On 01 Mar 2014, at 12:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, March 1, 2014 1:52:12 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Feb 2014, at 03:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, February 27, 2014 8:03:15 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
On 28 February 2014 03:02, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
In other words, why, in a functionalist/materialist world would we
need a breakable program to keep telling us that our hand is not
Alien?
Or contrariwise, why do you need a breakable programme to tell you
that it's your hand?
Sure, that too. It doesn't make sense functionally. What difference
does it make 'who' the hand 'belongs' to, as long as it performs as
a hand.
Maybe it isn't always obvious that it's my hand... I believe the
brain has an internal model of the body. I guess without one it
wouldn't find it so easy to control it? A body's quite complicated,
after all...
Why should the model include its own non-functional presence though?
Because the "model", the machine is not just confronted with its own
self-representation, but also with truth, as far as we are. Put
differently, because the machine can't conflate []p and []p & p.
Only God can do that.
I don't see why self-representation would or could go beyond a
simple inventory of functions.
[]p is self representation only.
But []p & p is not. We can prove that the machine cannot associate
anything 3p-describable for "[]p & p". It is not a representation, but
a (meta) link between representation and truth.
It seems a clear double standard to suggest on one hand that once a
substitution level is met there can be no difference between your
sun in law and a natural person, but on the other hand you are
saying that of course machines can tell a difference between two
identical functions just because one of them feels alien.
It is justified in all details. Follow the "math" thread, perhaps. It
is certainly a subtle point.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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