On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 8:21:58 PM UTC, [email protected] wrote: > > > On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 9:19:52 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 17 Mar 2014, at 23:19, [email protected] wrote: > > > On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:46:23 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:03, [email protected] wrote: > > > > I am not sure if I have any clue where we would differ, nor if that has > any relevance with the reasoning I suggest, to formulate a problem, and > reduce one problem into another.ia > > > Well, I do differ in general on the view that Science - why it worked - > has been understood. I also differ on the idea that philosophy - which is > pre-scientific or non-scientific - can explain science. The problem is that > logically....just the act of doing philosophy on science, pre-assumes that > philosophy *can* explain science. I mean....do you really think that if, as > it turned out, philosophy cahnnot explain science, that doing philosophy on > science would actually reveal that? no! the philosopher would find an > explanation. > > So just doing philosophy on science pre-assumes the answer to the > question. > > > I can agree. I don't believe in "philosophy". Nor do I really believe in > "science". I believe in scientific attitude, and it has no relation with > the domaon involved. Some astrolog can be more scientific than some > astronomers. > > The problem is that since theology has been excluded from academy, > "science" is presented very often as a pseudo-theology, with its God (very > often a primitive physical universe), etc. > > > > There's two camps Bruno. One is that science was just an extension of > philosophy, among other things. Almost everyone is in this camp, whether > explicitly or by default. > > > Many believe that philosophy is an extension, sometimes without rigor, of > science. > > > > The other camp is that something fundamental, and profound, happened with > science, that is extremely mysterious and unresolved. > > > With science and with "conscience", I can agree with that. In the comp > theory, it is the birth of the universal (Löbian) machine. The singling out > of the "[]", from the arithmetical reality. > > > > Membership of either camp is an act of faith. I'm in the second camp. > Sometimes I wonder if I'm the only one. > > > I might feel to be more in "the second camp" myself, except that precisely > here, computationalism explains what happens, somehow. > > > > > > You do look unhappy with something, apparently related to comp, or to the > UDA, or to AUDA? > > > Absolutely not. I've recently concluded my personal work on the wider > matter. It's been hugely valuable. Talking to you has been a part of it. > > > Thanks for reassuring me. > > > > I would like to give you something back...maybe I feel frustrated that I > can't get you to see what I am saying. > > > We might be closer than you thought, especially from above. > > > > > But never unhappy with you or your work. I'm very appreciative that you > talk to me at all. I'm not careful with what I say. I touch type about > 100wpm and rarely check what I said before posting. I'm sorry if that is > conveying an impression of not being happy. It isn't the case I assure you. > If I was unhappy, or I thought you were, I'd leave you alone. You don't owe > me anything...I'd consider it very rude to put emotional shit onto you. > > > OK. No problem. > > > > I just try sincerely to understand your point. > > > I know > > > OK. Keep in mind, that I am really a sort of simple minded scientist. I > understand only mathematical theories, and, when applied, I believe to > criterion of testability, or to the simplification they provide to already > tested theories. > > > > > ? > Case is both mathematic standard, and theoretical computer science > standard. > > > These aren't the parts that matter. It's possible to use math in > philosophy. It's possible to do philosophy of computing. The part that > matters is the analysis of the philosophy and the nature of the refutation. > > I didn't write the refutation to be a proper standard of argument. I > wrote for you....because I thought you'd get it. > > > > > I would not classify this as philosophy (a word which has different > meaning from one university to another one). > > > > > > How many different methodologies are used in the course of producing all > those definitions? > > If science is fundamentally different in 'kind' then the differences in > method only count at the core. So if that's your hunch t > Much more recently and still emerging is - at least with me - you proving just a tad intellectually slippery as to what you do and don't believe. and what you have and have not said, understood when I have said, etc. Then - the notion of Computation being intrinsically conscious - a basic assaumption that I'[d call a major recurrent theme of computionralism over a pretty long period. A lot o.f your friends have said they buy it. Russll has said it a few times. And so have you....more than a few. That with the fact on you've not challenged it ever, not once. I still remember back maybe in the 1990's, having to keep a sick bucket nearby, for every tirme some daft comp scientist wheeled himself out to say consciousness was purely about processing speed. Remember that one? That was pretty big in its day. I remember the same expressions and the solemnlu offered corrections every time I pointed out it was just totally groundless and thoughtless. Same corrections "This would seem to suggest not-comp" That one seems quiety dropped now. But for old time's sake Bruno, hand on heart, was that something you were saying too? If the answer is paradoxical then how about coming out against it...is that something you also did? ou... It just cannot be the right way to go about things....or maybe these two instances aren't tycical of what you do, If they were, it'd quickly become meaningless what you thought you had been shown right about in the fullness of time, how consistently you'd held onto a key set of ideas, how rigourous you thought your logic was. All of require the same things you can be shown right about, to show you wrong about also,
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