blablabla... genius.
2014-02-24 19:01 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen <[email protected]>: > Quentin, > > The typical adolescent response of someone unable to even understand the > post he is responding to. > > Edgar > > > > On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:57:17 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> I prefer the Pasta theory of the universe... the universe is generated >> with pasta... My pasta universe starts with the actual observable state >> of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is >> correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual >> pastas are or exactly how they taste like. >> >> However we can say many things about my pasta universe. For example, one >> thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete >> because it always continues to output the current observable information >> state of the universe with no problems whatsoever (tomatoes are the key to >> falsifiability). >> >> My pasta theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect >> while yours does not. >> >> Quentin >> >> >> >> 2014-02-24 18:45 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen <[email protected]>: >> >> Bruno, >>> >>> As I've stated on many occasions, computational reality is what computes >>> the actual information states of the observable universe. It is what >>> computes what science observes and measures, whatever that may be. >>> >>> Your comp starts with an abstract assumption without any empirical >>> justification. There is not even any way to falsify your comp, and there is >>> no reason to believe there is anyway it generates the actual observable >>> universe. >>> >>> My computational universe starts with the actual observable state of the >>> universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by >>> definition even before we might know what all of those actual computations >>> are or exactly how they work. >>> >>> However we can say many things about my computational universe. For >>> example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and >>> logically complete because it always continues to output the current >>> observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever. >>> >>> My computational theory conforms to standard scientific method in this >>> respect while yours does not. >>> >>> Edgar >>> >>> >>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote: >>>> >>>> Craig, >>>> >>>> I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some >>>> consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it >>>> from my computational reality. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> But please tell us what it is. "computational" is a technical term. >>>> Does your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any >>>> (Turing) universal machine or numbers? >>>> >>>> Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any >>>> mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical >>>> implementation of a computation. >>>> >>>> >>>> You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and >>>> 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that >>>> artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale >>>> different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems >>>> to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of "comp"). >>>> >>>> Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> :-) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Edgar >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Craig, >>>>>> >>>>>> Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Computational Theory of Mind. >>>>> >>>>> Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. >>>>> Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, >>>>> when >>>>> I suspect that is neither. >>>>> >>>>> Craig >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Edgar >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This might be a more concise way of making my argument: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the >>>>>>> method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are >>>>>>> encountered. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as >>>>>>> experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is >>>>>>> counted >>>>>>> must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic >>>>>>> re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. >>>>>>> 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be >>>>>>> pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how >>>>>>> numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the >>>>>>> whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual >>>>>>> machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware >>>>>>> substrate, >>>>>>> but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate >>>>>>> itself >>>>>>> from data which is not relevant to the machine? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism >>>>>>> behind computation, I conclude that: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical >>>>>>> theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. >>>>>>> 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical >>>>>>> inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. >>>>>>> 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii >>>>>>> fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level >>>>>>> mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental >>>>>>> phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. >>>>>>> 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and >>>>>>> should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy >>>>>>> directly. >>>>>>> 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a >>>>>>> trans-theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense >>>>>>> encounters is >>>>>>> the sole axiom. >>>>>>> 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can >>>>>>> be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. >>>>>>> 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, >>>>>>> rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from >>>>>>> PIP >>>>>>> as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, >>>>>>> theoretical platform of sense. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
