On Monday, March 3, 2014 1:16:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 02 Mar 2014, at 17:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Sunday, March 2, 2014 3:50:07 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 01 Mar 2014, at 12:24, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, March 1, 2014 1:52:12 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 28 Feb 2014, at 03:22, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, February 27, 2014 8:03:15 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: >>>> >>>> On 28 February 2014 03:02, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> In other words, why, in a functionalist/materialist world would we >>>>> need a breakable program to keep telling us that our hand is not Alien? >>>>> >>>>> Or contrariwise, why do you need a breakable programme to tell you >>>> that it's your hand? >>>> >>> >>> Sure, that too. It doesn't make sense functionally. What difference does >>> it make 'who' the hand 'belongs' to, as long as it performs as a hand. >>> >>> >>>> Maybe it isn't always obvious that it's my hand... I believe the brain >>>> has an internal model of the body. I guess without one it wouldn't find it >>>> so easy to control it? A body's quite complicated, after all... >>>> >>> >>> Why should the model include its own non-functional presence though? >>> >>> >>> >>> Because the "model", the machine is not just confronted with its own >>> self-representation, but also with truth, as far as we are. Put >>> differently, because the machine can't conflate []p and []p & p. Only God >>> can do that. >>> >> >> I don't see why self-representation would or could go beyond a simple >> inventory of functions. >> >> >> []p is self representation only. >> But []p & p is not. We can prove that the machine cannot associate >> anything 3p-describable for "[]p & p". It is not a representation, but a >> (meta) link between representation and truth. >> > > Why don't we see such a (meta) link in our own languages? > > > Because we duplicate too slowly, unlike amoeba, which have not the > cognitive abilities to exploit this. > This entails that in natural language we use the same indexical term "I" > for both the 3-I and the 1-I. We say "I lost a tooth" ("3-I") , and "I feel > pain in my mouth (1-I)". Only teleportation and duplication, or deep > reflexion on belief and knowledge, makes clear the difference. It appears > clearly in Theaetetus, and in other fundamental texts. >
When we say "I lost a tooth" what we mean is "In my experience it seems like I lost a tooth". It is still 1-I. We may wake up and find that experience was a dream, in which case we say "I didn't lose a tooth" but mean "In my experience it seems like my previous experience of losing a tooth was a dream", Instead of seeing it in terms of Bp & p, I see it as something like Bp & Bp^e (where e is Euler's number). There is no p, only a tendency toward stability across nested histories of experience as the accumulate. Craig > Bruno > > > PS for reason of scheduling, I will comment only paragraph that I > understand. > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
