blablabla... genius.
2014-02-24 19:01 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen <edgaro...@att.net>: > Quentin, > > The typical adolescent response of someone unable to even understand the > post he is responding to. > > Edgar > > > > On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:57:17 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> I prefer the Pasta theory of the universe... the universe is generated >> with pasta... My pasta universe starts with the actual observable state >> of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is >> correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual >> pastas are or exactly how they taste like. >> >> However we can say many things about my pasta universe. For example, one >> thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete >> because it always continues to output the current observable information >> state of the universe with no problems whatsoever (tomatoes are the key to >> falsifiability). >> >> My pasta theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect >> while yours does not. >> >> Quentin >> >> >> >> 2014-02-24 18:45 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net>: >> >> Bruno, >>> >>> As I've stated on many occasions, computational reality is what computes >>> the actual information states of the observable universe. It is what >>> computes what science observes and measures, whatever that may be. >>> >>> Your comp starts with an abstract assumption without any empirical >>> justification. There is not even any way to falsify your comp, and there is >>> no reason to believe there is anyway it generates the actual observable >>> universe. >>> >>> My computational universe starts with the actual observable state of the >>> universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by >>> definition even before we might know what all of those actual computations >>> are or exactly how they work. >>> >>> However we can say many things about my computational universe. For >>> example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and >>> logically complete because it always continues to output the current >>> observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever. >>> >>> My computational theory conforms to standard scientific method in this >>> respect while yours does not. >>> >>> Edgar >>> >>> >>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote: >>>> >>>> Craig, >>>> >>>> I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some >>>> consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it >>>> from my computational reality. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> But please tell us what it is. "computational" is a technical term. >>>> Does your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any >>>> (Turing) universal machine or numbers? >>>> >>>> Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any >>>> mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical >>>> implementation of a computation. >>>> >>>> >>>> You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and >>>> 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that >>>> artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale >>>> different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems >>>> to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of "comp"). >>>> >>>> Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> :-) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Edgar >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Craig, >>>>>> >>>>>> Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Computational Theory of Mind. >>>>> >>>>> Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. >>>>> Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, >>>>> when >>>>> I suspect that is neither. >>>>> >>>>> Craig >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Edgar >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This might be a more concise way of making my argument: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the >>>>>>> method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are >>>>>>> encountered. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as >>>>>>> experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is >>>>>>> counted >>>>>>> must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic >>>>>>> re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. >>>>>>> 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be >>>>>>> pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how >>>>>>> numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the >>>>>>> whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual >>>>>>> machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware >>>>>>> substrate, >>>>>>> but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate >>>>>>> itself >>>>>>> from data which is not relevant to the machine? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism >>>>>>> behind computation, I conclude that: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical >>>>>>> theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. >>>>>>> 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical >>>>>>> inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. >>>>>>> 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii >>>>>>> fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level >>>>>>> mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental >>>>>>> phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. >>>>>>> 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and >>>>>>> should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy >>>>>>> directly. >>>>>>> 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a >>>>>>> trans-theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense >>>>>>> encounters is >>>>>>> the sole axiom. >>>>>>> 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can >>>>>>> be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. >>>>>>> 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, >>>>>>> rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from >>>>>>> PIP >>>>>>> as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, >>>>>>> theoretical platform of sense. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>> >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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