On Thursday, March 6, 2014 12:32:32 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 06 Mar 2014, at 16:40, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: > > Did you mean to address me, or did you mean to address Chris? > > I don't object to any step in UDA. It seems internally consistent and > plausible to me. I'm unsure what level of confidence I would assign to it > being actually true, although my gut feeling is in the vicinity of 25%. > > > A reasoning is 100% valid, or invalid. Do you mean that the truth of the > premise, comp, is in the vicinity of 25%. making perhaps its neoplatonist > consequences in the vicinity of 25% ? > > I will make a confession: for me comp only oscillates between the false > and the unbelievable. >
Yes, that's what I mean. An argument on its own merits is presumably either valid or invalid, and either sound or unsound. Regarding UDA's soundness: I have no problem saying Yes Doctor. Similarly I have no problem with the Church thesis. But when it comes to Arithmetical Realism, I don't know of any convincing reasons to believe it. There are other options that seem just as sensible, and there's always the possibility that reality is quite unlike any of the ideas that seem sensible to us. In the usual Bayesian sense of probability it's fine to place a bet with a level of confidence between 0 and 1 even on fully determined unique events like whether AR is true. My bet would be about 25%. If someday I survive a bomb blast by quantum tunneling to safety, then I'll update to virtually 100%. :) Regarding validly, it's also the case that I don't have complete confidence that when I perceive an argument to be valid it actually is valid. For me this wariness developed in response to having been religious for many years in a way I no longer think was rationally justified, even if it seemed so at the time. UDA looks valid to me but it shares many of the features of other metaphysical arguments that I find suspicious, so I remain a bit suspicious of my capacity to judge it without succumbing to biases. I'd bet nearly 1 but not 1 on its validity. -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
