W or M, then he died, > > > If Bruno Marchal wants to invent a new language and that's what the words > "death" and "he" are decreed to mean then fine, but to be consistent John > Clark and Bruno Marchal of yesterday would have to be dead too. And it > should be noted that invented languages make communication with others > difficult, just look at Esperanto, and John Clark thinks that deep > philosophical discussions are difficult enough as they are even if > conducted in a mutually agreed upon language, so more obstacles to > understanding are not needed. > > > You quote and comment yourself! > > > > > > > > and then comp is false. > > > That's fine, I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of > ideas you call "comp" is false or not. The word is your invention not mine > and you're the only one who seems to know exactly what it means. > > > You have repeated that sentence an infinity of times. Comp is the quite > standard hypothesis that the brain, or whatever responsible for my > consciousness manifestation here and now, is Turing emulable. > It is not my invention. "comp" abbreviates computationalism. I show the > consequence, and you stop at step 3 for reason that you do not succeed to > communicate. > > > > > > We also died each time we measure a spin, or anything. > > > Then the word "died" doesn't mean much. > > > That was a consequence of your saying. > > > > > > > In AUDA this is a confusion > > > You have forgotten IHA. > > > I told you more than five times what AUDA means. Stop joking, and try to > be serious. AUDA is the Arithmetical UDA, also called "interview of the > universal machine" in sane04. It is the main part of the thesis in computer > science. > If you doubt that it means that you do repeat hearsay. > > > > > > between []p and []p & <>t. > > > How in the world could anybody be confused between []p and []p & <>t > especially if they had a nice low mileage AUDA convertible to help them get > around town? > > > Mocking does not help you. > > > > > > you believe we have refuted comp. That would be a gigantic discovery > > > Not to me it wouldn't! I don't care if "comp" is true or false because I > don't believe "comp" is worth a bucket of warm spit. > > > That contradicts your saying yes to step 0, 1 and 2. > > > > > > > Pronouns does not introduce any problem, > > > Personal pronouns like all pronouns are just a sort of shorthand that were > invented to save time and for no other reason, they generally cause no > trouble as long as the referent is clear. And yet it is a fact that Bruno > Marchal is simply incapable of expressing ideas about the unique nature of > personal identity without using personal pronouns. > > > I did it, but you are the one caming back with ambiguous pronouns in your > "refutation". > > There is no ambiguity at all. Just keep the 1-3 distinction in all the > uses. > > > > Why? Could it be because by using them and the assumption of uniqueness of > identity they engender it makes it much easier to prove the uniqueness of > identity? After all it is well known that proofs become somewhat easier to > write if Bruno Marchal just assumes what Bruno Marchal is trying to prove. > And if ideas are unclear the language should be too; a bad idea clearly > expressed is easy to identify as bad, but a bad idea expressed in murky > language can sometimes sound impressive if it's murky enough. > > > Stop doing irrelevant meta-remarks to hide your absence of arguments. > Focus on your point, if there is one, of move top step 4, if only to get > the idea. > > > > > > > when you agree that after the duplication we are both copies in the 3p > view > > > Yes. And you once said something abut "the future 1p" of the Helsinki man, > well that description would fit 2 people because both remember being the > Helsinki man. > > > yes, and that is why the confirmation is asked to the 2 people. There is > nothing ambiguous. "W or M" win, "W & M" lost. Given the precise question > of the 1p views, viewed from the 1p-views, and not on the 3-1 views. > > It is quasi primary school level. > > > > > > and only one of them, in the 1p view. > > > Only one? So which one is the phony, the Washington Man or the Moscow Man? > > > Both are the phony. No problem as both see indeed only once city. That was > a correct prediction by the H-guy. > > > > > > > I am happy you think it is a world class discovery, but let us be > modest, it is a reminder that the mind-body problem is not solved, and that > "science" has not decided between Aristotle and Plato. The discovery (the > thesis) is in the math part > > > I too have discovered a new sort of indeterminacy that involves math and > it is very very similar to the sort you discovered; I add 2 to the number 3 > and I add 8 to the number 3. The number 3 can't predict if it will end up > as a 5 or as a 11. I believe my discovery is just as profound as yours. Not > very. > > > So you accept that step 3 is a discovery? Nice. But to judge the result, > you have to move to step 4. > > Bruno > > > > > John K Clark > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
