On 22 Mar 2014, at 17:30, [email protected] wrote:
On Thursday, March 20, 2014 1:38:07 AM UTC, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Mar 19, 2014 at 03:53:02PM -0700, [email protected] wrote:
>
> Then - the notion of Computation being intrinsically conscious -
a basic
> assaumption that I'[d call a major recurrent theme of
computionralism over
> a pretty long period. A lot o.f your friends have said they buy
it. Russll
> has said it a few times.
I have not "bought" the idea that computation is intrinsically
conscious. I do not believe that the emacs process I'm typing this
email into is in any way conscious, for example.
I do accept, for the sake of argument, the possibility that
consciousness is a computational process, or can be implemented in
one. This is COMP. I don't believe it, and certainly have somne
reservations about it.
But I do buy the UDA, and its conclusion of reversal. In fact I think
its conclusion probably remains valid, even if you relax COMP to a
more general functionalism position (not Putnam's functionalism, mind
you, but the more usual variety), although this has more to do with
observers finding themselves in the Library of Babel, as one cannot
rely on the Church Thesis as one does with the UDA.
Cheers
I would accept consciousness is a computational process, if the term
'computational' were stripped right down to its bare bones, with all
assumptions removed that link the term to computing concepts as they
stand at the moment.
?????????????????
(this seems to me nonsensical). Computing is a standard notion on
which all experts agree? You are not pointing on assumption but on
definition, except for Church thesis which belongs to the intersection
of math and philosophy.
But that would mean specifically not assuming it's a possibility for
software compiled and run on hardware currently in play.
?
I'd be interested to hear your view about this (and Bruno's)
I think you are just assuming that Church thesis might be false. That
would not change the comp results, but it would make comp less general
than it is, with CT.
Bruno
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