On Tuesday, March 4, 2014 3:27:58 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 03 Mar 2014, at 21:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, March 3, 2014 1:16:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 02 Mar 2014, at 17:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, March 2, 2014 3:50:07 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 01 Mar 2014, at 12:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, March 1, 2014 1:52:12 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 28 Feb 2014, at 03:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thursday, February 27, 2014 8:03:15 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On 28 February 2014 03:02, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In other words, why, in a functionalist/materialist world would we
>>>>>> need a breakable program to keep telling us that our hand is not Alien?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Or contrariwise, why do you need a breakable programme to tell you
>>>>> that it's your hand?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Sure, that too. It doesn't make sense functionally. What difference
>>>> does it make 'who' the hand 'belongs' to, as long as it performs as a hand.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Maybe it isn't always obvious that it's my hand... I believe the brain
>>>>> has an internal model of the body. I guess without one it wouldn't find
>>>>> it
>>>>> so easy to control it? A body's quite complicated, after all...
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Why should the model include its own non-functional presence though?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Because the "model", the machine is not just confronted with its own
>>>> self-representation, but also with truth, as far as we are. Put
>>>> differently, because the machine can't conflate []p and []p & p. Only God
>>>> can do that.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I don't see why self-representation would or could go beyond a simple
>>> inventory of functions.
>>>
>>>
>>> []p is self representation only.
>>> But []p & p is not. We can prove that the machine cannot associate
>>> anything 3p-describable for "[]p & p". It is not a representation, but a
>>> (meta) link between representation and truth.
>>>
>>
>> Why don't we see such a (meta) link in our own languages?
>>
>>
>> Because we duplicate too slowly, unlike amoeba, which have not the
>> cognitive abilities to exploit this.
>> This entails that in natural language we use the same indexical term "I"
>> for both the 3-I and the 1-I. We say "I lost a tooth" ("3-I") , and "I feel
>> pain in my mouth (1-I)". Only teleportation and duplication, or deep
>> reflexion on belief and knowledge, makes clear the difference. It appears
>> clearly in Theaetetus, and in other fundamental texts.
>>
>
> When we say "I lost a tooth" what we mean is "In my experience it seems
> like I lost a tooth". It is still 1-I. We may wake up and find that
> experience was a dream, in which case we say "I didn't lose a tooth" but
> mean "In my experience it seems like my previous experience of losing a
> tooth was a dream",
>
>
> Funny but irrelevant. Like Clark can always avoid a question on the
> 1-views, by jumping out of his body and adding a 3 (passing from some
> 1-1-1 view to a 3-1-1-1 view for example), you can always add a 1 on any
> view, like you do here. But in the argument we were assuming the 3p view at
> the start.
>
I'm not adding a 1 view, I'm giving a literal description of the
phenomenon. There is no expectation of 3p unless that expectation is
provided by the 1p. We were not assuming the 3p view at the start though,
since I think that the 3p view is only realized as a (Bp-x/Bp)(x/Bp+x/Bp),
never as a stand-alone perspective.
>
>
>
> Instead of seeing it in terms of Bp & p, I see it as something like Bp &
> Bp^e (where e is Euler's number).
>
>
> ???
>
Yes. My view is that there is no "p" other than as a representation within
some "Bp". Truth is a measure of the length of the trail of experiences
leading back closer and closer to the capacity for sense itself. Short
trails present the truth of superficial, disconnected sensations. Long
trails present profoundly unifying states of consciousness.
>
>
> There is no p, only a tendency toward stability across nested histories of
> experience as the accumulate.
>
>
> If there is no p, there is no truth, and we waste our time when doing
> research.
>
No, there is truth, but it is not a separate perfect thing, it's more like
the mass of experience. Truth is a measure of how much sense is made of
what makes sense already.
> I begin to think I waste my time trying to get you back to research
> instead of your hopelessly negative and destructive quasi-racist personal
> reification.
>
I can see your research as hopelessly naive and potentially destructive as
well, as to me, it conflates the personal with a reified impersonal and
presents a quasi-racist arithmetic supremacy. I wouldn't hold that against
you though. You could still be right, I just happen to think that my view
makes more sense in defining the basic points.
Craig
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>
>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>> PS for reason of scheduling, I will comment only paragraph that I
>> understand.
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
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