On Wednesday, March 5, 2014 2:20:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 04 Mar 2014, at 19:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >
> >
> > On Tuesday, March 4, 2014 3:27:58 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > On 03 Mar 2014, at 21:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>>
> >>> Why don't we see such a (meta) link in our own languages?
> >>
> >> Because we duplicate too slowly, unlike amoeba, which have not the
> >> cognitive abilities to exploit this.
> >> This entails that in natural language we use the same indexical
> >> term "I" for both the 3-I and the 1-I. We say "I lost a tooth" ("3-
> >> I") , and "I feel pain in my mouth (1-I)". Only teleportation and
> >> duplication, or deep reflexion on belief and knowledge, makes
> >> clear the difference. It appears clearly in Theaetetus, and in
> >> other fundamental texts.
> >>
> >> When we say "I lost a tooth" what we mean is "In my experience it
> >> seems like I lost a tooth". It is still 1-I. We may wake up and
> >> find that experience was a dream, in which case we say "I didn't
> >> lose a tooth" but mean "In my experience it seems like my previous
> >> experience of losing a tooth was a dream",
> >
> > Funny but irrelevant. Like Clark can always avoid a question on the
> > 1-views, by jumping out of his body and adding a 3 (passing from
> > some 1-1-1 view to a 3-1-1-1 view for example), you can always add a
> > 1 on any view, like you do here. But in the argument we were
> > assuming the 3p view at the start.
> >
> > I'm not adding a 1 view, I'm giving a literal description of the
> > phenomenon. There is no expectation of 3p unless that expectation is
> > provided by the 1p.
>
>
> that is what I meant by adding the 1-p view.
>
What other view are you saying I am 'adding' the 1-p to?
>
>
>
> > We were not assuming the 3p view at the start though,
>
> That is why your position is akin to solipsism.
>
Not solipsism, distributed holipsism. Solipsism removes the distance
between here/now and there/then. Holipsism proposes that 'there and then'
is the distance-diffracted presence of 'here and now'
>
>
>
>
> > since I think that the 3p view is only realized as a (Bp-x/Bp)(x/Bp
> > +x/Bp), never as a stand-alone perspective.
>
> So what does stand alone?
>
What you call Bp: Sense, or aesthetic encounter/presence/re-acquaintance.
>
>
>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >>
> >> Instead of seeing it in terms of Bp & p, I see it as something like
> >> Bp & Bp^e (where e is Euler's number).
> >
> > ???
> >
> > Yes. My view is that there is no "p" other than as a representation
> > within some "Bp".
>
> That is a form of solipsism.
>
No, I'm not saying that truth is an ad hoc fantasy of a single being, I'm
saying that truth qualities relate to the function and organizational
aspects of sense. Truth is about the tension between eternity, history, and
now, not a sterile plaque on the wall which dictates the universe
mechanically. UDA is a form of nilipsism.
>
>
>
> > Truth is a measure of the length of the trail of experiences leading
> > back closer and closer to the capacity for sense itself. Short
> > trails present the truth of superficial, disconnected sensations.
> > Long trails present profoundly unifying states of consciousness.
>
> To do science, we have to bet on something on which we can agree, and
> which is supposed to be independent on us.
>
It is independent of us, but not of independent of sense. That should be
something on which we can agree, except that because sense is
participatory, we are free to invert the local and the absolute (and indeed
we need to do that to survive within our body's environment). As long as we
only use science for engineering purposes, the we should stick with the
empirical, nilipsistic view. When we want to understand deeply, however,
and use science to discover consciousness and qualities of life, then we
should augment the local view and incorporate the pansensitive perspective
as well.
>
> Keep in mind that I have no problem with your theory, especially that
> it is consistent with the machine's 1-view. I have a problem only with
> you using your theory to refute computationalism. It is non valid, if
> only because your theory is, basically, equivalent to the machine's 1-
> view.
>
This is the weird part that we've been over before already many times.
If we are both machines, and we have opposite theories of computationalism,
how can you claim that my view and not yours is the machine's 1- view?
Aren't you being racist, stereotyping the machine in a paternalistic way
while you yourself remain omniscient and meta-mechanical?
I agree that my conjecture cannot refute compatibilism within the frame of
logic, but part of my conjecture is that logic cannot capture sense at all,
since it is the effort to rigidly automate sense that is already there.
Logic is a contraction of sense, not a generator of it. You have to know
that what I am saying is true on some level...unless some people do
identify completely with the intellect rather than their experience?
>
>
>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >> There is no p, only a tendency toward stability across nested
> >> histories of experience as the accumulate.
> >
> > If there is no p, there is no truth, and we waste our time when
> > doing research.
> >
> > No, there is truth, but it is not a separate perfect thing, it's
> > more like the mass of experience. Truth is a measure of how much
> > sense is made of what makes sense already.
>
> This is a solipsistic vision of truth. You really talk like the
> machine"s "universal soul" (S4Grz).
>
No, you're straw manning my vision. Truth is the train's path as seen from
every perspective, not just the conductor's. The path doesn't exist outside
of the perspectives though. I think that yours is a nilipsistic vision of
truth.
>
>
> >
> > I begin to think I waste my time trying to get you back to research
> > instead of your hopelessly negative and destructive quasi-racist
> > personal reification.
> >
> > I can see your research as hopelessly naive and potentially
> > destructive as well, as to me, it conflates the personal with a
> > reified impersonal and presents a quasi-racist arithmetic supremacy.
> > I wouldn't hold that against you though. You could still be right, I
> > just happen to think that my view makes more sense in defining the
> > basic points.
>
> I have yet to see a theory.
I don't have a theory, I have conjectures.
> You assume sense, you assume some
> physicalness (at least your refer to it a lot without explaining what
> is when you assume only sense), so you assume what I estimate (and
> argue) that we have to explain.
>
I assume physicalness no more than you assume sense. Physicality is the
externalization of sense. Sense + distance = objects. What is distance?
Sense - x/sense.
>
> You are not trying to make a scientific theory. You just seem to
> defend a personal opinion, which is negative on a class of entities,
> without us ever being able to get a reason why, except your opinion.
>
The reason is contained within metaphors and examples. This is the nature
of consciousness. If we look for reason (a particular part of
consciousness) alone to find consciousness, I think that we will get only
the nilipsistic maze of tautological theory.
Craig
>
> > Edgar,
> >
> > In this list we are open minded and basically agnostic, we don't a
> > priori assume god, matter, universe, numbers, or whatever, and then
> > try theories by making clear the assumptions.
> >
> >
> > The a priori assumption is that you can have a sensible strategy to
> > deflate your assumptions by making a priori explicit sense of them.
>
> That is accepted at the meta-level for *any* scientific theory. You do
> the same with the term "sense". The difference is that many people
> actually agree on the assumptions, in the case of comp, and they are
> clear enough to learn from them.
>
>
>
> > In all cases, the first implicit assumption is sense itself. Sense
> > of arithmetic, sense of machines, sense of sense, sense of
> > self...all of that comes later.
>
>
> Sense is not an assumption. That does not make sense. If you complain
> about toothache to your dentist, saying something like "I feel pain",
> you would not be happy if your dentist answers by "that is your
> assumption". We can feel sense, we never assume it. Then I want an
> explanation of the relation between sense and our bodies/universe, but
> you don't address the point.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
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