On 03 Mar 2014, at 21:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, March 3, 2014 1:16:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Mar 2014, at 17:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, March 2, 2014 3:50:07 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Mar 2014, at 12:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, March 1, 2014 1:52:12 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Feb 2014, at 03:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, February 27, 2014 8:03:15 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
On 28 February 2014 03:02, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>
wrote:
In other words, why, in a functionalist/materialist world would
we need a breakable program to keep telling us that our hand is
not Alien?
Or contrariwise, why do you need a breakable programme to tell
you that it's your hand?
Sure, that too. It doesn't make sense functionally. What
difference does it make 'who' the hand 'belongs' to, as long as
it performs as a hand.
Maybe it isn't always obvious that it's my hand... I believe the
brain has an internal model of the body. I guess without one it
wouldn't find it so easy to control it? A body's quite
complicated, after all...
Why should the model include its own non-functional presence
though?
Because the "model", the machine is not just confronted with its
own self-representation, but also with truth, as far as we are.
Put differently, because the machine can't conflate []p and []p &
p. Only God can do that.
I don't see why self-representation would or could go beyond a
simple inventory of functions.
[]p is self representation only.
But []p & p is not. We can prove that the machine cannot associate
anything 3p-describable for "[]p & p". It is not a representation,
but a (meta) link between representation and truth.
Why don't we see such a (meta) link in our own languages?
Because we duplicate too slowly, unlike amoeba, which have not the
cognitive abilities to exploit this.
This entails that in natural language we use the same indexical term
"I" for both the 3-I and the 1-I. We say "I lost a tooth" ("3-I") ,
and "I feel pain in my mouth (1-I)". Only teleportation and
duplication, or deep reflexion on belief and knowledge, makes clear
the difference. It appears clearly in Theaetetus, and in other
fundamental texts.
When we say "I lost a tooth" what we mean is "In my experience it
seems like I lost a tooth". It is still 1-I. We may wake up and find
that experience was a dream, in which case we say "I didn't lose a
tooth" but mean "In my experience it seems like my previous
experience of losing a tooth was a dream",
Funny but irrelevant. Like Clark can always avoid a question on the 1-
views, by jumping out of his body and adding a 3 (passing from some
1-1-1 view to a 3-1-1-1 view for example), you can always add a 1 on
any view, like you do here. But in the argument we were assuming the
3p view at the start.
Instead of seeing it in terms of Bp & p, I see it as something like
Bp & Bp^e (where e is Euler's number).
???
There is no p, only a tendency toward stability across nested
histories of experience as the accumulate.
If there is no p, there is no truth, and we waste our time when doing
research. I begin to think I waste my time trying to get you back to
research instead of your hopelessly negative and destructive quasi-
racist personal reification.
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
PS for reason of scheduling, I will comment only paragraph that I
understand.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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