On Thursday, March 20, 2014 1:38:07 AM UTC, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Wed, Mar 19, 2014 at 03:53:02PM -0700, [email protected] > <javascript:>wrote: > > > > Then - the notion of Computation being intrinsically conscious - a > basic > > assaumption that I'[d call a major recurrent theme of computionralism > over > > a pretty long period. A lot o.f your friends have said they buy it. > Russll > > has said it a few times. > > I have not "bought" the idea that computation is intrinsically > conscious. I do not believe that the emacs process I'm typing this > email into is in any way conscious, for example. > > I do accept, for the sake of argument, the possibility that > consciousness is a computational process, or can be implemented in > one. This is COMP. I don't believe it, and certainly have somne > reservations about it. > > But I do buy the UDA, and its conclusion of reversal. In fact I think > its conclusion probably remains valid, even if you relax COMP to a > more general functionalism position (not Putnam's functionalism, mind > you, but the more usual variety), although this has more to do with > observers finding themselves in the Library of Babel, as one cannot > rely on the Church Thesis as one does with the UDA. > > Cheers > I would accept consciousness is a computational process, if the term 'computational' were stripped right down to its bare bones, with all assumptions removed that link the term to computing concepts as they stand at the moment. But that would mean specifically not assuming it's a possibility for software compiled and run on hardware currently in play. I'd be interested to hear your view about this (and Bruno's)
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